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 Preface 
 
My journey started 10 years ago when I decided to study Economics at the VU 
University. Considering you are reading this thesis you must understand that this 
decision turned out quite well for me. 
In my fourth and last year at the VU University, I felt that I learned enough from 
books and that it was time to explore what I could do with all this knowledge I had 
accumulated over the years. This motivated me to find an internship and combine this 
with writing my master thesis. To this day, I am grateful that I met Mauro 
Mastrogiacomo who arranged an internship for me at the CPB (Netherlands Bureau of 
Economic Policy Analysis). What followed was a snowball effect of progress, both on a 
personal and professional level. After the internship of 6 months, which involved 
research on the Dutch pension system, I got the chance to work for the OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) located in Paris, France. 
Together with a diverse group of skilled people, we created a measurement tool for 
trade in services barriers in order to help policy-makers identify areas of strengths 
and weaknesses for OECD member countries in certain sectors. One year later, 
in 2009, I came back to the Netherlands to start a new chapter in my life involving a 
PhD project at the Department of Spatial Economics. This dissertation is the result of 
these last four years. 
While I was in Paris, I kept in touch with a few dear classmates from the university. 
It was one of those contacts, Christiaan Behrens, who persuaded me to apply for one 
of the PhD projects that were available at that time at the Department of Spatial 
Economics. All these projects involved topics which I had very limited knowledge of. 
However, there was one particular project which caught my attention: ǲThe economic 
valuation of cultural heritageǳ. I read the proposal, applied for one of the subprojects, 
got accepted, moved back to the Netherlands, and started the project in January 2009. 
From that moment onwards, Piet Rietveld and Jan Rouwendal became my 
supervisors. I am very grateful that they brought me in a very special environment 
and guided me along the way. Their faith in me and their willingness to increase my 
knowledge made my progression and, finally, this dissertation possible. In particular, I 
would like to thank Jan Rouwendal for the inspiring discussions and the many things 
he taught me about the wonderful world of urban economics, which I had very limited 
knowledge of 4 years ago. 
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Although, I started working alone in a room on the 14th floor (far away from the 
department, which was located at the 4th floor), it did not take long before I was fully 
integrated into the department. The members of the Department of Spatial Economics 
offers a pleasant working environment, where both personal- and research-related 
discussions are possible and I would like to thank all who were involved in these 
discussions. After a few months I moved from the 14th floor to the 4th. There are a few 
colleagues who I want to mention as they were stuck with me in the same room. They 
are Jessie, Mediha, Faroek and Tom. I want to thank them for the many conversations 
and dealing with my presence daily. 
After a year, Jessie and I were chosen to replace the existing party committee 
members of the department. We made sure that there were a lot of events in the 
upcoming two years. We organized many drinks, birthday parties, active events, 
cultural events, Christmas dinners, et cetera to keep our colleagues happy and 
entertained. I want to sincerely thank Jessie for being my Ǯpartner in crimeǯ organizing 
all these events. I believe we did a great job and substantially contributed to the 
special environment of the department. 
I gratefully acknowledge Platform 31 (formerly known as NICIS Institute), VU 
University and all participating municipalities for financial support and my committee 
members for approving this dissertation: Jos Bazelmans, Jaap Boter, Pieter Gautier, 
Allen Klaiber, Sako Musterd, and Jos van Ommeren. 
Following on a more personal note, I would like to thank my friends that have stood 
by my side. In no particular order, Jeroen, Gerwin, Omer, Ornan and others that I have 
not named, you have contributed in an indirect way to this thesis and I thank you. 
Chris, this year we know each other for a decade. What started as classmates who 
commuted to the university together, developed into a friendship. You visited me in 
Paris, you brought me into contact with the VU University where we became 
colleagues, and you even agreed to share an apartment with me, which is very close to 
the VU (thanks to Elfie). I am happy you agreed to be my paranymph for my upcoming 
defense. 
I am lucky to have an amazing family. I want to thank the ones who closely followed 
my actions with a lot of interest. A few names should be mentioned explicitly. Ruud 
and Anneke, I do not only want to thank you for your interest and support in my 
research, but also for accepting me in your house every weekend. I want to mention 
my great sister, Suzanne. I am very proud of you. I am also very grateful that you were 
always there when I needed you, even if I asked you to check my Dutch and English in 
texts, while you were studying hard to get your own degree. I also want to mention my 
parents, Gerard and Hanneke. A simple Ǯthank youǯ would not be enough. Your love, 
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support, and interest, not only in my research, are very much appreciated. I am proud 
to say that you have made me what I am today.  
Above all, I would like to thank my dear girlfriend, Mariska. I am very happy to 
have you by my side from the start of this project. It was not always easy for you. First, 
you had to miss me for a year when I lived in Paris. Then, you had to endure my deep 
involvement in my PhD project. Your love, support and all the other things we do 
keeps me motivated every day. 
 
Mark van Duijn 
Amsterdam, March 2013 
 
 
 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 SETTING THE SCENE  
The location choice of households has faced many changes over time. Declining 
transport costs, technological advances in information and communication systems, 
and a persistent growth of welfare have caused many of these changes in the 20th 
century. These developments have made the job location of the head of the household 
less important for the location choice of households. Where urban economics treat 
cities traditionally as good for production, we observe that the role of consumption is 
becoming more and more prominent in cities (Glaeser, Kolko & Saiz, 2001). That 
implies that local amenities, that improve the attractiveness of a residential location, 
have become more important for the location choice of households. 
Economists are interested in household preferences that explain why households 
locate where they locate, given their relevance to many central issues in applied 
economics. The literature that follows Tiebout's seminal work (1956) suggests that 
preferences for local public goods shape the way that households sort in the housing 
market. Nowadays, we believe that a broader set of goods influences the sorting 
process. For example, in the literature we find amenity-based theory that provides 
evidence that the location of different types of households depend on the provision of 
these amenities (Brueckner, Thisse & Zenou, 1999). This then explains why the city 
center of Paris is rich and the city center of Detroit poor. As a consequence, policy 
makers see the provision of local amenities as a way to attract population, especially 
highly educated individuals and their employers. 
It is therefore not surprising that local governments invest in housing and local 
amenities to improve the quality of life in their city. For economists, it is interesting 
where they invest and what the externalities are of such investments. In particular, 
we are concerned with the impact of these investments on residential areas. 
Considering all the factors described above, heterogeneous households choose 
their location to live in houses of different quality and in areas with a specific set of 
characteristics. Each of these houses experience different house price developments 
over time. These mechanisms are complex and need to be studied carefully to 
understand the dynamics of the housing market and the location choice of 
households. We cannot address all mechanisms but the purpose of this dissertation is 
to investigate some aspects of these mechanics. 
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1.2 CONTEXT  
In this dissertation, we will mainly focus on a specific type of local amenities namely 
cultural heritage. Following the definition of the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 1972), cultural heritage can be divided 
into three groups and we quote: 
? Monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and 
painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, 
cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding 
universal value from the point of view of history, art or science. 
? Groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, 
because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the 
landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of 
history, art or science. 
? Sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas 
including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from 
the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view. 
In other words, cultural heritage is a complicated amenity. In the first place, the 
value of cultural heritage Ȃ like most nonmarket goods Ȃ cannot be easily expressed 
in monetary terms. Moreover, cultural heritage is highly heterogeneous. There are 
several studies which discuss methods to value cultural heritage and underline the 
complications of such a task (For example, Navrud & Ready, 2002, and 
Throsby, 2003).1 Secondly, cultural heritage can determine the image of a city, or it 
can also be seen as a local public good that improves the quality of life in a city. This 
provides a specific atmosphere that attracts many other (endogenous) amenities, 
such as commercial shopping centers, restaurants, musea, et cetera. This suggests 
that cultural heritage may have a multiplier effect through its impact on these other 
amenities. This makes it difficult to disentangle the value of cultural heritage from 
those other amenities. Finally, it is difficult, if not impossible, for local governments to 
create cultural heritage on the short-term. For example, the redevelopment of 
industrial heritage can take decades as was the case of the Western gas factory in 
Amsterdam. 
A large part of this dissertation makes use of quantitative methods to determine 
the economic value of cultural heritage. We find it therefore important to clearly set 
out what measures we use for cultural heritage. In this dissertation, we mainly make 
use of the location and size of conservation areas and the number of listed built 
                                                          
1 For other empirical studies, see Asabere et al. (1989), Schaeffer & Millerick (1991), Clark & Herrin 
(1997), Coulson & Leichenko (2001), Coulson & Lahr (2005), Ahlfeldt & Maennig (2010), Lazrak et al. 
(2011), Koster et al. (2013). 
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heritage. In the Netherlands, the designation of conservation areas is determined by 
the national government. These conservation areas are defined as 'groups of 
immovable objects which are of public interest because of their beauty, their spatial and 
structural coherence or their cultural and historical value and which include at least 
one monument' (The Monuments and Historic Buildings Act 1998). Policies 
concerning conservation areas began to rise in the 1960s. In the Netherlands, the first 
conservation area was appointed in 1965. The United States established the National 
Historic Preservation Act in 1966. In the United Kingdom, the concept of conservation 
areas was first introduced by the Civic Amenities Act in 1967. The number of 
conservation areas is still continuously growing.  
 
 
Figure 1.1. Protected historical areas in the Netherlands 
Source: RCE (2012), own graph. 
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Figure 1.1 gives an overview of the location and size of the protected historical 
areas in the Netherlands. It contains around 450 different areas which are divided 
into four groups. The assigned conservation areas are divided into historic city 
centers and historic sceneries. The location of the conservation areas are spread 
across the Netherlands. The largest areas can be found in the Randstad area, located 
in the western part of the country including Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and 
Utrecht as its main cities. If these historic city centers and historic sceneries are of 
value to its residents and, therefore, improve the quality of life in an area, it may be 
that these amenities are an important factor for the location choice of households. 
We are fully aware that the indicators we just described are not perfect. 
Conservation areas got their status after a long selection procedure. They have to 
satisfy a long list of requirements before they get selected. In this way, we expect that 
we pick up the most important aspect of cultural heritage that improves the quality of 
life, namely its atmosphere on surrounding residential areas.2 With the available data, 
we can divide the conservation areas into two groups. 
The estimation of the economic value of cultural heritage on surrounding 
residential areas has concentrated on house prices. The hedonic framework is a 
useful tool to show that housing characteristics and neighborhood amenities have a 
measurable and statistically significant impact on house prices. An important 
limitation of the hedonic framework is that it takes the house prices as a starting 
point of the analysis. Partly in response to this concern of the hedonic framework, 
recent literature developed a framework that focuses on household location choice in 
equilibrium, the sorting framework. The sorting framework explicitly models the 
interaction of demand and supply that results in a price equilibrium, and house prices 
are therefore endogenously determined. This implies that the equilibrium locations 
and the associated house prices (which define the hedonic framework) are no longer 
the starting point of the analysis, but its outcome. In addition, the sorting framework 
accounts for unobserved amenities and it incorporates heterogeneity of household 
preferences in the Tiebout tradition. The general equilibrium structure of the sorting 
framework allows for estimating willingness-to-pay (WTP) of different types of 
households on a variety of local amenities. Furthermore, it allows for policy 
simulations, in which the general equilibrium impact of changes in the value of these 
amenities can be analyzed through counterfactual analysis. 
Heterogeneity in household preferences for a particular location or house plays a 
central position in this dissertation. Not only cultural heritage itself is heterogeneous, 
but also the value attached to it is heterogeneous between individuals. If certain types 
of households are attracted to residential areas with cultural heritage, which 
                                                          
2 In the empirical analyses, we also use the number of listed built heritage as a robustness test. 
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improves their quality of life, they should be willing to pay more for housing in such a 
location than in other locations without cultural heritage. The WTP for cultural 
heritage is presumably different between different types of households. 
If highly educated and high income households are indeed attracted by such local 
amenities, policy makers have a tool to attract this type of households. They will be 
inclined to invest in local amenities and the type of houses that those households 
prefer. There are many examples of how local governments invest in urban 
redevelopment projects to improve the area, and therefore improve the quality of life. 
It is therefore interesting to investigate these externalities on surrounding residential 
areas. Again, if the improvement in quality of life in a residential area increases the 
housing demand, house prices will increase given the (fixed) housing supply. 
The dynamics of the housing market brings us another topic, in which we pay some 
attention to in this dissertation. It is a stylized fact that houses of different quality 
experience different price developments over time. The typical pattern is that luxury 
houses appreciate more in boom periods and depreciate more during busts than 
houses of lesser quality. The Netherlands experienced a boom period where house 
prices rose during the 1990s until 2007. In 2007 house prices started to depreciate in 
the Dutch housing market and this bust is still going on. This sets the scene for 
investigating diverging house prices caused by income shocks, both theoretically and 
empirically. Earlier explanations of this phenomenon relied on down-payment effects. 
However, in the Netherlands, where down-payment effects are negligible,3 we also 
observe diverging house price developments. It is well-known that there is a strong 
relationship between income and housing quality: households sort over houses of 
different qualities on the basis of their income. If, during an economic boom, income 
prospects improve, demand shifts from the lower quality houses to the higher quality 
houses. This results in diverging price movements of these types of housing. 
This dissertation focuses on the themes of location choice, economic valuation of 
cultural heritage, and the housing market in the Netherlands. In an innovative way, it 
provides research on location preferences of different types of households; it 
develops an alternative way to value nonmarket goods, such as cultural heritage; it 
shows how the housing market responds to changes in neighborhood characteristics 
and income shocks. 
 
                                                          
3 Almost all first-time buyers make use of cheaply available mortgage insurance that allows for a loan-
to-value ratio that is higher than 100%. For other buyers the down-payment requirement is usually 
not a problem, since they can use the revenues of selling their current house. 
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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
Recent methodological developments have allowed researchers to improve their 
quantitative models, and therefore improve their understanding of the dynamics of 
the housing market and the location choice of households. In this dissertation, we will 
study some of these models, apply them, and eventually extend them in the context of 
the Netherlands. In this section, we set out several research questions that will be 
addressed in the following chapters. 
Our empirical work aims to answer the following main- and sub-questions: 
1. What is the contribution of cultural heritage to the location choice of Dutch 
households? 
o What is the relationship between the WTP for cultural heritage and 
household characteristics? 
o What would happen to house prices if cultural heritage would be equally 
distributed over the Netherlands? 
2. What is the effect of urban redevelopment of Brownfield sites on surrounding 
residential areas? 
3. What is the impact of income shocks in the price developments of houses of 
different quality? 
 
1.4 OVERVIEW  
The schematic representation of the organization of this dissertation is given in 
Figure 1.2. It consists of an introduction, five research chapters, and a conclusion. 
Chapter 2 places the current research on location choice models into context by 
exploring sorting models that are most often used in the literature. The focus is not 
only on policy-relevant questions, but also on the economic content of the models, 
and to some important econometric issues involved. 
In an empirical setting, Chapter 3 describes the horizontal sorting model and uses 
it to determine the important factors of location choice of households in the 
Netherlands. Combining household characteristics with municipality characteristics 
allows investigating the WTP of different types of households on municipality 
characteristics, such as cultural heritage. We extend the model by using spatial 
econometrics and spatially lagged independent variables. The chapter also gives 
some insights on what would happen to house prices in the Netherlands if cultural 
heritage would be equally distributed over the municipalities. In our knowledge, this 
is the first empirical evidence about the impact of cultural heritage on the 
attractiveness of cities, and it suggests that its impact is large. 
Chapter 4 follows up by using the same methodology to investigate the location 
choice of Dutch households with different incomes and social economic status. We 
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focus on a smaller choice set, namely the Amsterdam area, and use neighborhoods as 
our spatial unit. We find, for instance, that high income homeowners Ȃ compared to 
the average household Ȃ prefer to reside in neighborhoods inside the historical area. 
Furthermore, we provide strong evidence that the multiplier effect exists with respect 
to the relationship between the historic city center and the concentration of high 
income households. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the house price developments between residential areas 
before and after the redevelopment of a Brownfield site, where the Western gas 
factory is located. There is little research on the impact of Brownfield redevelopment 
on surrounding residential areas. The redevelopment of the Amsterdam Western gas 
factory provides us with a Ǯnaturalǯ experiment in which we follow house price 
developments of surrounding residential areas before and after the opening of the 
Westerpark and renovation of the real estate of Western gas factory in 2003. We use a 
hedonic analysis to analyze whether the increase in house prices of nearby residential 
areas were caused by the investments made into the urban redevelopment of a 
former industrial area within the city of Amsterdam. In addition, we also compare the 
house price developments of houses north and south of the Western gas factory. 
Because the Western gas factory and the residential area north of it are separated by 
a railway, one could argue that this is a barrier for the spillover effects caused by the 
redevelopment of the Western gas factory. We show that this is not the case and that 
there is indeed a proximity effect, where both residential areas benefit from the 
redevelopment of the Western gas factory. 
In a theoretical setting, Chapter 6 provides an explanation why houses of lower 
and higher quality experience different house price developments followed by some 
empirical evidence. The explanation for the diverging price developments we put 
forward is closely related to the fact that higher income households tend to live in 
more expensive housing. In the stylized model we develop, there is perfect 
correlation between household income and housing quality. When (permanent) 
incomes shift upward, housing demand shifts from the lower quality houses to the 
higher quality houses. Since the housing stock is given in the short run, this implies 
upward pressure on the prices of better quality housing and downward pressure (at 
least in a relative sense) on the prices of lower quality housing. A downward shift in 
incomes results in the opposite shifts in demand. To show the relevance of these 
predictions, we document the increasing convexity of the price-quality relationship 
during the boom period 1995-2007, and the reverse movement in the years that 
followed. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the main findings of the dissertation in which it links the 
conclusions of each chapter back to the research questions which were set out above. 
8 | Chapter 1 
We also provide policy implications and suggest further research on the themes 
discussed in this dissertation. 
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1.5 CONTRIBUTIONS  
In our knowledge, this dissertation significantly contributes to the existing literature 
in several ways. We use the sorting framework to estimate the economic value of 
cultural heritage for Dutch residents. We extend the sorting framework by including 
spatial spillover effects. We propose a first step to identify the multiplier effect 
regarding cultural heritage. We simulate how house prices change if cultural heritage 
was equally distributed in the Netherlands and in the Amsterdam area (Chapters 2, 3 
and 4). Furthermore, we elaborate on the impact of redeveloping former industrial 
(Brownfield) sites on the house price development of surrounding residential areas 
(Chapter 5). Finally, we develop new insights to explain price developments of houses 
of different quality (Chapter 6). 
 
 
 2 ANALYSIS OF HOUSEHOLD LOCATION 
BEHAVIOR, LOCAL AMENITIES AND HOUSE PRICES 
IN A SORTING FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION4 
A substantial amount of our time is spent in the houses in which we live and in the 
neighborhoods in which they are located. Since there are substantial differences 
between houses and neighborhoods, and large transaction costs are associated with 
moving, the choice of a dwelling and its location is an important determinant of our 
welfare. It is therefore also of substantial interest for urban policy-makers and social 
scientists to know what drives these choices and their outcomes. 
Economists have concentrated on prices as a relevant indicator, and, especially 
after Rosenǯs (1974) seminal paper, hedonic analysis became the most important tool 
of analysis for urban housing market issues. Early examples are 
Freeman (1974, 1979), Harrison & Rubinfeld (1978), Witte, Sumka & Erekson (1979), 
Quigley (1982) and Palmquist (1984).5 It has been shown that many housing 
characteristics and neighborhood amenities have a measurable and statistically 
significant impact on house prices. The natural interpretation of these results is that 
they reflect the care taken by households when making their dwelling choices, and it 
enables the researcher to derive the marginal willingness-to-pay (WTP) for housing 
or neighborhood attributes. 
In the course of time, however, some limitations of conventional hedonic price 
analysis became apparent. An important one is that it takes the house prices as a 
starting point of the analysis. Rosenǯs (1974) analysis suggests that the hedonic price 
function should be interpreted as an equilibrium in a market in which heterogeneous 
consumers and producers interact. It follows then that the whole hedonic price 
function (and the implied marginal prices) may change as a consequence of changes 
in demand or supply. In other words, the marginal prices measured by hedonic 
analysis cannot be interpreted Ȃ at least not without further restrictive assumptions 
(see, e.g. Bajari & Benkard, 2005) Ȃ as structural parameters of consumer 
preferences. The hedonic price function, which describes a market equilibrium at a 
particular time, cannot be expected to be stable over time or space. Consequently, it is 
                                                          
4 The present chapter is based on Van Duijn & Rouwendal (2012), published in a special issue (New 
directions in housing economics) of Journal of Property Research. 
5 For a comprehensive review of hedonic methods, see Palmquist (1991) or Sheppard (1999). 
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difficult to do a counterfactual analysis of policy measures like the introduction of a 
significant change in urban amenities on the basis of a hedonic analysis. Since many 
types of urban policy use changes in amenities (parks, museums and availability of 
public transport) as their instruments, this implies a serious limitation of hedonic 
analysis for the purposes of policy evaluation. 
Partly in response to these concerns, a new branch of literature has been 
developed that focuses on household location choice in an equilibrium framework. In 
these models, the interaction of demand and supply that results in a price equilibrium 
is modeled explicitly, and house prices are therefore endogenous. This implies that 
the equilibrium locations and the associated house prices (which together make up a 
hedonic price function) are not the starting point of the analysis, but its outcome. In 
these models, the effect of changes in amenities on house prices can be predicted on 
the basis of underlying demand and supply parameters, which makes them much 
more useful for the purposes of policy analysis than the standard hedonic techniques. 
These newly developed household location choice models connect hedonic 
analysis to a second important branch of the urban housing market literature that 
starts with Tiebout (1956). This seminal paper was written in reaction to 
Samuelsonǯs analysis of the provision of public goods. It emphasized the possibility of 
providing local public goods through a kind of market where consumers Ǯvote with 
their feetǯ and move to neighborhoods that are most attractive for them. Schools are 
the most popular example of local public goods (see, e.g. Bénabou, 1996; Fernandez & 
Rogerson, 1996, 2003; Nechyba, 1999, 2000), but there are, of course, many other 
local amenities (parks, monuments and traditional architecture) that are important 
for the attractiveness of neighborhoods, although not all of them are determined by 
local politicians. The value of such amenities has, of course, been studied many times 
in conventional hedonic analyses, but it is a real advantage of the household location 
choice models that they allow researchers also to study their implications for the 
sorting of households over space. 
This sorting occurs on the basis of preferences and incomes. Heterogeneity of 
preferences is often related to household and individual characteristics, such as the 
presence of children, age, education and ethnicity. The socio-economic composition of 
the neighborhood population thus receives attention in the location choice models. 
This composition is not necessarily only an outcome, but it is probably also important 
as a driver of the sorting process, as it is well known that preferences with respect to 
oneǯs neighbors can have a substantial impact on preferences over neighborhoods. 
The household location choice models offer possibilities to incorporate this aspect as 
well. 
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The monocentric model has been, and still is, the workhorse of urban economic 
analysis (Alonso, 1964; Mills, 1972; Muth, 1969), but its simplicity and elegance are 
closely related to the convenient assumptions of homogeneity of space and 
households, which rule out sorting phenomena. To explain, for instance, why central 
Paris is rich, while central Detroit is poor, Brueckner, Thisse & Zenou (1999) 
introduce local amenities (heterogeneity in space), and distinguish between rich and 
poor households (heterogeneity of households) in an elementary way. This relaxation 
of central assumptions of the monocentric model turns out to have enormous 
implications for the relevance of the analysis to explain the substantial differences 
that we see in the internal structure of cities in the real world. The household location 
choice models discussed here go further along that road, and have already been used 
to deepen our insights into several aspects of the urban economy. The models also 
connect to a more general shift in emphasis among urban economists towards the 
consumption aspects of city life. One of the seminal articles in this respect is Glaeser, 
Kolko & Saiz (2001), who argue, on the basis of a wealth of empirical material, that 
urban consumer amenities are of increasing importance for understanding cities. Not 
only schools, but also shops, restaurants, theatres, cultural heritage and other 
determinants of neighborhood atmosphere are important ingredients of the urban 
residentsǯ well-being. By opening up better ways to incorporate them into the 
analysis of urban housing markets, the newly emerging literature has at least the 
potential to substantially enrich our knowledge of the functioning of cities. 
It is the purpose of this paper to provide an introduction to this active research 
field by discussing the central aspect of sorting models, as well as some of the issues 
that come up in their estimation. This paper is therefore not a literature review in the 
conventional sense of the word. We do not aim to give a reasonably complete 
overview of the literature. The purpose is rather to highlight the potential of the 
models for policy-relevant research through a discussion of the main conceptual 
issues involved. Through this paper, we focus on the literature that appeared since 
the 1990s, but, occasionally, we refer to seminal articles that appeared earlier. In 
Section 2.2, we discuss the structure of the sorting models. The emphasis is on the 
concepts used rather than on the technical details, and we use two papers Ȃ Epple & 
Sieg (1999) and Bayer, McMillan & Rueben (2004) Ȃ as prototypes of the models 
presented in the literature. At the end of that section, we briefly discuss possible 
alternatives and extensions. In Section 2.3, some policy applications are discussed. 
Section 2.4 concludes by discussing future research. 
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2.2 MODELING HOUSEHOLD LOCATION CHOICE IN A SORTING FRAMEWORK 
2.2.1 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This section discusses the structure of the household location choice models 
presented in the literature. They focus on the choice of housing among a set of 
alternatives by households. These alternatives represent often neighborhoods, but 
they can also be more specific, for instance a particular type of housing (e.g. detached, 
with a garage and at least two bathrooms) in a particular neighborhood. In principle, 
one may even distinguish every house in the urban area under study as a separate 
alternative, although that is usually not the best way to proceed. In all cases, the 
number of alternatives is finite, which means that a discrete choice model has to be 
developed. In most cases, the number of choices is large, and this can have important 
consequences for the model specification, as we will see below. In what follows, we 
assume that the choice alternatives are neighborhoods, but we will offer a brief 
discussion of other possibilities towards the end of the section. 
In this subsection, we start by considering individual choice behavior, then look at 
the market equilibrium, and provide a comparison with conventional hedonic 
analysis. In the next subsection, we discuss two types of models in some detail. 
Individual choice behavior is modeled by postulating a utility function u whose 
value is determined by the characteristics of the house q, the characteristics of the 
neighborhood x and the amount consumed of a composite good that represents all 
other consumption: 
 ? ? ???? ?? ??. (2.1) 
The composite good is available in continuous quantities at a unit price normalized 
to 1. Neighborhood characteristics are taken as given by individual households. The 
number of neighborhoods equals N, and we denote them by an index n. For instance, 
??is the vector of amenities in neighborhood n. The choice set for x is therefore given 
by the set ? ? ??? ????. These neighborhood characteristics include all kinds of 
amenities and other attributes of a neighborhood that are relevant for the well-being 
of its inhabitants, including the demographic composition of its inhabitants. The 
values of some of these attributes may be determined by the choices of all households 
simultaneously. Although, in that case, they are endogenous at the population level, 
they are, nevertheless, taken as given by individual households determining their 
choices. 
Households are allowed to choose the housing characteristics. A simple approach 
to model this decision is to follow the suggestion of Muth (1969) that housing quality 
can be summarized by a scalar measure called Ǯhousing servicesǯ. These housing 
services are considered to be a conventional consumer good that is available in 
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continuous quantities at a unit price ??. The budget constraint is now ? ? ??? ? ?. In 
writing the constraint this way, we have interpreted q as the number of housing 
services,6 while ?? denotes its unit price. Conditional upon the choice of 
neighborhood n the consumer maximizes utility by determining the values of q and c. 
After substitution of the optimal quantities of these variables into the utility 
function (Equation 2.1), we arrive at the conditional indirect utility function: 
 ?? ? ???? ??? ???. (2.2) 
In this approach, the household location choice is in fact modeled as a two-step 
procedure: the household first chooses its housing characteristics within each 
neighborhood, and then it chooses the neighborhood that offers the possibility to 
reach the highest level of utility. Location choice models naturally emphasize the 
second step. 
We have now considered the choice of an individual consumer among a set of 
heterogeneous neighborhoods. The next step is to introduce heterogeneity among 
consumers. However, note first that, with homogeneous consumers, it would be easy 
to close the model with a market equilibrium condition that requires housing demand 
to be equal to housing supply, which is typically taken as given. When all consumers 
have identical tastes and incomes they will only choose to live in neighborhoods that 
offer them the possibility to reach the highest utility. This means that all consumers 
will reach the same level of utility in all neighborhoods with a positive housing 
supply. Prices will adjust so that this situation will be reached. However, casual 
evidence suggests that most households are far from indifferent between living in 
different neighborhoods, and therefore that heterogeneity among households is 
important. 
We now introduce this heterogeneity into the model by allowing consumers to 
differ in income y, as well as in some parameters of the utility function which we 
denote as ?. That is, y and ? are allowed to differ over the households. Since the 
optimal neighborhood choice depends on the exact values of income and taste 
parameters, households may now differ in the optimal choice of their neighborhood. 
Let ??????? ?? denote the probability that a household chooses neighborhood n when 
the housing prices in all neighborhoods are p, and the amenities are X. The probability 
is usually related to the values of income y and the heterogeneity parameters ?. The 
choice mechanism implies that households with particular values of these parameters 
will be more likely to choose a particular neighborhood, or even that a particular 
                                                          
6 One can interpret q as a function of (elementary) housing characteristics, such as the size of the floor 
area, the number of rooms, the presence of a garage, et cetera. For an analysis on the concept of 
housing services, see Rouwendal (1998). 
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neighborhood will only be inhabited by households whose y and ? are in a particular 
range. 
The total demand for housing in neighborhood n can be found by multiplying this 
probability with the total number of households B. Denoting the supply of housing in 
neighborhood n as ??, the market equilibrium condition is: 
 ? ??????? ?? ? ??????? ? ???. (2.3) 
Later in this section, we will discuss the relationship between the choice probabilities 
and household characteristics, but for now it is important to observe that this 
condition determines the equilibrium price of housing in each neighborhood as a 
function of the amenities of all neighborhoods: 
 ?? ? ????? ??. (2.4) 
Conventional hedonic analysis can be interpreted as the study of Equation 2.4 
interpreted as a reduced-form equation. Typically, the house price in neighborhood n 
is specified as a function only of the amenities in this neighborhood. Equation 2.4 
shows that the coefficients of such equations must be expected to be functions of 
amenities and housing supply in all other neighborhoods as well, which points to a 
severe limitation of the conventional hedonic analysis.7 
Rosen (1974) showed that the first derivative of a hedonic price function with 
respect to amenities equals the marginal WTP for that amenity. Subsequent hedonic 
analyses have made abundant use of this conclusion. The household location choice 
models allow the researcher to carry the analysis further, because the estimated 
models allow for the computation of the marginal WTP for specific households (that 
is, the relationship between the marginal WTP and the heterogeneity parameter ? is 
made explicit). This makes clear that the household location choice models allow a 
researcher to carry out substantially deeper analysis than the conventional hedonic 
approach. There is, of course, a price to be paid for these advantages: the estimation 
of these models requires much more data than a standard hedonic price analysis. 
There are two main types of household location choice models in the literature 
under review: random coefficient models, and additive random utility models. Both 
model types fit in the framework discussed in the previous subsection, but the type of 
heterogeneity they allow for is quite different. The random utility models introduce 
heterogeneity by considering one or more parameters of the utility function as 
random variables. The additive random utility models add a neighborhood-specific 
                                                          
7 There is potential bias from ignoring the sorting process in hedonic analysis. By not accounting for 
sorting implies that hedonic analysis recovers the average treated on the treated (since households 
choose to live near amenities they prefer) and may not recover the average treatment effect. 
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random term to the utility model, and allow for differences in household 
characteristics. The additive random term allows households which are similar in 
income and observed characteristics to have different preference orderings over the 
neighborhoods. For this reason, they are sometimes referred to as Ǯhorizontal sorting 
modelsǯ. The models that use the random coefficient framework usually focus on a 
single amenity (which may be a composite of underlying elementary amenities). 
Households all appreciate this amenity, but differ in their WTP for it, depending on 
the value of the random coefficient in their utility function. This implies that, in 
principle, all households have the same preference ordering of the neighborhoods 
(given the amounts consumed of the composite good and housing characteristics). 
For this reason, models of this type are sometimes referred to as Ǯvertical sorting 
modelsǯ. 
In both types of models, demand for housing in different neighborhoods by a 
heterogeneous population of households is the main focus. Since the distribution of 
households of these neighborhoods is not uniform (except perhaps in special cases), 
this means that the models explain the sorting of households over neighborhoods. 
The uneven distribution of households over urban space, including the spatial 
concentration of poverty and wealth, is an aspect of metropolitan areas that has often 
attracted the attention of politicians. Households with young children tend to sort 
into neighborhoods with high-quality schools, driving up house prices there. Power 
couples sort into neighborhoods according to their job opportunities, possibly 
inducing single workers to accept longer commutes, as they move into more 
affordable housing in other locations.8 Households with similar wealth and 
characteristics may like to live close to each other, and perhaps also at some distance 
from households that are different.9 But households may also attach value to the 
diversity of the composition of the population in the neighborhood in which they live. 
These phenomena, and many others of potential significance, can be addressed by 
household location choice models, and this should be regarded as one of their major 
attractive features. 
 
2.2.2 VERTICAL SORTING 
Markets with heterogeneous consumers and product differentiation are more difficult 
to analyze than those with homogeneous products. It is natural to start with studying 
heterogeneity in a single dimension. Since differences in income between 
                                                          
8 For work on sorting models that explicitly consider the joint decision of work location and housing 
location, see e.g. Timmins (2007) and Kuminoff (2008). 
9 This can also be a factor for other economic agents, such as firms, or for other choices, such as car 
choice. 
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neighborhoods are obvious, it is not surprising that economists have constructed 
models of neighborhood choice for a population of consumers that differ (only) in 
income. Such models tend to predict a perfect correlation between income and 
neighborhood choice. However, the income sorting that we see around us is clearly 
imperfect and this suggests that a second type of heterogeneity must be introduced to 
make the model more realistic. For a satisfactory analysis, the existence and 
preferably also the uniqueness of the equilibrium in such model should be 
established. Epple & Platt (1998) present such an analysis. Their approach fits in the 
framework discussed above with ? interpreted as a scalar indicating the intensity of 
preference for neighborhood amenities, which are also modeled as a scalar variable.  
To demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium, these authors introduce 
assumptions on the curvature of the indifference curves associated with the 
conditional indirect utility function (Equation 2.2). Such indifference curves are 
defined as pairs of house prices p and amenity levels x that offer a household the 
possibility to reach a given level of utility, say ??. Standard properties of the utility 
function imply that this indirect indifference curve is increasing in x and concave. Its 
slope M is the householdǯs marginal WTP for neighborhood amenities, expressed in 
terms of the unit price for housing services: 
 ???? ?? ?? ?? ? ????????. (2.5) 
Epple & Platt (1998) assume that, for a given income y, M is increasing in the 
preference intensity ?, and that, for a given ?, M is increasing in y. The first part of 
this assumption implies that the parameter ? can be interpreted as reflecting the 
intensity of the preference for the neighborhood amenity. The second part gives the 
usual effect of a decreasing marginal utility of income. This assumption guarantees 
that the indirect indifference curves of households, that differ, will (at most) cross 
once, and are therefore sometimes referred to as single-crossing properties. 
Epple & Sieg (1999) provide an empirical analysis of neighborhood sorting which 
is based on this model. They assume that the conditional indirect utility 
function (Equation 2.2) can be written as the sum of two (sub-)functions, one of 
which refers to the amenity x, and the other to p and y: 
 ????? ??? ?? ?? ? ????? ?? ? ?????? ??. (2.6) 
The left-hand side of this equation repeats Equation 2.2, while making the 
heterogeneity parameter ? explicit. The right-hand side further specifies the 
conditional indirect utility function. This specification implies that the demand for 
housing services q is independent of the amenities, as can be easily verified by Royǯs 
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identity. This seems plausible if the neighborhood amenity is the low crime rate, but 
perhaps less so when it concerns the provision of parks, which may be a substitute for 
private gardens. 
The separability assumption on the conditional indirect utility function helps to 
keep the model tractable, and Epple & Sieg show, on the basis of a further 
specification of the utility function, that the sorting implied by their model can be 
illustrated as is shown in Figure 2.1. This figure assumes that neighborhoods are 
sorted on the basis of the amenity, with neighborhood 1 offering the lowest value of x, 
and N the highest value. The figure shows that households choosing neighborhood n 
have specific combinations of income y and the preference intensity ?. There is not a 
simple one-to-one relationship between income and neighborhood choice, but 
households with a low income that choose to live in n must have a relatively strong 
preference for the amenity, whereas households with a high income that locate in n 
have a relatively weak preference for the amenity. For a given value of ?, 
neighborhood choice is perfectly determined by income, and vice versa. In their 
empirical work, Epple & Sieg (1999) assume that the logarithms of income y and the 
taste parameter ? are bivariate normal-distributed, and they estimate the parameters 
of this distribution jointly with those of the utility function. Unlike income, the 
intensity of preference for the local public good ? cannot be observed for individual 
households, and the model thus explains the imperfect correlation between income 
and neighborhood choice observed in reality on the basis of unobserved taste 
differences. 
The model implies that, in equilibrium, house prices ?? are increasing in the level 
of amenities ??. The relationship between these variables is the hedonic price 
function. Households that are indifferent between locating in two neighborhoods, say 
n and n+1, have a WTP for the additional amenity ?? ? ???? ? ?? that is exactly equal 
to the price difference ?? ? ???? ? ??. It is important to note that the location of the 
indifferent households (the dashed lines in Figure 2.1) and the values of the 
associated WTP for the differences in the amenity levels are determined in a general 
equilibrium, and should therefore be expected to change when the amenity level, or 
the housing supply in some neighborhood changes. 
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Figure 2.1. Household sorting 
Source: Own graph, but inspired by Epple & Sieg (1999). 
 
Epple & Sieg (1999) investigate some testable implication of their model. They 
concentrate on the predictions of their model with respect to income sorting. In 
contrast to earlier models, theirs does not imply a one-to-one relationship between 
income and neighborhood choice, although it still predicts a strong relationship 
between the two variables: the ranking of neighborhoods on the basis of any quantile 
of the income distributions per neighborhood (e.g. median income) must be identical 
to the ranking of the neighborhoods on the basis of the provision of public goods. 
They argue that crime and education are the most important public goods, and use a 
linear function of both to arrive at a scalar representation of public good provision. In 
their data there is substantial variation in incomes within communities, which 
contradicts earlier models, but they show that there is close correspondence between 
the two rankings when the 25%, 50% (median) and 75% quartiles are used, as is 
implied by their model.  
 
2.2.3 HORIZONTAL SORTING 
The second type of household location choice model to be discussed uses the additive 
random utility framework for discrete choice, first introduced by McFadden (1973). 
In the simplest version of the model heterogeneity is introduced by adding a 
neighborhood-specific random term to the conditional indirect utility function. This 
????? 
????? 
households 
locating in n-1 
????????? ??????????? 
households 
locating in n+1 
households 
locating in n 
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means that ? is a vector of neighborhood-specific terms. These random terms are 
usually denoted by the symbol ?, and we therefore define?? ? ??? ? ????. The 
conditional indirect utilities are now: ?? ? ???? ??? ??? ? ??. If we assume that all 
random terms are independently identically distributed with extreme value type I 
distribution (McFadden, 1973; Cameron & Trivedi, 2009), the choice probabilities of 
utility maximizing households can be derived in closed form as: 
 ??????? ?? ? ???? ???? , (2.7) 
where ?? is shorthand notation for ???? ??? ???. This is the multinomial logit model. 
It can be further extended by allowing for heterogeneity in the deterministic part of 
the utility function ??. Apart from allowing income to differ among households, this is 
usually done by introducing observed household characteristics, denoted as z, as 
determinants of ????? ??? ??? ???. In the notation introduced above, this would mean 
that we extend the vector ? by ? ? ???? ?????.  
Assuming that y and z are discrete, this implies that the household population B 
can be split into a number, say K, of subpopulations. Households that belong to the 
same subpopulation have identical deterministic parts of their utility function. 
Denoting the number of households in subpopulation k as ??, we can now write the 
overall probability that neighborhood n will be chosen as: 
 ??????? ?? ? ? ???
?????? ?? ?????
? ?????? ??????
???? . (2.8) 
The right-hand side of this equation is a weighted average of the choice probabilities 
of the subpopulations implied by the multinomial logit model, with the weights equal 
to the population shares. 
This type of model was used in the 1980s mainly for the simulation of urban 
economies (see Anas, 1982). The existence and uniqueness of the price equilibrium 
were considered a bit later (see, for instance, Rouwendal, 1990).  However, the 
empirical estimation of such models for household location choice did not become 
popular, although housing choice was seen as a major application of discrete choice 
models at an early stage (see, for instance, McFadden, 1978).  
At the time, the restrictive independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA; see 
McFadden, 1973) property of logit models was seen as an important limitation for 
empirical work, but this view gradually changed. An important development was the 
increasing popularity of random coefficient logit models, which were shown by 
McFadden and Train (2000) to be able to approximate any discrete choice model 
arbitrarily close. The random coefficients introduce heterogeneity into the utility 
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function, and this has as a consequence that the IIA property does not hold at the 
population level, although it is still present at the individual level. Although the 
heterogeneity associated with (observed) household characteristics in Equation 2.8 is 
not random, it has a similar effect on the presence of the IIA property at the 
population level. To see this, assume that the conditional indirect utility function is 
linear in the coefficients, for instance: 
 ?? ? ?? ?????? ? ?????? ?????? ? ???????? ? ??. (2.9) 
We can rewrite this as the sum of average utility, and the deviation from that average 
as follows: 
?? ? ??? ???????????? ? ????? ?????? ? ???????? ??????? ??????? ? ????????? ??????????????????
? ? ??. (2.10) 
We have used bars to denote averages, and ?ǯs to denote deviations from the average. 
The first term in curly brackets in Equation 2.10 denotes the average utility of 
neighborhood n, which is equal for all households in the population. The second term 
denotes the deviation from the average that is specific for group k. It includes the 
deviation from the mean of log income, and of the coefficients for the housing price 
and the neighborhood characteristics. The income terms are of less interest as they 
drop out of the logit equation since they are not neighborhood-specific. The 
deviations from the average of the group-specific coefficients for the housing price 
and the amenities have an effect that is similar to that of deviations from the average 
of random coefficients. Since preference heterogeneity based on observed 
characteristics is similar to that based on random coefficients, its impact on the IIA 
property at the population level is also similar. This observation has removed a major 
reservation concerning the use of multinomial logit models to study demand for 
neighborhoods. This changing view is of considerable practical importance, because 
the multinomial logit model is, in practice, the only feasible discrete choice model 
when the number of choice alternatives is large. 
Another important difficulty in applications of the logit model was unobserved 
heterogeneity in the neighborhoods. In practice, a researcher is incompletely 
informed about the characteristics of a neighborhood that are relevant for household 
welfare. It may happen that many households choose a particular neighborhood 
where housing is expensive because of the presence of an attractive amenity that 
makes it well worth paying the higher price, at least for some households. Similarly, it 
may happen that households are reluctant to choose a neighborhood with a low 
housing price because of a negative amenity. If these amenities are not observed by 
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the researcher, he would erroneously conclude that households are not sensitive to 
house prices, or even seem to be attracted to particular neighborhoods by high house 
prices. To further explain the problem, suppose that there is an unobserved 
characteristic in each neighborhood, and denote its impact on the conditional indirect 
utility as??. Instead of Equation 2.9, the conditional indirect utility of neighborhood n 
should be written as: 
 ?? ? ?? ?????? ? ?????? ?????? ? ???????? ? ?? ? ??. (2.11) 
Note that this specification implies that the valuation of the unobserved 
characteristics is identical for all groups, an assumption that is common in the 
literature. Ignoring the unobserved term when estimating the model would not be a 
big problem if it were not correlated with the other explanatory variables, but we 
have already seen that we have good reasons to think that it will be correlated with 
the housing price. We must therefore expect that it biases the estimation results. This 
problem, which has similarities to the classical problem of identification of demand 
and supply curves, was addressed rigorously by Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn & 
Pakes (1995) in a different context. Their solution is a two-step estimation procedure. 
The starting point is the decomposition of the conditional indirect utility in 
Equation 2.10. If we apply this to Equation 2.11, the result is: 
?? ? ??? ???????????? ? ????? ?????? ? ??????? ? ??? ??????? ??????? ? ????????? ??????????????????
? ? ?? 
 ? ?? ? ????? ??????? ? ????????? ?????? ? ???????????? ? ??. (2.12) 
The second line summarizes the average utility of neighborhood n as a single 
parameter, ??, and the first step of the proposed estimation procedure is indeed to 
estimate the logit model in this way. Note that the new parameter ?? includes the 
effect of the unobserved characteristic. This means that we do not ignore this effect, 
and therefore avoid bias in the other coefficients that we estimate in the first step, 
those occurring in the deviation from the mean utility. 
The second step is to elaborate on the estimated ? coefficients by writing them out 
as: 
 ?? ? ?? ???????????? ? ????? ?????? ? ??????? ? ??, (2.13) 
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and estimating the coefficients that occur in this equation.10 The income term has no 
variation over n and therefore acts as a constant. The focus of interest is on the ?? 
coefficients. The unobserved heterogeneity term is treated as an error term. Since it is 
probably correlated with the housing price, we cannot use Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), but if an instrument can be found, Instrumental Variables (IV) regression will 
allow us to consistently estimate the ??ǯs. 
The analysis of Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes (1995) has had an enormous impact on 
empirical industrial organization, and also on other areas of research. Bayer, 
McMillan & Rueben (2004) provided a framework for applying this methodology to 
household location choice models. In the next section, we discuss some applications, 
but first make some further remarks. 
 
2.2.4 FURTHER REMARKS 
In the previous subsection we illustrated the new household location models on the 
basis of prototype models of two branches of this emerging literature. These two 
models give a good impression of what has been going on in this field. We have 
discussed specifications of the model in which housing consumption could be freely 
chosen by households. This is not a generic characteristic of these models. In many 
urban areas housing already exists, and it is costly to adjust it to the preferences of 
new inhabitants. This suggests that it may be more reasonable Ȃ at least in some 
situations Ȃ to take the housing characteristics as given, and to let the market decide 
on the prices of different housing types. In this set up, the choice alternatives are 
housing types in combination with neighborhoods. The conditional indirect utility 
functions now also have housing characteristics (which need not be summarized in a 
scalar housing services indicator) as their arguments, but otherwise nothing 
substantial changes in the model. 
Another characteristic of sorting models discussed above is that they impose 
specific functional forms on the indirect utility function and the distribution of tastes. 
This is often restrictive, and may lead to erroneous conclusions. In a recent working 
paper Epple, Peress & Sieg (2010) propose a new sorting model that uses a semi-
parametric approach. This model allows the data to decide what the functional form 
is for the relationship between observed neighborhood quality and the observed 
price rank of the neighborhood. Extending the model in this way forced them to 
establish a totally different estimator. Their results show that their new semi-
parametric sorting model fits the model better than the parametric sorting model of 
                                                          
10 The key advantage of this approach is the linearity of Equation 2.13 which makes the instrumental 
variable strategy simpler to implement. 
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Epple & Sieg (1999). The Epple, Peress & Sieg (2010) model is only partially non-
parametrically identified, so there seems to be room for improvement. 
A third issue that deserves attention is that the sorting literature is silent about 
spatial dependence between locations, although this is potentially important, as 
households often use facilities located in adjacent neighborhoods, and experience 
externalities originating from them. In Chapter 3, we have developed a model in 
which household location choice also depends on the characteristics of nearby 
neighborhoods, in addition to those of the neighborhood in which households choose 
to locate. Tests on spatial dependence confirm that this is the case on the municipal 
level in the Netherlands, and developments in the spatial econometrics literature 
have provided the appropriate tools for incorporating this phenomenon in sorting 
models. Chapter 3 mainly focus on cultural heritage, and find that being close to the 
Amsterdam inner city contributes to the attractiveness of locating in the surrounding 
municipalities. We should expect spatial dependence to be even more important on a 
lower level, for example the neighborhoods within the Amsterdam municipality. 
 
2.3 POLICY APPLICATIONS 
Earlier in this paper we have argued that sorting models have a great potential 
regarding policy analysis. They can help policy makers to better understand the 
consequences of local government interventions, changes in (permitted) land use, 
and exogenous shocks. We covered two different frameworks in the previous section 
that apply to different policy applications. In this section, we focus on different policy 
applications that are pursued by these frameworks. 
Epple, Romer & Sieg (2001) analyse voting behavior and collective choices within a 
system of local jurisdictions. They use a vertical sorting model that controls for 
observed and unobserved neighborhood characteristics, heterogeneity of households, 
the potential endogeneity issues of prices and expenditures, and the self-selection of 
households in those neighborhoods. The level of public good provision is based on the 
majority rule, and thus depends on the preferences of the residents within a 
neighborhood. The idea is that households sort themselves among those 
neighborhoods according to their preferences, until there is an equilibrium. The 
households within the neighborhood collectively determine the level of public good 
provision. The provision of public goods and the taxes used to finance them have 
consequences for the attractiveness of the neighborhood, and therefore for local 
house prices. Hence, there is a trade-off between the local public expenditures and 
local house prices in each neighborhood. Epple, Romer & Sieg (2001) consider how 
households perceive these trade-offs. They test two specifications: a myopic voting 
model, and a sophisticated voting model. In the first, households consider the 
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population of a neighborhood to be fixed. In other words, they do not anticipate a 
change in the neighborhood population following a change in local public 
expenditures, as is the case in the second model. Using a data set from the 1980 US 
Census that refers to the Boston Metropolitan Area and its surroundings, they find 
that the myopic voting model does not fit the data well, and significantly 
underestimates the trade-offs between the local public expenditures and local house 
prices. In contrast, they do find that the sophisticated voting model fits the data much 
better, which suggests that households do take into account possible changes in 
public good provision. 
More recent empirical research strengthens this view. Epple, Romano & 
Sieg (2010) show that older households without children Ȃ in comparison with 
younger households with children Ȃ prefer to reside in neighborhoods with lower 
educational expenditures, and, therefore, vote as such. Most households make 
transitions between these two preference types over the life-cycle. In a world without 
moving costs, each shift in preferences implies moving to a neighborhood that better 
fits the current preferences. Moving costs complicate the picture, but do not change 
the essence. The authors find that older households tend to move to neighborhoods 
with lower educational quality. These older households are often wealthy, and the 
authors point out that their moves create a tax externality, in the sense that the 
incoming older households increase the tax base per student. This tends to have an 
equalizing effect on the educational quality of the different neighborhoods. 
Bayer, Ferreira & McMillan (2005) use the horizontal sorting model to reconsider 
Blackǯs (1999) investigation of the value attached to educational quality. In that study 
a regression discontinuity design was used to measure the value of school quality by 
the difference in house prices at the boundaries of school districts. The idea is that 
houses on both sides of the boundary are identical in neighborhood characteristics, 
except for the fact that different schools are used on both sides, which allows a 
researcher to get a Ǯcleanǯ estimate of the value attached by households to the 
difference in quality between the two schools. Bayer, Ferreira & McMillan (2005) 
point out that when household location choice is (partly) driven by considerations of 
school quality, differences in demographic composition (age, income, ethnicity) will 
result that may have an additional impact on the difference in house prices on the 
boundary of the school districts, which should also be taken into account. For 
example, Bayer, McMillan & Rueben (2005) show that the demographic composition 
is important for the household location choice. They find, among other things, that the 
WTP of white households for a house in a particular neighborhood is decreasing if the 
neighborhood has a larger percentage of black households. By accounting for these 
other neighborhood characteristics, Bayer, Ferreira & McMillan (2005) show that 
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doing so by means of a sorting model implies a much lower estimated WTP for better 
education than previous studies, including Blackǯs (1999). They also show that taking 
into account the presence of unobserved neighborhood heterogeneity is important 
because it tends to be correlated with the socio-demographic composition of the 
neighborhood population. What at first glance appears to be a strong preference to 
live close to better-educated and wealthier neighbors may in fact be a desire to live in 
neighborhoods that are more attractive for reasons that are not observed by the 
researcher. 
Klaiber & Phaneuf (2010) have developed a horizontal sorting model to analyse 
the impact of converting privately-owned agricultural and undeveloped parcels to 
publicly-owned open space. Their results show that with a 2.5% increase in open 
space, the average WTP rises in the whole area, but mainly in the urban fringe and 
outside the city. Hence, it seems that households outside the inner city prefer to live 
in areas with open space. 
Using such a model, van der Straaten & Rouwendal (2010) examine the location 
choice of power couples Ȃ households in which both spouses are highly-educated and 
working Ȃ in the Netherlands. These households have to find a house within a 
reasonable commuting distance of two jobs that often require highly-specialized skills 
Ȃ the co-location problem. Costa & Kahn (2000) have argued persuasively that this 
results in a strong preference among such households for locating close to large and 
diversified metropolitan areas. Van der Straaten & Rouwendal (2010) show that 
Dutch households are, on average, willing to pay ̀919 to live one kilometer closer to 
a large labor market, whereas power couples are willing to pay ̀6046. 
Chapter 3 investigates the importance of cultural heritage for household location 
choices in the Netherlands. A counterfactual analysis based on an estimated 
horizontal sorting model shows that if there were no cultural heritage at all in the 
Netherlands, house prices would fall by 17% in Amsterdam and 8% in Utrecht. These 
figures refer to overall effects that include the larger number of restaurants, shops, et 
cetera that are attracted to the city as a kind of multiplier effect of its basic 
attractiveness related to cultural heritage. Such figures are important for policy 
makers who sometimes have to fight for the preservation of cultural heritage, as the 
implied costs are much easier to document than the benefits. 
 
2.4 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Although the literature on household location choice is relatively young, it has already 
contributed substantially to our understanding of the urban housing market. The 
main strengths of these models is that they allow for much more detail than the 
conventional monocentric urban economic model, while still adopting a general 
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equilibrium perspective, and that they put the conventional hedonic price analysis 
into a solid market equilibrium setting, thereby enriching the possibilities for welfare 
and policy analysis. In the previous sections, we have discussed the structure of two 
important types of such models and provided a number of examples of their 
application. More such examples have already appeared in the literature (Bayer, 
Ferreira & McMillan, 2005; Bayer, McMillan & Rueben, 2005; Epple, Romer & 
Sieg, 2001; Epple, Romano & Sieg, 2010; Klaiber & Phaneuf, 2010; Murdock, 2006; 
Timmins, 2005; van der Straaten & Rouwendal, 2010; Walsh, 2007), or are Ǯin the 
pipelineǯ, and we expect still others to come up in the next years. 
We also expect further development of the model structures themselves. An 
important issue is that presently existing sorting models are static whereas housing 
decisions are inherently dynamic, as has recently been stressed by Bayer 
et al. (2010). These authors make an interesting attempt to introduce dynamics into a 
sorting model by allowing for forward-looking behavior of households with respect to 
house prices and moving costs.  A comparison of the results of the dynamic model 
with those of a static one Ȃ as in Bayer, McMillan & Rueben (2004) Ȃ strongly suggests 
that ignoring forward-looking behavior of households causes omitted variable bias. 
They find that, compared with the dynamic model, the static model overestimates or 
underestimates the effect of location characteristics on indirect utility. This implies 
that, if one expects the neighborhood to improve in quality, the authors find an 
underestimate of the neighborhood characteristics in a static model. If, on the other 
hand, one expects the neighborhood to decrease in quality, the authors find an 
overestimate. Hence households are willing to pay extra for houses in neighborhoods 
that are expected to improve in quality over time. One problem within this dynamic 
framework is that it ignores the endogeneity of prices. In a static framework Ȃ as 
discussed in Section 2.2 Ȃ an instrumental variables strategy is used to control for the 
correlation between prices and unobserved quality aspects of the location. Such an 
instrumental variables strategy is not possible if current prices are correlated with 
expected future utility. 
In a recent working paper, Epple, Romano & Sieg (2010) also extend their sorting 
framework to include moving costs and life-cycle components. The aim of their 
working paper is to study the intergenerational conflict over the provision of public 
education between younger households with children and older households without 
children. The idea is that, in contrast to older households without children, younger 
households with children prefer locations with high levels of educational 
expenditures and low levels of other public expenditures. This assumes that the 
preferences of households evolve over the life-cycle. Voting within a neighborhood 
decides the level of these expenditures. In a simple life-cycle model of two periods, 
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households can choose to reside at most in two different locations. However, 
households will have to take moving costs into account. If those moving costs are 
high, older households are less likely to move to neighborhoods with low education 
expenditures. Their model can predict the expenditures spent on education and other 
public goods in neighborhoods in the Boston Metropolitan Area and which 
households will move to another neighborhood in the following period. As they also 
recognize in their conclusions, there is still scope for future work. Relaxing 
assumptions, such as assuming there are only two periods and only two different 
types of households, would be interesting additions for future research on this topic. 
The extension towards dynamic models is just one Ȃ important Ȃ example of the 
many possibilities and challenges ahead for sorting models which cannot all be 
covered in this brief paper.11 However, we hope to have made clear that, even in its 
present state of development, the literature on household location choice has made 
an important contribution to housing economies. Sorting models help policy makers 
understand the mechanics of the housing market and the consequences of policy 
interventions. We hope this brief review will help to draw the attention of more 
researchers and policy makers to these models, and we are convinced that more 
theoretical, as well as empirical, work in this area will be extremely useful. 
 
                                                          
11 For an excellent survey on equilibrium sorting and its possibilities and challenges, see Kuminoff, 
Smith & Timmins (2010). 
  
 3 CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE LOCATION 
CHOICE OF DUTCH HOUSEHOLDS IN A 
RESIDENTIAL SORTING MODEL 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION12 
Household location choices in urban areas are determined to a large extent by 
accessibility to employment Ȃ as is stressed in the Alonso-Muth-Mills model. More 
recent literature acknowledges that such location choices can also be affected by 
other amenities than employment. For instance, Brueckner, Thisse & Zenou (1999) 
develop a theory about the sorting of households in urban areas which recognizes the 
importance of urban amenities, particularly those typically found in downtown areas. 
Their theory is based on the assumption that the marginal valuation of these 
amenities rises sharply with income (Brueckner, Thisse & Zenou, 1999, p. 93). As a 
consequence, higher income households have a strong willingness-to-pay for central 
city locations if urban amenities are present (like in Paris), but prefer to consume 
more space in suburban locations otherwise (for instance in Detroit). 
It is now widely acknowledged that consumer amenities are important for cities. 
Glaeser, Kolko & Saiz (2001) have forcefully argued this on the basis of a wealth of 
empirical material. They showed, among other things, that US cities with many 
consumer amenities grow faster. This finding has been confirmed in other research. A 
recent example is Carlino & Saiz (2008) who concentrate on the attractiveness of 
particular urban areas for tourists. These authors show that especially the areas close 
to tourist offices have benefitted from the recent revival of city life in the US, which 
suggests that tourist attractions also attract high potentials to the residential areas in 
their proximity. Marlet & Poort (2005) have argued that the presence of cultural 
heritage attracts highly educated households in the Netherlands. Moreover, locations 
where highly educated households prefer to reside attract more industries and 
perform better economically (Florida, 2002; Marlet & van Woerkens, 2005). If these 
                                                          
12 The present chapter is based on Van Duijn & Rouwendal (2013), published in the Journal of 
Economic Geography. The results of this chapter have also been translated for Dutch policy purposes 
which are published as a book chapter (in Dutch): Van Duijn, M. & J. Rouwendal (2013), ǮCultureel 
erfgoed en het vestigingsgedrag van huishoudensǯ, in: S. van Dommelen & C.J. Pen (eds.), Cultureel 
erfgoed op waarde geschat: Economische waardering, verevening en erfgoedbeleid, Platform 31, Den 
Haag.  
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statements are correct, cultural heritage is an important determinant of urban 
growth. 
Historical inner cities provide a special identity to urban areas and are generally 
considered to be an important amenity for citizens living there. The cultural heritage 
preserved in these areas seems to function like an anchor point for shops, 
restaurants, theatres and other urban amenities. The literature referenced above 
suggests strongly that urban amenities also affect the location choice of households 
and attract the higher educated and more productive workers. In this paper, we 
provide empirical evidence for this phenomenon by developing a household location 
choice model and estimating it on Dutch data. The basic idea is that households 
choose among residential locations on the basis of the accessibility of employment as 
well as urban and non-urban amenities. A historic city center is an example of the 
former category, whereas recreational areas in the vicinity exemplify the latter. The 
paper therefore attempts to overcome the difficulty of measuring the value people 
attach to cultural heritage (Marlet, Poort & Laverman, 2007; Navrud & Ready, 2002; 
Throsby, 2003) by focusing on location choices. We use recently developed 
techniques for studying sorting in an equilibrium setting (Bayer, McMillan & Rueben, 
2004; Bayer & Timmins, 2005 and 2007). This approach allows us to estimate the 
willingness-to-pay of various types of households for municipality characteristics, like 
having a historical inner city.  
In this paper we also extend a residential sorting model by accounting for spatial 
dependence between municipalities. If a household chooses to locate in area A with 
few amenities, this does not mean it is restrained from consuming the amenities in 
area B. It could even be the case that the household preferred to locate in area B 
because of its amenities but could not afford to locate there because of higher house 
prices. Hence, the household chooses to live as close as possible to the preferred area. 
This means that the characteristics of area B have an effect on the attractiveness of 
area A. In such cases A can be a Ǯsatelliteǯ of B. This happens quite often in the 
Netherlands which has a decentralized urban system with many small and medium 
sized towns located close to each other. Taking into account this spatial structure is 
therefore of potential importance. Our modeling approach therefore combines an 
equilibrium sorting model and spatial spillover effects.  
We devote the next section to a discussion of the methodology used in our analysis. 
This includes the residential sorting model and the extensions to account for spatial 
dependence in various ways. Our data and some descriptive statistics are discussed in 
Section 3.3. Estimation results are reported and discussed in Section 3.4. The 
implications of these results are then considered in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 
summarizes and concludes. 
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3.2 THE LOCATION CHOICE MODEL 
3.2.1  METHODOLOGY 
This study focuses on the role of cultural heritage in household location decisions. By 
cultural heritage we mean all those amenities that relate the past to the present and 
are valued as such. Our primary interest is the remnants of the past that contribute to 
the identity of a site or town. A prime example for the Netherlands, to which our 
empirical work refers, are the historical inner cities of the towns that date back to 
17th century Ȃ the Dutch Golden Age Ȃ or earlier. Cultural heritage contributes to the 
atmosphere in the area and its attractiveness for residents, firms and tourists (Marlet, 
Poort & Laverman, 2007). The result may be that there will be more shops, cafés, 
restaurants and similar (endogenous) amenities in these areas, which further 
contribute to its attractiveness. Cultural heritage may therefore have a multiplier 
effect through its impact on endogenous amenities. 
Currently, the most popular methods to value cultural heritage are the contingent 
valuation method and the hedonic price method. Throsby (2003) provides a detailed 
discussion on the contingent valuation method that exploits stated preference 
surveys to directly measure the willingness-to-pay of respondents. There is an 
ongoing debate about the reliability of this method, but aside from that, it is doubtful 
if it is more suitable to measure the direct impact of cultural heritage than its total 
effect on the attractiveness of particular locations. The hedonic price method links 
house prices to the presence of cultural heritage in the vicinity and interprets its 
marginal prices as an indicator of the average willingness-to-pay for this amenity.13 
Recent developments have shown that a more detailed picture of this measure may 
be obtained if house prices are linked to information of the residents (Kuminoff, 
Smith & Timmins, 2010). Therefore, we will use a residential sorting model to study 
the role of cultural heritage in the location decisions of households. One advantage of 
this type of model is that it allows us to investigate differences in the willingness-to-
pay for cultural heritage between groups of households. This is of some interest as it 
has been argued that this type of amenities is in particular attractive for high 
potentials (Carlino & Saiz, 2008). Our model follows the line of research initiated by 
Bayer, McMillan & Rueben (2004). The equilibrium sorting model they develop has 
recently been applied in a variety of empirical studies (Klaiber & Phaneuf, 2010; 
Murdock, 2006; Timmins, 2005; Van der Straaten & Rouwendal, 2010). 
 
3.2.2 RESIDENTIAL SORTING MODEL 
We consider a population of households, indexed by ? ? ?? ?, that have to choose a 
residential location from a large number, N, of alternatives ? ? ???. The 
                                                          
13 For the seminal study on hedonic price methods, see Rosen (1974). 
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multinomial logit (MNL) model is the only discrete choice model that is tractable in 
this situation. However, it is well-known that this model has important shortcomings. 
One is that it suffers from the restrictive IIA property. Another is that, in its standard 
form, the MNL model has difficulties in dealing with unobserved characteristics of 
alternatives, in particular when they may be correlated with observable 
characteristics. Both problems are relevant in the present setting and we will 
therefore start with a brief discussion on how we deal with those issues. 
The IIA property of the model restricts the substitution between the choice 
alternatives at the level of the individual actor. If the deterministic part of the utility 
function is the same for all actors, the property is also present at the level of the 
population. However, if there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity among them, 
aggregate demand functions are hardly restricted and substitution between 
alternatives at the population level is determined by the properties of the data. This 
was first realized for the case where the coefficients of the utility function were 
considered to be random variables, the so-called mixed logit model. Indeed, Train & 
McFadden (2000) prove that this model is able to approximate any reasonable 
discrete choice model to any desired degree of accuracy. Bayer, McMillan & Rueben 
(2004) have argued that a similar argument holds when there is substantial 
heterogeneity in the observed characteristics of the actors and the parameters of the 
utility function are treated as functions of them. To see how this works, consider a 
utility function that is linear in the parameters and refers to choice alternatives with 
K characteristics, indexed ? ? ???: 
 ??? ? ? ???????? ??? ? ??? . (3.1) 
In this equation ???  denotes the value of the k-th characteristic of alternative n, the 
?ǯs are coefficients and the ?ǯs random variables that are IID extreme value type I 
distributed. The matrix ???  includes an indicator for the cultural heritage in n, other 
amenities that determine its attractiveness and also the local housing price. Note that 
the coefficients, ?, are individual-specific. They are functions of household 
characteristics Z: 
 ???? ? ???? ? ? ???????? ????? ? ????. (3.2) 
In this equation ???? denotes the value of the l-th characteristic of household i 
(? ? ???), and ??? the population mean of characteristic l, while the ?ǯs are 
coefficients. Household characteristics include age, education, et cetera. Using 
Equation 3.2, we can rewrite utility as: 
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 ??? ? ? ??????? ??? ? ? ?? ???????? ????? ? ????????? ??? ? ??? .  (3.3) 
The first term on the right-hand side can be interpreted as the utility attached to 
alternative n by the average household. The second term is the deviation from the 
average utility of household i. Equation 3.3 looks like the error component 
formulation of the mixed logit model (see, for instance, Train, 2003). The second term 
on its right-hand side can be interpreted as resulting from a random draw of a 
household from the population. The generalization of the MNL model that is obtained 
by taking account of household heterogeneity on the basis of observed characteristics 
leads therefore to a generalization that is similar to that of the mixed logit model. 
The second issue is that, in practice, a researcher cannot be sure that all relevant 
characteristics of the alternatives have been taken into account. There is always the 
possibility that households react to characteristics that are absent in the data. To see 
the consequences, we introduce an additional term ? that represents an unobserved 
characteristic into the utility function: 
 ??? ? ? ??????? ??? ? ?? ? ? ?? ???????? ????? ? ????????? ??? ? ??? .  (3.4) 
This simple formulation, that assumes that all households value the unobserved 
characteristic in the same way, is standard in the literature. Ignoring the unobserved 
characteristics may in practice have modest consequences as long as ? is uncorrelated 
with the ?ǯs. However, in the setting of sorting models, this is unlikely to be the case, 
since one of the ?ǯs is the housing price. To see the problem, define ???  as the 
probability that household i chooses alternative n. That is, ???  is the probability that 
???  for all ? ? ??? is at most equal to ??? . In market equilibrium we must have: 
 ? ??????? ? ??  (3.5) 
where ?? denotes the housing stock in n. A researcher who does not take into account 
the unobserved characteristic, but mistakenly assumes Equation 3.5 to be valid will 
observe a relatively high price that cannot be explained on the basis of observed 
characteristics for neighborhoods with a positive ?. Similarly, a relatively low price 
that is unrelated to observed characteristics will be observed for neighborhoods with 
a negative ?. The researcher will probably conclude that households do not care much 
about the price, whereas in fact they react to an unobservable.  The problem is that 
the housing price is correlated with  ?.14 
                                                          
14 Note that this endogeneity issue arises only at the aggregate (municipal) level. Individual actors take 
prices and amenities (observable as well as unobservable) as given. This means that we can estimate 
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This problem was first analyzed by Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn & 
Pakes (1995) in the context of the automobile market. The solution they proposed 
was to estimate the model (Equation 3.4) in two steps. Therefore Equation 3.4 is 
rewritten as: 
 ??? ? ?? ? ? ?? ???????? ????? ? ????????? ??? ? ???   (3.6) 
with 
 ?? ? ? ???????? ??? ? ?? (3.7) 
In the first step one estimates the vector of mean indirect utilities, ?, and the 
coefficients of the cross effects of household and alternative characteristics, ????, on 
the basis of Equation 3.6. These are estimated as a MNL model, in which the ?ǯs are 
alternative specific constants. The MNL model predicts the probability, ??? , that each 
household i chooses alternative n. The sum of the probabilities for each alternative 
are forced to be equal to the housing stock for each alternative by adjusting the 
alternative specific constants Ȃ hence satisfying the equilibrium constraint 
(Equation 3.5). In the second step the ??ǯs are analyzed further on the basis of 
Equation 3.7. Because of the endogeneity problem just discussed, using OLS provides 
biased coefficients of the ????ǯs. However, 2SLS can be used if an instrument for the 
price is available. Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes (1995) suggested to use the 
characteristics of similar alternatives as instruments, but in one of the first 
applications of this methodology to sorting on the housing market Bayer, McMillan & 
Rueben (2004) proposed a different approach. Our approach is based on Bayer, 
McMillan & Rueben (2004). We construct a single instrument by solving for the 
vector of prices that would clear the market if there were no unobserved 
heterogeneity (that is if all ??ǯs were equal to zero). This instrument is by 
construction independent of the unobserved heterogeneity term ? and in all 
probability strongly correlated with the observed housing prices.  
Some additional explanation on the creation of the instrument is useful. The 
instrument should be based on the Ǯtrueǯ values of the coefficients in Equation 3.4. 
However, initially the ????ǯs are still unknown and we, therefore use an iterative 
procedure. Initial values of the ????ǯs are obtained by estimating Equation 3.7 via OLS. 
These coefficients, along with those obtained from estimating the MNL (Equation 3.6), 
are then used to calculate a price vector, ?? , that, after setting ?? ? ? for all n, satisfies 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
the first step using a multinomial logit model, which has the unobservable characteristics included in 
the mean utility, without instrumenting the price. 
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the equilibrium condition (Equation 3.5). This price vector is then used as an 
instrument for prices by estimating Equation 3.7 via 2SLS. This results in new 
coefficients for ???? which we plug back into Equation 3.4 to solve for a new price 
vector that satisfies the equilibrium condition (Equation 3.5) in the same way as 
before. This process is repeated until the instrument stabilizes.15 
 
3.2.3 CULTURAL HERITAGE 
The purpose of the sorting model is to investigate the role of cultural heritage in 
location choice behavior. Cultural heritage is basically something that remains from 
the past, and therefore predetermined. Although it is clearly impossible for 
municipalities to create authentic cultural heritage, decisions with respect to 
maintenance, and investments in the surrounding neighborhoods to improve the 
presentation of the cultural heritage, have a potentially important effect on the 
impact of cultural heritage on municipal attractiveness. On the other hand, abstaining 
from such measures causes cultural heritage to depreciate faster. It may become 
dilapidated and its positive contribution to the attractiveness of cities will disappear. 
This discussion suggests that cultural heritage is also endogenous, at least, to some 
extent. Cities with small amounts of cultural heritage may invest heavily to make the 
most of it, while cities with large amounts may lack the financial means to keep all 
objects in good condition. This is not just a theoretical possibility. Recently, the city 
Bergen op Zoom in the Dutch province Noord-Brabant realized a doubling of the size 
of its protected inner city area after a procedure that took more than 14 years and 
involved, among other things, substantial changes in the local land use plan.16 
 
3.2.4 SPATIAL EXTENSIONS 
The sorting model is used to analyze location decisions of Dutch households. Our 
basic unit of analysis is the municipality. Although this is an administrative rather 
than an economic unit, it has the advantage that many data are available at this level. 
There are almost 450 municipalities in the Netherlands and they differ substantially 
in area and population size. One consequence is that the amenities consumed by 
households do not necessarily have to be located in the municipality where they live. 
For instance, many Dutch workers have a job that is located outside the municipality 
where they reside, and we take this into account by using an indicator for 
employment that is determined by the wages in nearby municipalities. Similarly, 
                                                          
15 The instrument stabilizes rapidly (within five iterations) and is independent on the initial 
coefficients of ????. For more discussion on the instrumental variables strategy, see Bayer, McMillan & 
Rueben (2004). 
16 This was announced in the regional newspaper 'De Stem' of 27 and 28 January 2012. 
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accessibility to the national highway system may be determined by a ramp located 
outside oneǯs municipality of residence. 
The focus of this paper is on cultural heritage preserved in ancient inner cities and 
the impact of this amenity may also extend over municipal boundaries. The historical 
city centers are important for residents of the municipality in which they are located, 
but often also for people living in the proximity who like to visit such a center for 
shopping, dining and recreational purposes. Casual evidence suggests that many 
people appreciate to live in the proximity of historical city centers so that it can easily 
be visited, but do not necessarily want to reside in the municipality in which it is 
located, for instance because the houses that are available there are either too small 
or too expensive. Choosing a location in a nearby municipality may be a strategy that 
offers the best of both worlds. These considerations suggest that also for cultural 
heritage we should take into account the possibility that the attractiveness of a 
municipality as a residential location is determined in part by the cultural heritage in 
the surrounding municipalities, just as is the case with other amenities.17 
To take into account the possibility that the attractiveness of a particular 
municipality is partially determined by the amenities in surrounding municipalities, 
we will extend our baseline model in which only a measure of municipality 
characteristics of the Ǯownǯ municipality in our model is included, by also 
incorporating a weighted sum of municipality characteristics in the proximity.18 More 
specifically, we use the Ǯpotentialǯ formulation: 
 ??? ? ? ?????????? ?? (3.8) 
The variable ??? is a weighted sum of the measure of municipality characteristics ?? 
in municipalities m in a set ?? of municipalities surrounding n, where the weights are 
defined as an exponential function of the distance ??? between m and n. We include 
both ??? and ?? in Equation 3.7. The variable ??? can also be interpreted as a spatial 
lag with exponential weights. It introduces a spatial element into the model. Since it 
relates only to exogenous variables, this has no significant consequences for 
estimating the model in itself.19 
                                                          
17 These considerations are reinforced by the irregular shape of the Dutch municipalities. Amsterdam 
provides a good example of a municipality with an irregular boundary and some remote areas (such as 
the Bijlmer) that are further from the city center than some locations in neighboring municipalities 
(such as Amstelveen). 
18 Note that our use of characteristics of surrounding municipalities as arguments of the mean utilities 
invalidates their use as instruments for the price. This underlines the importance of our use of the 
computed instrument suggested by Bayer, McMillan & Rueben (2004) for the price. 
19 The distance decay coefficient, ?, is set at 0.08. The function is therefore exponentially decreasing 
and weights are going toward zero when distance increases (weight < 0.1 if distance is 30km). 
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However, once we admit that the attractiveness of a particular municipality as a 
residential location is affected by amenities in surrounding places, we should be 
aware of the possibility that some of the relevant amenities are unobserved.  In other 
words, it may be the case that the error term ? is affected by unobserved 
characteristics of the surrounding municipalities. If this happens, the residuals of the 
mean utilities become spatially correlated.  
A first step to deal with this concern is to use Moranǯs I to test for the presence of 
such spatial correlation between the ?ǯs. If it is absent we can continue as before. If 
not, it is desirable to take the spatial correlation into account when one wants to 
efficiently estimate the coefficients of the model. A linear equation with spatially 
correlated error terms is known as a spatial error model (SEM) and there exist 
standard techniques to deal with it (see, for instance, LeSage and Pace, 2009). 
However, until recently, the spatial econometric literature did not pay much attention 
to endogeneity, which is an important issue in the present analysis. Fortunately, a 
recent paper by Drukker, Egger & Prucha (2010) fills this gap by providing a GMM/IV 
procedure for estimating spatial econometric models in the presence of endogenous 
regressors. The GMM/IV procedure uses an iterative procedure to estimate a spatial 
error parameter that accounts for both the autoregressive and the heteroskedastic 
nature of the disturbances. 
For understanding this GMM/IV procedure it is helpful to simplify the notation of 
Equation 3.7, including Equation 3.8, and to consider the following SEM with an 
autoregressive disturbance term: 
 ?? ? ??? ? ???? ? ??  
 ?? ? ???? ? ?? (3.9) 
where ? is the autoregressive parameter and ? the spatial weight matrix which 
represents the inverse distance between municipalities.20 
The first step of the GMM/IV procedure proposed by Drukker, Egger & Prucha 
(2010) is to compute the 2SLS estimator of the first equation (Equation 3.9) without 
taking into account the spatial correlation in the error term.21 We use the iterative 
procedure discussed in Section 3.2.2 to compute the instrument for prices. We then 
use the Kelejian & Prucha (1998, 2010) procedure to get an estimate of the 
autoregressive parameter ??.  
                                                          
20 The inverse of the Euclidean distance between municipalities is used in the analysis. This seems a 
good proxy for the dense road and rail network in the Netherlands. 
21 Note that the 2SLS estimates for the parameters ? and ? will be unbiased if the underlying model is a 
SEM, but not efficient (LeSage & Pace, 2009). 
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This autoregressive parameter is used to carry out a Cochrane-Orcutt 
transformation on Equation 3.9. This results in: 
 ??? ? ???? ? ????? ? ?? (3.10) 
where ??? ? ??? ? ???????? ??? ? ??? ? ???????? ???? ? ??? ? ????????. 
Following Drukker, Egger & Prucha (2010) we then re-estimate ? and ? by using 
2SLS on Equation 3.10. In order to obtain our instrument for prices, we again use the 
iterative procedure discussed in Section 3.2.2.22  
It is important to note that our proposed spatial extension does not involve spatial 
lags of the dependent variable. The average utility that is attached to neighborhood n 
is assumed to be independent of the utility attached to neighborhoods in the vicinity. 
Direct interaction between the utilities reached in proximate locations seems 
implausible, whereas spatial lags in the explanatory variables seem highly likely, as 
we argued above. By excluding spatial lags in the dependent variable, we avoid the 
so-called reflection problem (see Manski, 1993, 2000) that complicates identification 
of social interactions. We only introduce spatial lags of some of the independent 
variables and the unobserved characteristics term ?. However, we should note that 
we maintain the conventional assumption that ? is uncorrelated with ?, except for the 
endogeneity issues concerning the price and the cultural heritage indicator that we 
discussed above. If this assumption does not hold, taking into account spatial 
correlation may help to mitigate the associated problems, although it is usually not a 
satisfactory solution (see the discussion in Gibbons & Overman (2010)).  
Summarizing, our empirical model uses the methodology developed by Bayer, 
McMillan & Rueben (2004) to deal with endogeneity of the house prices for owner 
occupiers and uses spatial econometric techniques within that framework. The 
GMM/IV procedure is computationally simple, flexible to implement in equilibrium 
sorting models, and avoids the assumption that the disturbance term is normally 
distributed and homoskedastic. In Section 3.4 we report the estimation results. 
 
3.3 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
We carry out a national analysis for the Netherlands using municipalities as our 
spatial units. The Netherlands is a small Western European country. Its urban system 
is very decentralized, although population density is highest in the so-called 
Randstad, located in the western part of the country with Amsterdam, The Hague, 
Rotterdam and Utrecht as its main cities. The central part of the Randstad is often 
referred to as The Green Heart because it is mainly agricultural. There is a lot of 
                                                          
22 Drukker, Prucha & Egger (2010) continue with a discussion of efficient estimation of ? but since our 
interest focuses on ? and ?, we do not discuss their step 2b here. 
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cross-commuting between the various parts of the country, which makes it difficult to 
define separate urban areas.  
Estimation of the equilibrium sorting model needs essentially two types of data: 
household and locational characteristics. Household characteristics are provided by 
the Netherlands Housing Research 2009 (WoON).23 The WoON survey is held every 
four years to investigate housing needs and current housing conditions of the 
population. The 2009 version provides detailed information on individual and 
household characteristics, housing attributes and location. This information is 
provided for approximately 70,000 households spread over 438 municipalities. 
We want to investigate the heterogeneous preferences of different types of 
households. In particular, we are interested in highly educated households. It has 
been argued that highly educated households are attracted to locations with cultural 
heritage in the Netherlands (Marlet & Poort, 2005). We distinguish between highly 
educated singles and double earners because highly educated double earners show a 
different work-home relation than the highly educated singles. Therefore, the 
preferences between the highly educated singles and double earners are likely to be 
different. 
The preferences of households are likely to be affected by the presence of children 
below the age of 18. The existing (predominantly Anglo-Saxon) literature mainly 
focuses on the provision of Ǯgoodǯ schools which is an important determinant of 
household location choices in the United States (Bayer, Ferreira & McMillan, 2004; 
Bénabou, 1996; Fernandez & Rogerson, 1996, 2003; Nechyba, 1999, 2000). In the 
Netherlands, the educational system is different from that in the US and the UK. There 
are no school districts (households can freely choose a school for their children) and 
denominational schools are more important than public schools. 
Finally, we also take into account the age of the head of the households. The results 
could tell us something about life-cycle preferences of households. 
Table 3.1 reports some descriptive statistics of the household types that we will 
use in the equilibrium sorting model. Highly educated singles were identified as 
single person households and the person should have at least a university degree. In 
our sample single person households represent 35% and the highly educated singles 
represent 10%. Highly educated double earners were identified as power couples 
(both partners have at least a university degree) who both have an income. Highly 
educated double earners form 10% of the households in our dataset. Around 34% of 
                                                          
23 ?Woononderzoek Nederland 2???? (WoON) in Dutch. The data includes household specific weighting 
factors that ensure representativeness of the sample for the distribution of the Dutch population over 
the municipalities. This facilitates the use of equilibrium equation 3.5 and these weights were used in 
all estimations. 
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the Dutch households have children below the age of 18. The average age of the head 
of the household is 50 years. 
These different types of households probably differ in their preferences for 
housing and urban and recreational amenities. We include five municipality 
characteristics: (i) cultural heritage, (ii) housing market, (iii) natural amenities, (iv) 
labor market, and (v) accessibility to transport facilities. 
Our main focus is on cultural heritage. The Netherlands has a rich historical 
background. It is therefore not surprising that in many locations in the Netherlands 
there is a wide variety of cultural heritage. There is not a single, generally accepted 
measure of cultural heritage but there exist a number of partial indicators. 
We have information on national monuments, archaeological sites, and Ǯhistorical 
city and village viewsǯ that is made publicly available by the Netherlands Institute for 
Cultural Heritage.24 The dataset counts 61,172 national monuments and 459 
historical city or village views. The latter are areas with many old houses or other real 
estate of cultural or scientific value arranged around a square or a canal or (parts of) 
a street that have been given an official protected status (Monumentenwet 1988). 
Such an area is appointed on the national level Ȃ after an advice at the municipal level 
Ȃ with the approval of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment. 
Many monuments are located within these areas. Historical inner cities, measured as 
the number of square kilometers of protected city views in a municipality, is our 
preferred indicator of cultural heritage. These areas represent a large share of the 
cultural heritage within a municipality. Moreover, the concentration of historical real 
estate provide the specific atmosphere of a location that presumably is the main 
attraction of cultural heritage for household location choice. 
 
Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics household characteristics 
Variables Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Highly educated working single 0.098 0.297 0 1 
Highly educated double earners 0.099 0.299 0 1 
Household with children (-18) 0.342 0.474 0 1 
Age head of household 49.97 17.27 18 107 
          
Source: WoON 2009; No. of observations is 69,149. 
 
                                                          
24 ?Rijksdienst voor het Cultureel Erfoed? in Dutch and this Service is part of the Ministry of Education, 
Culture and Science of the Netherlands. This dataset is processed in a geographic information system 
(GIS). Hence we know the exact location of these monuments, sites and landscapes. 
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We will use information on monuments and museums to examine the robustness 
of the results we reach when using historical inner cities as our indicator of cultural 
heritage. We will also use historical sceneries in our sensitivity analysis. These 
historical sceneries are usually located outside large cities and their cultural heritage 
refers as much to the landscape as to real estate. These are often less valued than 
historical inner cities. We noted in Section 3.2 that it may be argued that cultural 
heritage is endogenous. Taking into account this potential endogeneity calls for a 
suitable instrument. We propose a dummy for city rights and the population of 1650, 
for those cities for which it is known, as such. City rights were special rights and 
privileges ascribed to certain towns in the Netherlands (and elsewhere) during the 
Middle Ages. The traditional definition of a city in Europe was indeed that of a town 
with city rights. All main urban centers in late medieval Europe had city rights. 
Typically, cities had a larger population than other settlements. Nowadays, cities 
often have a lot of cultural heritage, which ensures that there is a positive correlation 
between these instruments and our indicators of cultural heritage. Moreover, in the 
larger cities typically more real estate was created. This was in particular the case in 
the 17th century when the Netherlands experienced a ǮGolden Age.ǯ The variables that 
determined whether or not a medieval town could obtain city rights were 
considerably different from those that determined city growth in the 19th and 20th 
centuries. Also, the rank size distribution of Dutch towns in the 17th century differed 
substantially from that today. This information suggests strongly that these 
instrument variables are independent of the recent treatment of cultural heritage. 
Our instruments intend to focus on the physical basis of the cultural heritage that 
plays a role in todayǯs city life. 
 
Table 3.2. Correlation matrix cultural heritage and other urban amenities 
 
Historical 
inner 
cities 
Historical 
sceneries 
Monuments Museums 
Hotel 
and 
catering 
industry 
Shops 
Historical inner cities 1 
Historical sceneries -0.03 1 
Monuments 0.58 0.06 1 
Museums 0.61 0.05 0.83 1 
Hotel and catering industry 0.65 0.03 0.85 0.92 1 
Shops 0.65 0.02 0.78 0.90 0.98 1 
              
Source: RCE (2008) and ABF (2007). 
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Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics municipality characteristics 
Variables Data source Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Historical inner cities (km2) RCE(2008) 0.24 0.90 0.00 13.34 
Historical sceneries (km2) RCE(2008) 0.36 1.64 0.00 26.07 
Monuments RCE(2008) 139 397 0 7442 
Museums ABF(2006) 2.81 4.82 0 74 
Wage (%) GGS(2011) 0.00 4.61 -18.14 16.64 
Distance to intercity station (km) ABF(2005) 10.27 7.15 1.09 41.56 
Distance to motorway ramp(km) ABF(2000) 5.45 5.15 0.14 34.30 
Nature (km2) CBS(2007) 1.37 3.33 0.00 50.36 
Water (km2) CBS(2007) 1.71 5.69 0.00 58.69 
Price of standard house (euros) NVM(2007) 190041 44160 92179 366401 
            
Note: We include 438 municipalities which covers most of the Netherlands. A few municipalities are 
left out because of the low number of household observations in the WoON 2009 dataset. 
 
We argue that cultural heritage preserved in these areas seems to function like an 
anchor point for shops, restaurants, theatres and other urban amenities. The proxies 
for cultural heritage capture a substantial part of the effect of other urban amenities. 
Table 3.2 provides a correlation matrix that gives a first impression to what extent 
the proxies for cultural heritage pick up these effects. We show that the correlations 
between the proxies for cultural heritage and other urban amenities (here: hotel and 
catering industry, and shops) do not fall below 0.6 Ȃ except for historical sceneries 
which are not found in cities. 
We capture the housing market by including a municipal price index for a standard 
house, which we interpret as the price of housing services. The price index is based 
on estimation of a standard hedonic price method with municipality fixed effects. The 
average price of the standard house is 190 041 euro. The lowest standard house price 
is in the municipality Reiderland, which is located in the north-east part of the 
Netherlands. The price index shows the expected pattern of high house prices in the 
western part of the country and in the larger cities. The highest standard house price 
is in the municipality Bloemendaal, which is located in the west part of the 
Netherlands. 
We also take into account nature and water coverage, measured as the number of 
square kilometers. These give an indication about the natural landscapes of each 
municipality. In the Middle, East and South of the Netherlands and along the coastline 
nature is in abundance. The lowest coverage of nature is located in the center of the 
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Randstad, The Green Heart. These municipalities mostly contain agricultural land. A 
fifth of The Netherlands consists of open water, rivers and lakes. This amenity is not 
only highly valued by its residents but along the coast the beaches also attract many 
tourists. 
To deal with the labor market we need a measure that reflects the labor market 
attractiveness of each municipality. We include wage differentials between 
municipalities as computed by (Groot, de Groot & Smit, 2011). These figures are the 
(municipal) fixed effects of a wage regression that takes into account all the relevant 
characteristics of workers and jobs. The general pattern is that wages are higher in 
locations within the Randstad area and in the larger cities, as one should expect. Since 
the municipality of residence of the household  is often not the same as the 
municipality in which his or her job is located, wages of surrounding municipalities 
are most likely also  important. 
Accessibility to various modes of transport can also be of importance for 
households in their location decision. Individuals have to be able to travel to their 
work whether this is by car or by train. Therefore, we include the distance to the 
nearest intercity station and the distance to the nearest motorway ramp. The distance 
to the nearest intercity station does not only pick up the preferences of households 
for travel time, but probably also picks up some of the urban amenities, which are 
often close to intercity stations in the Netherlands. Table 3.3 reports the descriptive 
statistics of these municipality characteristics.25 
 
3.4 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
This section reports and discusses the results of the residential sorting model for 
municipalities in the Netherlands. We provide an overview of the estimation results 
based on the basic residential sorting model. We first show the first step estimation 
results, which are based on the MNL model, and then the second step estimation 
results, which are based on 2SLS. Furthermore, we report results of the spatial 
extensions of the equilibrium sorting model accounting for spatial dependence in 
various ways. 
 
3.4.1  THE BASIC RESIDENTIAL SORTING MODEL 
In the first step of the residential sorting model developed by Bayer, McMillan & 
Rueben (2004) we estimate the mean utilities and the coefficients of Equation 3.6 via 
MNL with the location choice (municipality) of households as the dependent variable. 
In 2009, there were 438 municipalities in the Netherlands and we distinguish rental 
and owner-occupied housing. Apart from the mean utilities, which are estimated as 
                                                          
25 Correlations between these variables and the instruments can be found in Appendix 3.A. 
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alternative specific constants, we include cross effects of household and municipality 
characteristics as described in Section 3.2.2. We estimated two sets of coefficients: 
one for the rental sector and another for the owner-occupied sector. The reason is 
that the allocation mechanism in the rental sector is considerably different from that 
in the owner-occupied sector. More than 90% of the rental housing stock is rent 
controlled and waiting lists are often long, especially in the big cities.26 Priority is 
given to households that are judged to be especially in need of housing, but the rules 
used are not transparent to outsiders. Given these large differences, we decided to 
include the rental sector in each municipality as an alternative for the owner-
occupied sector. In the Netherlands Housing Research 2009 we have information on 
the renter and owner-occupied status of each household. We use this to estimate 
different sets of coefficients for rental and owner-occupied housing.27 Although this is 
not a fully-fledged model of tenure choice, this approach is reasonably flexible and 
should suffice for the purposes of the present paper.28 
We are, in particular, interested in the heterogeneous preferences of households 
for cultural heritage. The basic version of the model uses the historical inner cities as 
an indicator of cultural heritage in a municipality. The coefficients of the cross effects 
of household and municipality characteristics, ????, for homeowners are reported in 
Table 3.4. The results give an indication how the different types of households value 
municipality characteristics. They show, for instance, that highly educated 
households are less sensitive to high house prices than the average Dutch household, 
whereas the presence of children and being older tend to make people more sensitive 
to house prices. Appreciation of historical inner cities, which are of key interest in the 
present study, is higher than average among the highly educated singles, and less 
than average among households with children and the elderly. No significant 
coefficient is found for high educated double earners. Perhaps the time constraints 
that are related to work and a relationship are the reason why they value cultural 
heritage less than highly educated singles. 
 
 
                                                          
26 Rents are determined on the basis of quality points, which ignore location characteristics. This 
implies that houses with the same structural characteristics in Amsterdam and the periphery of the 
country have basically the same rents. 
27 An alternative would be to assume that households first decide to rent or own, and then choose a 
residential location. This would suggest the development of a model for the owner-occupied sector 
only. A disadvantage of this approach would be that it does not take into account that the accessibility 
of rental housing differs substantially over the country, which suggests that the two tenure types are 
much better substitutes in some municipalities than in others. 
28 The data does not inform us about wealth and possibilities to get a mortgage. 
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Table 3.4. First step estimation procedure: Interaction parameter estimates 
Municipality characteristics Household characteristics 
 Highly educated 
single 
Highly 
educated 
double earners 
Households 
with children (-
18) 
Age 
Standardized house price (ln euros) 0.01850 0.00701 -0.00636 -0.00026 
 
(0.00255)*** (0.00245)*** (0.00165)*** (0.00004)*** 
Historical inner cities (km2) 0.04708 0.00614 -0.02994 -0.00108 
 
(0.00476)*** (0.00522) (0.00358)*** (0.00009)*** 
Wage (%) 0.02440 0.01516 0.00029 -0.00033 
 
(0.00419)*** (0.00367)*** (0.00242) (0.00007)*** 
Distance to intercity station (km) -0.04171 -0.01726 0.02033 0.00052 
 
(0.00314)*** (0.00274)*** (0.00168)*** (0.00005)*** 
Distance to motorway ramp (km) -0.03758 -0.02172 0.00142 0.00032 
 
(0.00457)*** (0.00389)*** (0.00233) (0.00007)*** 
Nature (km2) -0.02048 0.00950 0.01213 0.00063 
 
(0.00532)*** (0.00486)* (0.00333)*** (0.00009)*** 
Water (km2) 0.01029 -0.01580 -0.00495 -0.00033 
 
(0.00296)*** (0.003)*** (0.00186)*** (0.00005)*** 
          
Note: Parameter estimates reported with all variables normalized to have mean zero. These 
coefficients report the deviations from the mean indirect utility. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Significance at 90%, 95% and 99% level are, respectively, indicated as *, **, and ***. The regression 
results based on other proxies or scenarios can be obtained from the author. 
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Table 3.5. Second step estimation procedure: Decomposition of the mean indirect utilities 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
OLS (se) 2SLS (se) 2SLS (se) 
Standard house price (ln euros) -0.827 (0.163)*** -14.603 (2.874)*** -15.138 (3.183)*** 
Historical inner cities (km2) 0.273 (0.038)*** 0.331 (0.159)** 0.907 (0.330)*** 
Wage (%) 0.034 (0.008)*** 0.182 (0.044)*** 0.172 (0.045)*** 
Distance to intercity station (km) -0.042 (0.005)*** -0.149 (0.031)*** -0.142 (0.032)*** 
Distance to motorway ramp (km) -0.023 (0.008)*** -0.156 (0.042)*** -0.163 (0.045)*** 
Nature (km2) 0.034 (0.013)*** 0.285 (0.074)*** 0.305 (0.082)*** 
Water (km2) -0.008 (0.008) -0.075 (0.035)** -0.090 (0.038)** 
         
Constant 10.76 (1.97)*** 176.72 (34.63)*** 183.22 (38.37)*** 
     
Price instrumented no yes yes 
Cultural heritage instrumented no no yes 
                      
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at 90%, 95% and 99% level are, respectively, 
indicated as *, **, and ***. The regression results based on the other proxies can be obtained from the 
author. 
 
The second step of the residential sorting model consists of 2SLS estimation of 
Equation 3.7.29 The dependent variable is the vector of mean indirect utilities Ȃ in 
other words that part of the utility that is equal for all households.30 We deal with 
endogeneity through instrumental variables as discussed in Section 3.2.2. The 
instrument for house prices is computed as the equilibrium housing price that would 
prevail in the absence of unobserved heterogeneity. The results of the estimation can 
be found in Table 3.5, which reports the effect of municipality characteristics on the 
indirect utilities of the average household. Column 1 shows the simple OLS results, 
which ignores any endogeneity. The OLS results show a highly significant negative 
effect of the house price and a highly significant positive effect of historical inner 
cities. Column 2 shows the 2SLS results, which takes into account the correlation 
between the price variable and the unobserved characteristics. Some of the 
parameter estimates change substantially when we use the instrumental variables, 
notably the price coefficient, as is not uncommon in these models.31 In Column 3, 
                                                          
29 First stage regression estimates of the 2SLS are available upon request. The null hypothesis of both 
under- and weak identification are rejected. 
30 The vector of mean indirect utilities, ??, was estimated as alternative specific constants in the first 
step of the estimation procedure (Equation 3.6). 
31 See, for example, Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes (1995). 
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historical inner cities are instrumented with city rights and population of 1650. This 
results in a much higher and still significant coefficient for historical inner cities, 
while the changes in the coefficients of the other variables are modest. If 
municipalities with a small amount of cultural heritage tend to maintain it better and 
use it more intensively for city marketing purposes, the result may be a smaller 
coefficient for historical inner cities when it is not instrumented. 
 
3.4.2  SPATIAL EXTENSIONS 
We now introduce some spatial extensions of the model. The first one is the inclusion 
of cultural heritage, wages and natural amenities in surrounding municipalities 
among the explanatory variables. These new (spatial) independent variables were 
introduced in Section 3.2.4. In the second extension we also account for spatial 
dependence of the disturbance term, following Equation 3.9. 
Moranǯs I and the (robust) Lagrange multipliers for the spatial error model are 
used to test whether the residuals of the 2SLS estimation show a spatial pattern. We 
find that this is not only the case in our base model but also in the model where we 
include the characteristics of surrounding municipalities. Table 3.6 reports Moranǯs I 
and the (robust) Lagrange multipliers which are the results of our extended model 
where we include the characteristics in surrounding municipalities. Moranǯs I statistic 
clearly shows that the residuals still show a spatial pattern. Both the Lagrange 
multiplier and the robust Lagrange multiplier tests for the spatial error model show 
significant values. A (natural) next step is to incorporate the spatial error model. The 
spatial error model should be flexible in the sense that it can be combined with the 
equilibrium sorting model with endogenous regressors and is computationally 
simple. The GMM/IV procedure by Drukker, Egger & Prucha (2010) gives us the 
opportunity to do so. 
 
Table 3.6. Test statistics for spatial dependence 
Test Statistic p-value 
Moran's I 3.358 0.001 
Spatial error 
Lagrange multiplier 7.986 0.005 
Robust Lagrange multiplier 11.290 0.001 
      
Note: These statistics are computed in GAUSS and STATA. 
Source: Anselin (1988) and Anselin et al. (1996). 
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In the first extension we add variables that represent the municipality 
characteristics in surrounding municipalities through a distance decay function as 
described in Section 3.2.4.32 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.7 report these results. The 
coefficient of the historical inner cities in surrounding municipalities can be 
interpreted as the effect of a one square kilometer increase of the historical inner city 
in a municipality at a distance of around 20km. The same holds for the natural 
amenities in surrounding municipalities. The coefficient of the wages in surrounding 
municipalities can be interpreted as the effect of a 1% increase of the wages in all 
surrounding municipalities. The signs of the significant coefficients are identical to 
those in the corresponding columns in Table 3.5. A comparison makes clear that the 
introduction of cultural heritage in the surrounding municipalities has a substantial 
impact on the estimation results. The coefficients for the house price and a historical 
inner city in the own municipality increase in absolute value, while the coefficient for 
historical inner cities in surrounding municipalities also gets a large and significant 
coefficient. This remains true if we instrument historical inner cities by city rights and 
population of 1650. The coefficient of the wage in the municipality of residence and 
the wage potential is no longer statistically significant. A possible explanation for this 
finding is that the local wage effect is measured with some error, especially for the 
smaller municipalities. The wage potential can be regarded as a kind of average wage 
indicator for the surrounding municipalities which should be less sensitive to 
measurement error but is nevertheless not significant. 
Columns 3 and 4 show that the results of taking into account spatial correlation in 
the unobserved heterogeneity through the GMM/IV procedure developed by Drukker, 
Egger & Prucha (2010) does not change the results much but makes the estimation 
parameters more efficient. 
 
3.4.3  SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
Before ending this section, we briefly report the results of some sensitivity analyses. 
We have estimated variants of our model in which we included other proxies for 
cultural heritage: the number of monuments33 per municipality and the number of 
museums per municipality. This did not result in substantial differences of the 
coefficients estimated for the other variables and the estimated WTP measures were 
of comparable order of magnitude when focusing on the same percentage change. 
Another proxy for cultural heritage, namely historical sceneries, we found no 
                                                          
32 The distance decay function gives cultural heritage in the surrounding municipalities a lower weight. 
The average distance in this sample Ȃ measured from the core of a municipality to the cores of the 
surrounding municipalities within a radius of 30 km Ȃ is 19.6 km. 
33 We included the number of objects with the official status of a national monument. 
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significant estimates. We also included other proxies for the labor market: Distance to 
the nearest concentration of 100,000 jobs and number of total jobs per municipality. 
These alternative indicators were included instead of as well as in combination with 
the wage indicator in separate estimations. In all these cases we found similar results. 
In particular, the indicators for cultural heritage (except for historical sceneries) were 
always significant and of the same order of magnitude. Using city rights and 
population of 1650 as instruments for these alternative proxies for cultural heritage 
did increase the coefficient in the same way as it did for the historical inner cities. 
This suggests that our results are reasonably robust. 
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3.5 IMPLICATIONS 
3.5.1  MARGINAL WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY 
In this section we consider some implications of our estimation results. We focus on 
the results reported in Column 3 of Table 3.7, where spatial effects are taken into 
account. We choose this specification because it indicates a somewhat smaller effect 
of cultural heritage than the model in which we instrument this variable. With the 
estimation results in hand it is simple to compute the marginal willingness-to-pay 
(MWTP) of various households for municipality characteristics (see Appendix 3.B for 
technical details). This allows us to compare between municipalities, not within 
municipalities. Table 3.8 reports the mean MWTP for some municipality 
characteristics (in Column 1) and the deviations from that mean of various household 
types (in the other columns).  
The MWTP Ȃ in terms of higher house prices Ȃ for historical inner cities is large 
and significant (̀5495/km2). The MWTP for historical inner cities in surrounding 
municipalities is also positive and significant (̀1026/km2). The interpretation of the 
MWTP for historical inner cities in surrounding municipalities is that an extra square 
kilometer of historical inner cities in surrounding municipality B Ȃ where the distance 
between neighboring municipalities A and B is around 20km (the mean distance 
between neighboring municipalities in the Netherlands) Ȃ has an effect of ̀1026 on 
the mean marginal MWTP in terms of house prices in municipality A. The same 
interpretation holds for natural amenities (+km2) in surrounding municipalities. The 
interpretation of the wage in surrounding municipalities is that an extra percent in all 
surrounding municipalities has an effect of ̀1275 on the mean MWTP but it is not 
significant. 
The deviations of the mean MWTP of highly educated singles and double earners 
are reported in columns 2 and 3, respectively. Highly educated singles have a MWTP 
for residing in municipalities with a large historical inner city that is around 5% 
larger than the average household, for power couples the deviation is a bit more than 
2% than the average household. This implies that municipalities with a large area of 
historical inner cities attract highly educated households relative to the average 
household, but not by a large amount. These highly educated households also appear 
to have a tendency to live in municipalities that have high wages and good 
accessibility to intercity stations. Natural landscapes are somewhat of less 
importance for highly educated households. 
Column 4 reports the results of the households with children under 18. Those 
households compared to the average household do not prefer to reside in 
municipalities with historical inner cities and high wages. Households with children 
are rather identified by the fact that they prefer to reside further away from labor 
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markets with high wages and intercity stations but instead they prefer to reside in 
municipalities with a larger area of nature and in the vicinity of historical city centers. 
In Column 5, we show that younger households are willing to pay more to live in 
municipalities with a larger area of protected historical inner cities. We also see that 
younger households prefer to live in municipalities with high wages. On the other 
hand, older households prefer to live in municipalities with a larger share of nature 
and in the vicinity of a municipality with a historical inner city. This implies that 
younger households tend to move to municipalities with a large area of historical 
inner cities where the labor market is also attractive and live close to transport 
facilities whereas older households tend to move away from municipalities with a 
favorable business environment to municipalities where they can enjoy more nature. 
This result is in line with the recent work of Chen and Rosenthal (2008) for the US. 
 
Table 3.8. Marginal willingness-to-pay results from the GMM/IV spatial error model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Variables Mean 
 
Highly 
educated 
working 
single 
Highly 
educated 
double 
earners 
Households 
with 
children (-
18) 
Age (+10 
years) 
Historical inner cities (+km2) 5495.4 
 
357.2 
 
123.1 
 
-98.2 
 
-60.5 
 
Historical inner cities in 
surrounding mun's (+km2) 
1025.7 
 
13.6 
 
35.1 
 
24.1 
 
12.4 
 
Wage (+%) 529.6 
 
84.3 
 
16.7 (ns) -46.7 
 
-52.8 
 
Wage in surrounding mun's (+%) 1274.6 (ns) 72.3 
 
47.4 (ns) -0.5 
 
3.2 (ns) 
Distance to intercity station (-
km) 
964.8 
 
302.9 
 
121.5 
 
-106.3 
 
-41.5 
 
Distance to motorway ramp (-
km) 
218.9 (ns) 204.5 
 
67.9 
 
-36.4 
 
-37.7 
 
Nature (+km2) 3416.0 
 
-220.6 
 
-18.6 (ns) 77.0 
 
56.9 
 
Nature in surrounding mun's 
(+km2) 
978.0 (ns) 53.9 
 
70.0 
 
13.4 
 
2.2 (ns) 
Water (+km2) -504.3 
 
123.3 
 
-36.0 (ns) -29.1 
 
-25.4 
 
Water in surrounding mun's 
(+km2) 
-167.1 (ns) -19.8 
 
-32.5 
 
5.2 
 
-2.4 
 
                      
Note: The values in this table are in euros. The first column reports the mean willingness-to-pay of a 
marginal positive (+) or negative (-) change of the municipality characteristic. Columns 2 through 6 
report the deviation from the mean willingness-to-pay for that type of household. (ns) means not 
significant at 5% level. The significant levels of Columns 2 through 5 are based on the first step of the 
residential sorting model. 
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3.5.2  COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS 
The sorting model suggests that house prices react to differences in consumer 
amenities and we therefore expect that observed differences in house prices between 
municipalities can be explained by differences in the willingness-to-pay for the 
bundles of amenities offered by these cities. To illustrate this, we consider pairs of 
municipalities in the Netherlands that are related in the sense that one can be 
considered as a Ǯsatelliteǯ of the other. Dutch spatial planning is rather tight and 
attempts to mitigate the growth of the largest cities by concentrating new housing 
supply in growth centers at some distance from these mother cities. The growth 
centers thus become satellites of these larger cities and typically have more nature 
but less cultural amenities. Accessibility to jobs is typically less good in the satellites, 
and house prices are usually much lower than in the mother cities.  
Table 3.9 provides information on two of such mother-satellite pairs, viz, 
Amsterdam - Almere and Utrecht - Nieuwegein. The housing price in Amsterdam is 
almost twice as high as in Almere (̀313k vs. ̀162k); the difference between Utrecht 
and Nieuwegein is smaller (̀250k vs. ̀206k), but still approximately 20%. The 
differences in city characteristics are large. For instance, Amsterdam has more than 7 
km2 of historical inner city, whereas Almere has no protected historical inner city and 
somewhat lower wages. On the other hand, Almere has more nature and water. There 
are similar differences between Utrecht and Nieuwegein, but they are of a smaller 
size, as is true for the difference in house prices. Table 3.9 also reports the MWTP for 
each characteristic in each municipality for the average Dutch household. The 
outcome of our computations is that the average Dutch household is willing to pay 
approximately ̀65,000 more for a standard house in Amsterdam than for a similar 
house in Almere and ̀10,000 more for a house in Utrecht than a similar one in 
Nieuwegein because of the direct and indirect effects of the presence of cultural 
heritage. The actual difference in house prices between Amsterdam and Almere is 
large because of the strong WTP of particular groups for the cultural heritage that is 
abundantly available in the mother cities and absent in the satellites, and by 
differences in unobserved amenities. 
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 Table 3.10. Counterfactual simulation: Eliminating cultural heritage using the GMM/IV procedure 
    Amsterdam Almere   Utrecht Nieuwegein 
Standardized house price (in euros) 312,539 162,834 250,317 206,176 
Predicted house price (in euros)           
Adjusted equilibrium - No cultural 
heritage 
 
259,678 157,229 
 
230,879 188,081 
ȟ -52,861 -5,605 -19,438 -18,095 
% 17% 3% 8% 9% 
              
Note: The estimated house prices, taken into account the adjusted equilibrium, are reported as a 
counterfactual simulation that sets all cultural heritage to zero. 
 
We have also carried out a counterfactual simulation in which we compute the 
house prices that would prevail if there were no differences in the availability of 
cultural heritage among Dutch municipalities. We set cultural heritage in each 
municipality at zero as if cultural heritage would not exist. This result in a new 
equilibrium and therefore new equilibrium prices (see Appendix 3.C for technical 
details). We then compute the house prices and scale them so the mean house price in 
the situation with and without cultural heritage is identical. 
Table 3.10 reports the prices of a standard house in both situations for each of the 
four municipalities. Our results show that the municipalities with cultural heritage in 
their municipality or in their vicinity are affected by a significant decrease in prices 
for a standard house. The house price in Amsterdam, for instance, would decrease by 
17%. This high percentage is expected to be around the upper boundary as 
Amsterdam is one of the municipalities with the most cultural heritage in the 
Netherlands. Municipalities with less cultural heritage than Amsterdam, like Utrecht, 
prices would decrease around 8%. Even in the municipalities in the vicinity of rich 
areas of cultural heritage, like the satellite cities, house prices will decrease.  
Another interesting observation is that the gap between the price of a standard 
house in Amsterdam and Utrecht will almost disappear. However, these 
municipalities still have favorable characteristics regarding to the wages and the 
accessibility of transport facilities. For this reason the price of a standard house in 
these main municipalities will still be larger than their satellite municipalities. 
 
3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this empirical paper we investigate whether cultural heritage affects the location 
choice of different households. We attempt to measure the value households attach to 
cultural heritage using a recent developed sorting model on Dutch data. While the 
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existing literature on the valuation of cultural heritage has provided no conclusive 
evidence about the impact of cultural heritage on the attractiveness of cities, this 
paper focuses on that issue and suggests that the impact is large. The total impact is 
the sum of a direct effect Ȃ an ancient inner city makes a city more attractive Ȃ and an 
indirect effect Ȃ a city that is attractive because of its cultural heritage is a good 
location for shops, cafés, restaurants et cetera, and this contributes further to its 
attractiveness. 
Households reveal their preferences for locational characteristics by choosing their 
location. Our analysis uses the equilibrium framework developed by Bayer, McMillan 
& Rueben (2004) in which house prices equilibrate demand and supply for housing in 
each municipality. We find positive and significant values for the mean marginal 
willingness-to-pay for residential locations close to protected historical inner cities. 
The marginal willingness-to-pay for cultural heritage varies substantially between 
different types of households. Highly educated households have the highest marginal 
willingness-to-pay for this amenity and are therefore attracted to municipalities with 
a higher than average amount. 
Our findings make clear that the success of a city does not only depend on job 
opportunities and transport facilities, but also on cultural heritage. Indeed, the impact 
of such amenities seems so large that our findings can be interpreted as empirically 
confirming Brueckner, Thisse & Zenou (1999)ǯs contention that central Paris is rich 
and central Detroit is poor because of the huge differences in amenities.   
Although it is clear that politicians cannot create (authentic) cultural heritage, 
there is a clear policy suggestion implied by our analysis: maintenance of cultural 
heritage and exposing it to visitors and residents can contribute substantially to the 
attractiveness of cities. Further research should try to look more carefully into the 
issues of maintenance and exposure than the data at our disposal allowed us to do.  
In a geographical setting it is likely that the locational characteristics are spatially 
correlated between locations. This spatial dependence is present in our sample. This 
complicates the estimation procedure and the original estimates are then likely to be 
biased due to omitted variables. We presented two possible extensions. The first 
extension has taken into account the spatial dependence of municipality 
characteristics. The second extension uses the GMM/IV spatial error model to account 
for the spatial dependence in the disturbance term in a setting with endogenous 
regressors. Our model suggests that the first extension is a crucial one. We show that 
accounting for characteristics of surrounding locations, in particular cultural heritage 
in surrounding municipalities in our setting, is important for the location choice of 
households and that, in general, accounting for the unobserved characteristics of 
surrounding municipalities can help against the omitted variable bias caused by the 
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attractiveness of surrounding municipalities. This improves the estimation of the 
model. The results report less biased and more efficient MWTP results for cultural 
heritage. This gives us an idea what the impact is of including characteristics of 
surrounding locations and the spatial error model in an empirical setting. 
In our simulation we show that, if there would be no cultural heritage the price of a 
standard house in Amsterdam would decrease around 17%. This decrease will be 
around the upper boundary since Amsterdam is one of the richest areas regarding 
cultural heritage. In Utrecht, this decrease is around 7%. Because of this decrease, the 
house price discrepancy between Amsterdam and Utrecht decreases. The satellite 
municipalities, Almere and Nieuwegein, do also suffer from a decrease since they are 
in the vicinity of areas with cultural heritage. The main municipality would, in this 
situation with no cultural heritage, still have a higher price of a standard house 
because of its favorable characteristics regarding to the wages and the accessibility to 
transport facilities. 
Combining the equilibrium sorting model with spatial econometrics gives us the 
opportunity to not only account for the heterogeneity of households and unobserved 
characteristics of locations, but also for the observed and unobserved characteristics 
of surrounding locations. In our opinion it is important to think about spatial 
correlations when you do research in a locational setting. Future research on linking 
those streams of literature should be most interesting. 
We conclude with a discussion of some relevant extensions that could be 
addressed in future work. First, although it is standard in the literature to assume 
that unobserved heterogeneity can be captured by a scalar variable, it is not unlikely 
that several dimensions are present. Athey & Imbens (2007) develop an approach for 
dealing with this issue and show that it can indeed be important to treat unobserved 
heterogeneity as a vector. Second, we have treated cultural heritage as a pure public 
good, whereas the crowdedness of the main attractions of a city like Amsterdam 
during the holiday seasons may decrease its attractiveness. This is probably less of a 
concern for residents than for tourists, but it may still be the case that some people do 
not wish to live in Amsterdam because of the many tourists there. For others, this 
phenomenon may contribute to the cosmopolitan atmosphere of this city that is 
experienced as one of its attractive features. Third, it is possible that the labor market 
in a particular region is insufficiently characterized by variables like the local wage 
component or the distance to the nearest substantial concentration of jobs that do not 
differentiate between types of workers. It is well known, for instance, that for highly 
educated couples with specialized skills the large and dense labor markets of 
metropolitan areas offer important advantages (Costa & Kahn, 2000). Finally, our 
analysis shows that the impact of cultural heritage extends outside the borders of the 
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municipality in which it is located. This means that surrounding municipalities also 
benefit from this amenity. If the costs of maintaining cultural heritage would have to 
be financed completely by the municipality in which it is located, this would result in 
underinvestment. However, in the Netherlands the national government is heavily 
involved in these activities, and therefore this conclusion may not be valid. It is also 
not clear that the government acts on the basis of the WTP for cultural heritage of 
residents and visitors. It is therefore an open question whether a sufficient amount of 
local and national public money is assigned to this amenity. We hope at least that the 
figures presented in this paper contribute to an efficient allocation of resources to the 
remnants of the past that remain useful in the present. 
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APPENDIX 3.B. DERIVATION OF THE MARGINAL WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY 
 
The procedure to derive the marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) for locational 
characteristics is as follows. Equation 3.6 and 3.7 can be written as a hedonic price 
regression allowing for heterogeneity in household preferences. 
??? ? ?
??? ? ????????? ? ????
???? ? ????????? ? ????
? ??? ? ?
?
???? ? ????????? ? ????
? ??
? ? ????? ? ????????? ? ????
? ??? ? ?
?
???? ? ????????? ? ????
? ??? ? 
where ??? ? ?????? ? . It is now simple to compute the MWTP of each i type of 
household for each locational characteristic ???? ?. 
????
???? ? ?
??? ???????????????
??? ???????????????? ??? . 
The household characteristics are constructed to have mean zero. This simplifies 
the MWTP of the average household, 
????
???? ? ?
???
??? ? ??? . 
The sorting model controls for the preferences of each type of household. As a 
result the MWTP of the average household can be substantially different from the 
MWTP of a particular type of household. This provides a household specific valuation 
of each locational characteristic. 
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APPENDIX 3.C. COUNTERFACTUAL SIMULATION 
 
The sorting model can predict how certain policies which target amenities affect 
equilibrium prices. In our counterfactual analysis we allow cultural heritage to be the 
same for each municipality. These changes result in different probabilities of 
household i choosing municipality n. The equilibrium condition is given in 
Equation 3.5: 
? ????
?
???
? ??? 
where the probabilities are estimated by a conventional logit model. We can 
transform the equation as follows:
 
?? ??
????
? ????????
?
???
? 
where ???  is the deterministic part of the utility in Equation 3.1. If cultural heritage 
would not exist, we set cultural heritage to zero which is included in the deterministic 
part. This implies that the market clearing condition does not hold anymore at the 
original prices. Therefore, prices have to adjust in order to satisfy the market clearing 
condition in the alternative situation without cultural heritage. For comparison, we 
scale the new equilibrium prices so that the average price in the situation with and 
without cultural heritage is identical. Also demand in the rental sector will change, 
and in the absence of market prices we have adjusted the alternative specific constant 
to take simulate the new equilibrium. The change in the alternative specific constant 
can be interpreted as reflecting the change in the average length of waiting times 
caused by the change in cultural heritage. The procedure results in predicted prices 
for owner occupied housing in all Dutch municipalities in the counterfactual situation 
in which there would be no cultural heritage, or (what amounts to the same thing) in 
which the cultural heritage were equally distributed over space. 
 
 
 4 SORTING BASED ON AMENITIES AND INCOME 
COMPOSITION: EVIDENCE FROM THE AMSTERDAM 
AREA 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Urban amenities are becoming more prominent in the residential location choice. 
Although the work location will always be an important factor for location choice of 
households, as is stressed in the Alonso-Muth-Mills models, other consumer needs 
are growing in relative importance. This has certain implications for urban growth. It 
is argued that certain consumers enjoy cultural heritage, and therefore they choose a 
location that has a cultural identity. If this statement is correct, research on which 
consumers are attracted to these locations is very interesting for local policy makers. 
This is not only relevant for the largest European cities, of which most have a historic 
city center, but also for other cities that have the prospect of becoming a historic city. 
Typical consumers could be identified, for example, by income composition or life-
cycle status. This paper investigates the location choice of households that are in 
different stages of the life-cycle, and therefore have a different income composition. 
The analysis distinguishes students, (self-)employed, unemployed, retired 
households, and we include their income. Each of these households have a different 
set of location preferences. We investigate the heterogeneous preferences of these 
households on neighborhood characteristics, such as house prices, proximity to large 
labor markets, concentration of high income households, and the area of historic city 
center. We focus on the Amsterdam area. We use a horizontal sorting model, 
following Bayer, McMillan & Rueben (2004; 2007), and Bayer & 
Timmins (2005; 2007), to find evidence on which amenities drive sorting considering 
different types of households. The basic idea of the sorting model is that households 
choose among neighborhoods on the basis of the neighborhood characteristics. We do 
not observe all observed characteristics. The advantage of using a sorting model is 
that it controls for heterogeneous households and unobserved characteristics. 
Cultural heritage is one of the observed amenities. We define it as all those features 
(e.g. listed buildings, monuments) that relate the past to the present, but it is the 
combination of all these features which contribute to the cultural identity of a city. In 
the literature, this is called the ensemble effect (Brueckner, Thisse & Zenou, 1999; 
Lazrak et al., 2011). Therefore, in this paper we focus on the historic city center of 
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Amsterdam, which is a national conservation area, where most important historic 
buildings date back to the seventeenth century Ȃ the Dutch Golden Age Ȃ or earlier. 
This paper also considers including spatial elements in the sorting model by 
accounting for the characteristics of surrounding neighborhoods. Households living 
just outside the historic city center can still enjoy the amenities that the historic city 
center has to offer. This means that certain characteristics of surrounding 
neighborhoods have an effect on the attractiveness of its own neighborhood. Taking 
into account the spatial elements in the sorting model can therefore be of potential 
importance. Hence our modeling approach combines an equilibrium sorting model 
and spatial spillover effects. 
This paper is related to the previous chapter which studies the distribution of 
heterogeneous households over Dutch municipalities using a horizontal sorting 
framework. In this paper, we concentrate on a smaller spatial scale, viz. the 
Amsterdam area. Since this area can be regarded as a single labor market, we can take 
wages as given. Since the spatial units that we now distinguish are smaller, we pay 
more attention to the impact of the demographic composition on neighborhood 
choice. We focus, in particular, on the concentration of high income households. We 
show there is a relation between the historic city center and the concentration of high 
income households in the Amsterdam area. We provide strong evidence that the 
historic city center attracts high income households. This increases the share of high 
income households in the neighborhood, which then attracts additional high income 
households. This suggests that there are indeed multiplier effects present regarding 
the effect of living in or close to a historic city center. 
In Section 2, we discuss the methodology concerning the residential sorting model 
and the introduction of spatial elements in the model. Our unique data on household 
and neighborhood characteristics, as well as, some descriptive statistics are discussed 
in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the estimation results. The implications of these 
results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
 
4.2 THE LOCATION CHOICE MODEL 
4.2.1 METHODOLOGY 
This study focuses on the location decisions of households with a different income 
composition and whether these households are attracted by cultural heritage within 
the Amsterdam area. We observe large variation in house prices within the 
Amsterdam area (see Figure 4.A.1 in Appendix 4.A). If this picture also reflects the 
income distribution, it is interesting to investigate these differences. High income 
households are mainly located in the city center, but can also be found in some 
neighborhoods outside the city center. Low income households are mainly found in 
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the fringes of the city, but because of the unique rental market in the Netherlands, 
they are also found in the center of Amsterdam. We distinguish households not only 
by their income, but also by their social economic status. We are able to identify 
households that are in different stages of the life-cycle: students, (self-)employed, 
unemployed and retired households. Apart from the quality of the house, it is 
interesting to analyze what other motives play a role in the location decision of these 
households. Although, we are in particular interested which of these households are 
attracted by cultural heritage, we also investigate if they are attracted by high income 
neighborhoods. 
We focus on the historic city center of Amsterdam as an amenity that plays a role 
in the location choice of households. The historic city center contributes to the 
atmosphere in the area and to its attractiveness for residents, firms, and tourists. As a 
result, there are more shops, restaurants and similar endogenous amenities in these 
areas, which further contribute to its attractiveness. Hence, it may be the case that 
historic city centers have a multiplier effect through its impact on endogenous 
amenities. We provide a first step to identify those multiplier effects regarding the 
effect of the historic city center with respect to the concentration of high income 
households (for technical details, see Appendix 4.B) 
We use the framework of sorting models developed by Bayer, McMillan & 
Rueben (2004). This framework has emerged in the last two decades and has its roots 
in the theoretical literature (e.g. Tiebout, 1956; Epple, Filimon & Romer, 1984; 
Benabou, 1993; Anas & Kim, 1996; Nechyba, 1999) analyzing how households sort 
themselves into local jurisdictions to enjoy its desired level of a public good. In the 
empirical literature, two main types of household location choice models Ȃ horizontal 
and vertical Ȃ are distinguished that diverge in the type of heterogeneity in 
preferences they allow. Vertical sorting models often study heterogeneity in a single 
dimension (e.g. Epple & Platt, 1998; Epple & Sieg, 1999). Horizontal sorting models 
use the additive random utility framework for discrete choice, first introduced by 
McFadden (1973), that allows for a more flexible approach concerning amenity and 
household heterogeneity (which is particularly relevant in our case).  Bayer, McMillan 
& Rueben (2004) provide a framework for applying the horizontal sorting model 
which has recently been applied in a variety of empirical studies (Timmins, 2005; 
Murdock, 2006; Klaiber & Phaneuf, 2010). For applications with a large number of 
choice alternatives, the multinomial logit (MNL) is the only tractable specification of 
an additive random utility model. Although this model is known to suffer from the 
restrictive independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property. Recent literature 
has stressed that this property is not present at the level of the population if a 
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sufficient amount of heterogeneity among the actors is allowed.34 Moreover, it is now 
possible to incorporate unobserved characteristics of choice alternatives into the 
model, and to deal with the related endogeneity problems through a two-step 
procedure. 
 
4.2.2 BASIC SPECIFICATION 
The framework that we use in this paper follows the sorting model developed by 
Bayer, McMillan & Rueben (2004). We follow the random utility framework and 
consider a population of households, indexed by ? ? ?? ?, that have to choose a 
residential location from a large number, N, of alternatives ?? ? ???? with K 
?? ? ???? characteristics. In our application, the alternatives consist of 
neighborhoods in the Amsterdam area. The utility of household i from choosing to 
reside in neighborhood n is given as: 
 ??? ? ? ???????? ??? ? ?? ? ???  . (4.1) 
In this equation, ???  denotes the value of the k-th characteristic of neighborhood n, 
the vector ?? are the unobserved neighborhood characteristics, the ????ǯs are 
coefficients and the ?ǯs random variables. The vector ?? includes indicators of 
observable neighborhood characteristics, observable household characteristics, and 
prices. Note that the coefficients, ????, are individual-specific. They are functions of 
household characteristics Z: 
 ???? ? ???? ? ? ???????? ????? ? ???? . (4.2) 
In this equation ???? denotes the value of the l-th characteristic of household i 
?? ? ????, and ???  the population mean of characteristic l, while the ?ǯs are 
coefficients. Household characteristics include income, life-cycle status, et cetera. 
Using Equation 4.2, we can rewrite utility as: 
 ??? ? ? ??????? ??? ? ?? ? ? ?? ???????? ????? ? ????????? ??? ? ???  .  (4.3) 
If we assume that all random variables are IID extreme value type I distributed, the 
choice probabilities of utility maximizing households can be derived in closed form 
as: 
                                                          
34 For an insightful discussion on the assumptions of the vertical and horizontal sorting models, see 
Chapter 2 or Kuminoff, Smith & Timmins (2010). Another way to deal with heterogeneity among actors 
is using the mixed logit models (see, for example, Train & McFadden, 2000), which we will not discuss 
here. 
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 ???? ? ??????? ?? ??????? ????? , (4.4) 
where ???  is the deterministic part of the utility function in Equation 4.3. The sum of 
the probabilities yields the predicted demand for each neighborhood. Given the 
housing stock in each neighborhood, demand should be equal to the supply in each 
neighborhood to clear the housing market. The housing market clearing condition is 
then defined as: 
 ? ???????? ? ??. (4.5) 
It is important to note that this condition determines the equilibrium price of housing 
in each neighborhood. Although the model does not result in a closed-form 
specification of the equilibrium price equation, estimated versions allow the 
computation of equilibrium prices for all neighborhoods with counterfactual values of 
amenities and/or housing supply in some or all neighborhoods. Moreover, 
substitution of these equilibrium prices into the choice probability equation ????  
allows one to study the change in the demographic composition of the neighborhood 
population induced by the change in amenities. This will be discussed in detail later 
on. 
An important property of the model is that it accounts for unobserved 
heterogeneity in neighborhoods, ??. In practice, a researcher is incompletely 
informed about the characteristics of a neighborhood that are relevant for household 
welfare. Ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity in neighborhoods may, in practice, 
have modest consequences as long as ? is uncorrelated with the ?ǯs. Since the housing 
price is one of the ?ǯs, we have good reasons to think that unobserved neighborhood 
characteristics have an effect on house prices. It may be the case that some 
households choose a particular neighborhood where housing is expensive because of 
the presence of an attractive (unobserved) amenity that makes it well worth paying 
the higher price. Similarly, it may be the case that some households are reluctant to 
choose a neighborhood with a low housing price because of a negative (unobserved) 
amenity. This problem was addressed rigorously by Berry (1994) and Berry, 
Levingsohn & Pakes (1995) in the context of the automobile market. Their solution is 
to estimate the model (Equation 4.3) in a two-step estimation procedure. To explain 
their method, we start by rewriting Equation 4.3 as: 
 ??? ? ?? ? ? ?? ???????? ????? ? ????????? ??? ? ???   (4.6) 
with 
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 ?? ? ? ???????? ??? ? ?? . (4.7) 
In the first step one estimates the vector of mean indirect utilities, ?, and the 
coefficients of the cross effects of household and alternative characteristics, ????, on 
the basis of Equation 4.6. These are estimated as a MNL, in which the ?ǯs are specified 
as alternative specific constants. The MNL model predicts the probability, ???? , that 
each household i chooses alternative n, as is illustrated in Equation 4.4. The sum of 
the probabilities for each alternative are forced to be equal to the housing stock for 
each alternative by adjusting the alternative specific constants Ȃ hence satisfying the 
equilibrium constraint (Equation 4.5). 
In the second step the ??ǯs are analyzed further on the basis of Equation 4.7. 
Because of the endogeneity problem just discussed, using OLS provides biased 
coefficients of the ????ǯs.35 However, 2SLS can be used if an instrument for the price is 
available. Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes (1995) suggested to use the characteristics of 
similar alternatives as instruments, but in one of the first applications of this 
methodology to sorting on the housing market Bayer, McMillan & Rueben (2004) 
proposed a different approach, which we follow in our analysis. We construct a single 
instrument by solving for the vector of prices that would clear the market if there 
were no unobserved heterogeneity (that is if all ??ǯs were equal to zero). This 
instrument is by construction independent of the unobserved heterogeneity term ? 
and in all probability strongly correlated with the observed housing prices.  
Some additional explanation on the creation of the instrument is useful. The 
instrument should be based on the Ǯtrueǯ values of the coefficients in Equation 4.3. 
However, initially the ????ǯs are still unknown and we, therefore use an iterative 
procedure. Initial values of the ????ǯs are obtained by estimating Equation 4.7 via OLS. 
These coefficients, along with those obtained from estimating the MNL (Equation 4.6), 
are then used to calculate a price vector, ?? , that, after setting ?? ? ? for all n, satisfies 
the equilibrium condition (Equation 4.5). This price vector is then used as an 
instrument for prices by estimating Equation 4.7 via 2SLS. This results in new 
coefficients for ???? which we plug back into Equation 4.3 to solve for a new price 
vector that satisfies the equilibrium condition (Equation 4.5) in the same way as 
before. This process is repeated until the instrument stabilizes.36 
                                                          
35 Note that this endogeneity issue arises only in the second step estimation procedure at the aggregate 
(neighborhood) level. Individual actors take prices and amenities (observable as well as unobservable) 
as given. This means that we can estimate the first step using a MNL model, which has the 
unobservable characteristics included in the mean utility, without instrumenting the price. 
36 The instrument stabilizes rapidly (within five iterations) and is independent on the initial 
coefficients of ????. For more discussion on the instrumental variables strategy, see Bayer et al. (2004). 
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We also include a neighborhood socio-demographic characteristic in the utility 
function (percentage of rich households), which is likely to be endogenous with 
respect to the unobserved neighborhood characteristics. We will address this issue in 
our empirical work. Earlier research, for instance Bayer, Ferreira & McMillan (2007), 
has shown that households have strong preferences for living with similar 
households that are similar in income, ethnicity or education. To take this into 
account we introduce aspects of the demographic composition of neighborhoods that 
are potentially relevant into the household utility function that we estimate. The 
demographic composition is therefore as much a determinant of the choice behavior 
as its outcome. To take the associated heterogeneity into account we will use an 
instrumental variable strategy that is similar to the one just explained for the price 
and simultaneously estimated. That is, we compute the distribution of the households 
over the neighborhoods that would be observed if no unobserved heterogeneity were 
present in the model and use this counterfactual distribution as our instrument for 
the actual distribution, while computing the price instrument. We are able to do so 
because our data includes all households from the Amsterdam area. This implies that 
we estimate ????  for each household, and therefore we can compute the  
counterfactual concentration of high income households per neighborhood. This 
instrument is also by construction independent of the unobserved heterogeneity term 
? and in all probability strongly correlated with the observed concentration of high 
income households. 
 
4.2.3 SPATIAL SPILLOVERS 
The focus of this paper is on attractiveness of the historic city center on the location 
choice of households with different income composition. This amenity probably also 
extend over neighborhood boundaries. The historical city center is not only important 
for households who are located in this conservation area, but often also for 
households living in the proximity who like to visit such a center for shopping, dining 
and recreational purposes. Casual evidence suggests that many people appreciate to 
live in the proximity of historical city centers so that it can easily be visited, but do not 
necessarily want to reside in neighborhoods in which it is located, for instance 
because the neighborhood is too noisy or the available houses are too expensive. 
Choosing a location in a nearby neighborhood may be a strategy that offers an 
optimal location choice. These considerations suggest that we should take into 
account the possibility that the attractiveness of a neighborhood as a residential 
location is determined in part by the amenities in the surrounding neighborhoods. 
To take into account the possibility that the attractiveness of a particular 
neighborhood is partially determined by the amenities in surrounding 
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neighborhoods, we will extend our basic specification of the sorting model in which 
not only a measure of neighborhood characteristics of the Ǯownǯ neighborhood in our 
model is included, but also by incorporating a weighted sum of neighborhood 
characteristics in the proximity.37 More specifically, we use the Ǯpotentialǯ 
formulation: 
 ????? ? ? ?????????? ??. (4.8)  
The variable ????? is a weighted sum of the measure of neighborhood characteristics 
?? in neighborhoods m in a set ?? of neighborhoods surrounding n, where the 
weights are defined as an exponential function of the distance ??? between m and n. 
We include both ????? and ?? in Equation 4.7. The variable ????? can also be 
interpreted as a spatial lag with exponential weights. It introduces a spatial element 
into the model. Since it relates only to exogenous variables, this has no significant 
consequences for estimating the model in itself.38 
 
4.3 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
We carry out a regional analysis for the Amsterdam area using neighborhoods as our 
spatial units. The estimation of the sorting model requires two types of data: 
household and neighborhood characteristics. The location of the household is 
essential information to combine the household and neighborhood data. We make use 
of a unique dataset of household characteristics that include all household 
observations within each neighborhood. In this section, we describe the historic city 
center, household income and the housing market in the Amsterdam area. 
Furthermore, we will discuss the data used in the analysis and show some additional 
descriptive statistics. 
 
4.3.1 HISTORIC CITY CENTERS 
In the Netherlands, historic city centers are national conservation areas which 
contain a high concentration of listed buildings and monuments. These areas are 
designated by the national government for its architectural and historic value. 
Becoming a conservation area involves a long bureaucratic process that involves 
many institutions, such as the municipality involved and the Netherlands Institute for 
                                                          
37 Note that our use of characteristics of surrounding neighborhoods as arguments of the mean utilities 
invalidates their use as instruments for the price. This underlines the importance of our use of 
computed instruments suggested by Bayer, McMillan & Rueben (2004). 
38 The distance decay coefficient, ?, is set at 0.5. The function is therefore exponential decreasing and 
weights are going towards zero when distance increases (weight < 0.1 if distance is 5 km). 
 Sorting based on amenities and income |  73 
 
Cultural Heritage.39 In the US, these conservation areas are called historic districts. 
These are listed on the National Register of Historic Places under the authority of the 
National Park Service.40 It is important to note that from the perspective of home 
owners, the designation of conservation areas in the Netherlands is exogenously 
determined. Also, the boundaries of the conservation areas do not correspond to the 
neighborhood boundaries. We can take the historic city center of Amsterdam as an 
example. Its historic city center is 679 hectare (6.79 km2), where the average in the 
Netherlands is around 75 hectare (0.75 km2). Ten neighborhoods are within the 
historic city center of Amsterdam. These neighborhoods are well-known for their 
canals, gabled houses and numerous monuments. In 2010, the canal ring area inside 
the Singelgracht (which covers a large part of the historic city center) was added to 
the UNESCO World Heritage list. 
The area of historic city center in each neighborhood and a separate variable for 
the area of historic city center in surrounding neighborhoods are the indicators for 
cultural heritage that are included in our analysis. In this paper, the historic city 
center is measured as the number of square kilometers. We have this information on 
the neighborhood level. The neighborhood which has the largest part of the 
Amsterdam historic city center is Nieuwmarkt en Lastage (1.03 km2). We also include 
the weighted sum of historic city center in the proximity to estimate the spatial 
spillover effect, as we discussed in Section 4.2.3. 
 
4.3.2 INCOME AND THE HOUSING MARKET 
The variation in the (gross and net) income in the Netherlands is relatively small 
compared to many other countries. Within the Netherlands, the larger cities show a 
higher dispersion between rich and poor than the smaller villages. This is because the 
Netherlands has a unique rental sector. It has a high share of social housing, in 
particular in the larger cities. In 2003, around 50% of the housing supply in the city of 
Amsterdam Ȃ compared to the average of 35% in the Netherlands Ȃ belonged to the 
social renting sector. It is therefore not surprising that Amsterdam has a lot of 
households with a lower income. On the other hand, Amsterdam also has residents 
with a very high income. If these high income households live in the most expensive 
houses in Amsterdam, Figure 4.A.1 in Appendix 4.A could give a good picture of 
where those households reside. Because the owner-occupied and rental sector are 
very different from each other, we make a distinction between the owner-occupied 
                                                          
39 ?Rijksdienst voor het Cultureel Erfgoed? in Dutch and this Service is part of the Ministry of Education, 
Culture and Science of the Netherlands. 
40 The National Park Service is a government office of the United States Department of the Interior. 
Note that the criteria of designation to become a conservation area could differ between countries. 
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and rental sector in our analysis. In this way, we should be able to distinguish the 
preferences of renters and owner-occupiers. We focus on the owner-occupied market 
because in the rental sector not all households freely choose their location. 
 
4.3.3 DATA 
In our application, estimation of the location choice model makes use of household 
and neighborhood characteristics. Statistics Netherlands provides us with a unique 
dataset that includes detailed information on all Dutch individuals and households. 
The information we use in our analysis is from 2010 and contains approximately 
600,000 households spread over 320 neighborhoods. Using the information on 
household characteristics makes it possible to investigate the heterogeneous 
preferences of different types of households. We consider gross primary household 
income and the social economic status (students, (self-)employed, unemployed and 
retired households). The existing (predominantly Anglo-Saxon) literature mainly 
focuses on the provision of Ǯgoodǯ schools which is an important determinant of 
household location choices in the United States (Bénabou, 1996; Fernandez & 
Rogerson, 1996, 2003; Nechyba, 1999, 2000; Bayer, Ferreira & McMillan, 2004). In 
the Netherlands, the educational system is different from that in the US and the UK. 
There are no school districts (households can freely choose a school for their 
children) and denominational schools are more important than public schools. 
The choice set for each household is the Amsterdam area, which includes all 
neighborhoods in the Amsterdam area. We drop some neighborhoods from the choice 
set which have almost no household observations, for example neighborhoods with a 
large share of industrial estate. We have information on the location of each 
household on the neighborhood level. This enables us to link the household and 
neighborhood characteristics. We include several neighborhood characteristics in the 
utility function. We already discussed the historic city center which is likely to be an 
important amenity for the attractiveness of a neighborhood. We also include the 
distance to the nearest concentration of 100,000 jobs. This measure is used to reflect 
the accessibility to jobs. These data are provided by the Netherlands Environment 
Assessment Agency.41 The variable reflects the location of the largest agglomeration 
economies in the Netherlands. In the last decade, there have not been major shifts of 
large labor markets in the Netherlands. The distance to a high concentration of jobs 
for the Amsterdam area is low, compared to average the Netherlands. The socio-
                                                          
41 ?Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving? in Dutch and is the national institute for strategic policy analysis 
in the field of environment, nature and spatial planning. The distance to the nearest 100,000 jobs are 
given by a 500 by 500 meter cell. We combined the coordinates of these cells with the coordinates of 
the neighborhoods in the Amsterdam area and calculated the average distance for each neighborhood. 
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demographic characteristic of a neighborhood that is included in the analysis is the 
percentage of high-income households. There is likely correlation between the 
concentration of high income households and the unobserved neighborhood quality, 
which causes an endogeneity issue. We proposed an instrumental variable strategy at 
the end of Section 4.2.2. We capture the housing market by including a neighborhood 
price index for a standard house, which we interpret as the price of housing services. 
The price index is based on estimation of a standard hedonic price method with 
neighborhood fixed effects. This price is also likely to be correlated with the 
unobserved neighborhood quality. The instrumental variable strategy we use to 
account for endogeneity of house prices are discussed in Section 4.2.2. Table 4.1 gives 
an overview of the data and its sources that are used in our analysis. 
 
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics household and neighborhood characteristics 
Variables Data source Mean SD Min. Max. 
Household characteristics 
Gross primary household income CBS (2008) 42,835 55,740 0 1,000,000 
Household with children (-18) CBS (2008) 0.240 0.427 0 1 
Age of oldest household member CBS (2008) 48.730 17.461 16 107 
Social Economic Category 
Student CBS (2008) 0.053 0.223 0 1 
(Self-)Employed CBS (2008) 0.559 0.496 0 1 
Unemployed (Social assistance benefits) CBS (2008) 0.176 0.381 0 1 
Retired CBS (2008) 0.212 0.409 0 1 
Neighborhood characteristics 
Historic city center (km2) RCE (2012) 0.027 0.134 0.000 1.029 
Distance to the nearest 100,000 jobs (km) PBL (2005) 8.287 3.355 0.637 18.407 
Percentage rich households (%) CBS (2008) 33.325 14.433 0.000 77.707 
Price of standard house (in euros) NVM (2009) 209,858 49,587 112,877 390,691 
              
Note: We include 314 neighborhoods which covers most of the residential neighborhoods in the 
Amsterdam area. A few neighborhoods are left out because of the low number of household 
observations. 
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Table 4.2. First step estimation procedure: cross term estimates for homeowners 
Neighborhood characteristics Household characteristics     
  Income Student Unemployed Retired 
Standardized house price (in euros) 0.01259 7.16892 1.1332 3.53872 
(0.0006)*** (0.5332)*** (0.1438)*** (0.1147)*** 
Historical city center (km2) 0.00313 0.46699 0.2735 0.11243 
(0.0004)*** (0.2561)* (0.105)*** (0.0971) 
Historical city center in surrounding 
neighborhoods 
-0.00031 0.48496 -0.04107 -0.19689 
(0.00005)*** (0.0412)*** (0.0107)*** (0.0088)*** 
High income households (%) 0.00027 -0.56594 -0.00735 0.00133 
(0.00001)*** (0.0067)*** (0.0019)*** (0.0015) 
Distance to the nearest 100,000 jobs 
(km) 
0.00001 -0.0897 0.01799 0.06445 
(0.00004) (0.0411) (0.0093)* (0.0075)*** 
          
Note: Parameter estimates reported with all variables normalized to have mean zero. These 
coefficients report the deviations from the mean indirect utility. The coefficients for students, 
unemployed and retired homeowners are compared to the reference which are the (self-)employed 
homeowners. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at 90%, 95% and 99% level are, 
respectively, indicated as *, **, and ***. The regression results based on other specifications can be 
obtained from the author. 
 
4.4 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
This section reports and discusses the results of the first and the second step of the 
sorting model for neighborhoods in the Amsterdam area. We provide an overview of 
the estimation results based on the basic specification, including the spatial spillovers 
of historic city centers, of the sorting model. 
 
4.4.1 FIRST STEP ESTIMATION RESULTS 
In the first step of the residential sorting model, developed by Bayer, McMillan & 
Rueben (2004), we estimate the mean utilities (or: alternative specific constants) and 
the coefficients of Equation 4.6 via MNL with the location choice (neighborhood) of 
households as the dependent variable. The estimated coefficients are consistently 
estimated since we have no endogeneity issues on the household level, as we 
discussed in Section 4.2.2 (see footnote 8). Table 4.2 reports the estimated 
coefficients,?????, of the cross effects between household and neighborhood 
characteristics of homeowners. The interpretation of the cross effect coefficients for 
income is straightforward. Since the household characteristics have a mean zero, the 
cross coefficients for income can be interpreted as the deviation from the mean utility 
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(which is the utility of the average household). The interpretation of the cross effect 
coefficients for the social economic status is somewhat less straightforward. The 
coefficients are still deviations from the mean, but regarding to the reference category 
which are the (self-)employed households. When we know the coefficients of the 
second step estimation, with the cross effect coefficients we are able to calculate the 
deviations in the mean MWTP for the neighborhood characteristics. 
The results give an indication how different types of households value amenities. 
For instance, results show that high income homeowners are less price sensitive than 
the average household. Homeowners that are students, unemployed (at the moment) 
or retired also seem to be less price sensitive than the (self-)employed. In other 
words, these types of homeowners are attracted to neighborhoods with a high 
standard house price. Students that have bought a house are most likely financed by 
their (rich) parents and seem to live in neighborhoods with relatively high standard 
house price (many students live in and around the city center of Amsterdam). 
Homeowners that became unemployed (most likely after they bought their house) 
also seem to be located in the more expensive neighborhoods compared to the 
(self-)employed homeowners. Their social economic status at this moment in time 
did most likely not affect their location choice in the past, but it is remarkable that 
they seem to prefer to live in neighborhoods with a higher standard house price than 
the (self-)employed homeowners. Most of the retired homeowners have benefitted 
from the boom in house prices over the last decades. It is most likely that they prefer 
to live in neighborhoods with a higher standard house price compared to the 
(self-)employed homeowners, where a large share did not benefit from the boom in 
house prices as much as the older generation. 
We are, in particular, interested in the appreciation of the historic city center and 
the concentration of high income households. The results show that high income 
households prefer to live in neighborhoods that are within the historical city center 
and not so much around the historic city center. High income households are also 
attracted to a high concentration of high income households. These results imply that 
the historic city center attracts high income households. The sorting of these high 
income households increases the concentration of high income households, which 
further contributes to the attractiveness of the neighborhood for high income 
households. We show that this suggests that there is indeed a multiplier effect of the 
historic city center through attracting high income households. It is also likely that 
the increase in attractiveness of the neighborhood attracts many other (endogenous) 
amenities. This would suggest that the historic city center also has a multiplier effect 
through its impact on other consumer amenities, such as shops, restaurants, et cetera. 
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However, this is outside the scope of this paper and we cannot provide evidence for 
this.  
Students and unemployed homeowners also prefer to live within the historic city 
center compared to the (self-)employed homeowners, whereas they do not prefer to 
live in neighborhoods with a high concentration of high income households. Students 
also prefer to live in neighborhoods close to the historic city center, whereas the 
unemployed and retired homeowners do not. Retired homeowner prefer to live in 
neighborhoods that are further from the large labor market and do not significantly 
differ in preferences for living in the historic city center and in neighborhoods with a 
large concentration of high income households compared to the (self-)employed. 
 
4.4.2 SECOND STEP ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The second step of the residential sorting model consists of 2SLS estimation of 
Equation 4.7.42 The dependent variable is the vector of mean indirect utilities Ȃ in 
other words that part of the utility that is equal for all households.43 We deal with 
endogeneity through instrumental variables as discussed in Section 4.2.2. The 
instrument for house prices is computed as the equilibrium housing price that would 
prevail in the absence of unobserved heterogeneity. The instrument for the 
concentration of high income households is computed as the equilibrium 
concentration of high income households that would prevail in the absence of 
unobserved heterogeneity Ȃ simultaneously determined with the price instrument. 
The results of the estimations are reported in Table 4.3. Column 1 reports the simple 
OLS results. These coefficients suggest that the historic city center is an important 
amenity for the location choice of the average household. However, the coefficients 
are likely biased as they do not account for the heterogeneity of prices and 
neighborhood socio-demographic characteristics. Column 2 reports the 2SLS results 
where only prices are instrumented. Some of the coefficients change substantially 
when we use the instrumental variables, notably the price coefficient, as is not 
uncommon in these models.44 
Column 3 reports the 2SLS results where both prices and the concentration of high 
income households are instrumented. The coefficients change somewhat compared to 
Column 2. The coefficients have the expected sign and most of them are statistically 
significant. The results report a positive and significant effect of the historic city 
center and the spatial spillovers of the Amsterdam historic city center. This suggests 
                                                          
42 First stage regression estimates of the 2SLS are available upon request. The null hypothesis of both 
under- and weak identification are rejected. 
43 The vector of mean indirect utilities, ??, was estimated as alternative specific constants in the first 
step of the estimation procedure (Equation 4.6). 
44 See, for example, Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes (1995). 
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that not only neighborhood inside the historic city center enjoy the benefits of the 
historic city center, but also those neighborhoods that are close to the historic city 
center also benefit from this amenity. We thus find strong evidence that there are 
spatial spillovers of the historic city center. Column 3 also shows that the 
concentration of high income households has a positive and significant sign. This 
suggests that the attractiveness of a neighborhood also depends on the concentration 
of high income households. The results show that only the distance to the nearest 
100,000 jobs is not statistically significant. This is probably because the research area 
is only the Amsterdam area. This area only covers one large labor market. There is 
probably an effect of the distance to a large labor market on the national level, but 
here we only take into account variation within the Amsterdam area. 
 
Table 4.3. Second step estimation procedure: decomposition of the alternative specific constants 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
  OLS (se) 2SLS (se) 2SLS (se) 
Standardized house price (in euros) -1.2582 -26.6315 -37.9354 
(0.5621) ** (7.976) *** (10.434) *** 
Historical city center (km2) 1.3146 5.7193 7.5236 
(0.3482) *** (1.9397) *** (3.327) ** 
Historical city center in surrounding 
neighborhoods 
0.0521  1.2362  1.7907  
(0.0435) (0.3828) *** (0.517) *** 
High income households (%) -0.0079 0.1634 0.2618 
(0.0087) (0.0577) *** (0.0812) *** 
Distance to the nearest 100,000 jobs (km) -0.1323 -0.1383 -0.1692 
(0.0285) *** (0.0922) (0.1393) 
Constant 15.5797 317.8204 451.915 
(6.661) ** (95.043) *** (124.15) *** 
              
Price instrumented No Yes Yes 
High income households instrumented No No Yes 
F-statistic  11.427 6.598 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at 90%, 95% and 99% level are, respectively, 
indicated as *, **, and ***. The first stage regression results can be obtained from the author. 
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4.5 IMPLICATIONS 
In this section, we consider the implications of our estimation results of Section 4.4. 
We focus on the results in Column 3 of Table 4.3. The sorting model allows us to 
calculate the marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) of each type of household that we 
included in the analysis. These figures give a clear overview of the impact of different 
neighborhood characteristics on the location choice of heterogeneous households 
with respect to the price of a standard house. Furthermore, the sorting model also 
allows us to do a counterfactual analysis. The general equilibrium property, where 
housing demand has to match the housing supply, enables us to show how prices of a 
standard house change when we change one of the neighborhood or household 
characteristics. We report changes in the price of a standard house for several 
neighborhoods if there were no differences in the availability of the historic city 
center among all neighborhoods in the Amsterdam area.45 
 
4.5.1 MARGINAL WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY 
The estimation results in Section 4.4 enable us to calculate the MWTP of 
heterogeneous households for neighborhood characteristics (see Appendix 4.C for 
technical details). This allows us to compare the MWTP between neighborhoods. 
Column 1 of Table 4.4 reports the mean of the MWTP for all neighborhoods in the 
Amsterdam area. Columns 2 through 5 report the deviations from the mean for 
different types of homeowners. 
 
Table 4.4. Marginal willingness-to-pay results from the 2SLS estimation 
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High income households (+%) 1,448 
 
140 
 
-2,124 
 
55 
 
166 (ns) 
Distance to nearest 100,000 jobs (-km) 936 (ns) 20 (ns) 552 (ns) -15 
 
-160 
 
                      
The values are in euros. (ns) means not significant at the 5% level. The significance levels of Column 2 
to 5 are based on the first step estimation procedure of the residential sorting model. 
 
                                                          
45 Similar interpretations are the change in prices if there would be no historic city center in the 
Amsterdam area or if all households would not value the historic city center. 
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The mean MWTP Ȃ in terms of higher prices for a standard house Ȃ for living inside 
the historic city center is large and significant (̀41,619/km2). This implies that the 
price of the standard house increases on average with ̀41,619 for an extra square 
kilometer of historic city center. Since most neighborhoods are smaller than one 
square kilometer, this number decreases. The mean MWTP for living not inside but 
close to the historic city center is also positive and significant (̀9,906/km2). This 
number can be interpreted as an extra square kilometer of historic city center in 
surrounding neighborhoods Ȃ where the distance between adjacent neighborhoods is 
1km (the average distance is somewhat lower than 1 km in the Amsterdam area) Ȃ 
that the average household is willing to pay in terms of the price for a standard house. 
The MWTP for living in neighborhoods with an extra percentage of high income 
households is positive and significant (̀1,448/%), whereas the MWTP for living 1km 
closer to a large labor market is positive but it is not significant. 
Column 2 reports the deviations from the mean MWTP for homeowners with 
different incomes. If the household earns ̀10,000 euro per year more than average, 
their MWTP for living inside the historic city center is around 5% higher than the 
average household. For living 1km from the historic city center, the MWTP is 1% 
higher than the average household. An extra percentage of high income households in 
the neighborhood, the MWTP is 10% higher than the average household. These 
numbers increase when the income of an household is even larger than ̀10,000 more 
than average. 
The deviations from the mean MWTP for homeowners in different stages of the 
life-cycle are reported in Columns 3 through 5. The results show that students have 
the highest MWTP to live in neighborhoods inside the historic city center, which is 
almost 15% higher than the average household. Students that are homeowners seem 
very eager to live in the historic city center, where they are not only close to the 
university but where they can also enjoy many other amenities, such as the night life. 
If they cannot afford the housing within the historic city center, they also have a 
higher MWTP to live just outside the historic city center than the average household 
(+25%). However, they do have a lower MWTP for an extra percentage of high 
income households living in the neighborhood. The MWTP of students for living 
closer to the labor market is not significantly different than the average household. 
The MWTP for unemployed homeowners is for each of the neighborhood 
characteristics not very different than the mean MWTP, but they are all significantly 
different. The deviations of the mean MWTP for retired homeowners is not 
significantly different for an extra square kilometer of historic city center than the 
average household. The same is reported for an extra percentage of high income 
households in the neighborhood. Retired homeowners have a lower MWTP for living 
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close to the historic city center than the average household (only -2%) and a lower 
MWTP for living closer to the labor market (almost -20%). 
These results imply that younger homeowners (students) tend to move to 
neighborhoods within or close to the historic city center whereas retired 
homeowners tend to move away from neighborhoods close to a large labor market. 
These findings support our earlier work in Chapter 3 and are in line with the current 
literature on this topic (see, for example, Chen & Rosenthal, 2008). 
 
4.5.2 COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS 
The sorting model suggests that house prices react to changes in amenities. The 
general equilibrium property of the sorting model allows us to estimate the changes 
in house prices when the number of neighborhood amenities change. We have carried 
out a counterfactual simulation in which we compute the price of a standard house 
that would prevail if there were no differences in the availability of the historic city 
center in each neighborhood in the Amsterdam area. We set the area of historic city 
center at zero as if the historic city center would not exist. Evidently, the spatial 
spillovers of the historic city center will also disappear. This results in a new 
equilibrium and, therefore, new equilibrium prices. We then compute the price of a 
standard house for each neighborhood and scale them so the mean house price in the 
situation with and without the historic city center is identical. Because of the scaling, 
there will be neighborhoods where the price of a standard house will decrease (or 
increase) substantially. 
 
Table 4.5. Counterfactual simulation: eliminating historic city center 
Neighborhoods 
Standardized 
house price  
(in euros) 
Predicted 
house price  
(in euros) Difference Percentage 
 Amstel III en Bullewijk 119,581 191,581 +72,000 +60% 
 Bijlmer-Oost E, G en K 144,981 180,890 +35,909 +25% 
 Bijlmer-Centrum D, F en H 146,714 181,313 +34,599 +24% 
 
Grachtengordel-Zuid          359,220           204,869          -154,351  -43% 
Grachtengordel-West          359,694           204,790          -154,904  -43% 
Museumkwartier          380,141           210,465          -169,676  -45% 
            
Note: The predicted house prices, taken into account the general equilibrium property of the sorting 
framework and the scaling, are reported as a counterfactual simulation that sets all cultural heritage to 
zero. 
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Table 4.5 reports the prices of a standard house of the top 3 neighborhoods where 
the standard house price will increase and decrease (See Figure 4.A.2 in Appendix 4.A 
for the location of these neighborhoods). The simulation shows that some of the 
poorest neighborhoods in the Amsterdam area will benefit the most if the historic city 
center would not exist. The standard house prices in the richest neighborhoods inside 
or close to the historic city center will decrease the most. Note that the neighborhood 
Museumkwartier is just outside of the historic city center but, because of the large 
spatial spillover effects of the historic city center, house prices in this neighborhood 
will also decrease. The gap between the prices of a standard house in these 
neighborhoods decreases, however, the prices in the city center will still be larger 
than in the other neighborhoods due to other amenities. 
 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this empirical paper, we investigate the location choice of households with 
different income compositions in the Amsterdam area. We compare households in 
different stages of the life-cycle. We include students, employed (reference), 
unemployed and retired households, and their income. We use a horizontal sorting 
model to measure the value that those heterogeneous households attach to a variety 
of amenities. The historic city center is such an amenity. We show that the impact of 
the historic city center on the location choice is large and significant. The total impact 
is the sum of its direct effect Ȃ living inside the historic city center improves the 
attractiveness of the neighborhood Ȃ and its indirect effect Ȃ neighborhoods inside 
the historic city center are attractive for other (endogenous) amenities. The results 
also suggest that spatial spillovers of the historic city center are present. Hence, 
neighborhoods that are just outside the historic city center are also attractive for 
households since they are still able to enjoy the amenities that are located within the 
historic city center. 
Our analysis uses the sorting framework developed by Bayer, McMillan & 
Rueben (2004) in which the price of a standard house is explained by the housing 
supply and demand equilibrium. The idea is that different types of households reveal 
their preferences for neighborhood characteristics by choosing their neighborhood. 
The sorting framework allows us to calculate the marginal willingness-to-
pay (MWTP) of different types of households for a variety of amenities. We show that 
for the Amsterdam area, the MWTP for living in a neighborhood inside the historic 
city center is highest for high income homeowners and students that have bought a 
house compared to the average household. Students also have a higher MWTP to live 
just outside the historic city center compared to the average household. We find that 
retired households are not so different from the average household, except that they 
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prefer to live further away from a large labor market. This suggests that the location 
choice of households in different stages of the life-cycle and with different incomes 
varies substantially.  
In addition, we attempt to find strong evidence that the historic city center has a 
multiplier effect on the attractiveness of neighborhoods. There are strong believes 
that the historic city center attracts many other amenities. To prove the existence of 
this multiplier is effect suffers one major problem: most of these amenities are 
endogenous. We include the concentration of high income households in our analysis. 
We control for the endogenous variables, price and concentration of high income 
households, using an instrumental variable strategy that takes advantage of the 
general equilibrium property of the sorting model. We find strong evidence that the 
multiplier effect of the historic city center exists. Our results suggest that high income 
homeowners are not only attracted to the historic city center but also to each other. 
This increases the concentration of high income households in the neighborhood, 
which further attracts more high income homeowners. 
In our counterfactual simulation, we show that if there would be no differences in 
the availability of the historic city center in each neighborhood in the Amsterdam 
area, the price of a standard house of neighborhoods inside or just outside the 
historic city center decreases by a large amount. These neighborhoods still have 
higher house prices than most other neighborhoods because of their favorable 
characteristics regarding their location close to other amenities. 
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APPENDIX 4.A. MAPS OF THE AMSTERDAM AREA 
 
 
Figure 4.A.1. Variation in house prices in Amsterdam. 
Note: Dark red represents the highest house prices, green the lowest house prices. Prices are not 
controlled for structural characteristics. 
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Figure 4.A.2. Neighborhoods in Amsterdam. 
Note: The yellow areas are the top 3 neighborhoods that increased or decreased in the price of a 
standard house in the case when there is no differences in the availability of the historic city center 
(the blue areas). 
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APPENDIX 4.B. THE MULTIPLIER EFFECT 
 
In this appendix we illustrate the effect of preferences with respect to demographic 
composition on the impact of a small change in cultural heritage for a simple two-
good, two neighborhood example. The difference between the utilities of 
neighborhood 1 and 2 for group ???? ? ???? is: 
??? ? ???? ? ???????? ? ???? ? ??????? ? ??? ? ???????? ? ????. 
And the choice probabilities are: 
???? ?
????
?? ? ?????????????? ? ? ? ????? 
In these equations ?? denotes the housing price, ? the share of group 1 households 
and ?? an indicator of cultural heritage, while the ?ǯs are coefficients. 
We assume that group 1 is the rich group and that ???? ? ???? ? ?, ???? ? ???? ? ?. 
That is, the price sensitivity of group 1 is less than that of group 2, whereas group 1 
appreciates cultural heritage more than group 2. Assume for the moment that 
???? ? ???? ? ?. 
In equilibrium the housing market clears, so we must have: 
?????? ? ?????? ? ?? 
where ?? is the number of households of group ? and ?? is the number of houses in 
neighborhood ?.  
After a small change in cultural heritage in neighborhood 1, we must have: 
??????? ? ??????? ? ? 
We can compute de changes in the choice probabilities as: 
????? ? ?????? ? ?????????????? ? ?????????? 
Substitution of this result into the market equilibrium condition allows us to compute 
the change in the housing price difference as: 
????
???? ? ?
???????? ? ????????? ? ???????? ? ?????????
???????? ? ????????? ? ???????? ? ?????????
 
Now consider the change in the share of rich households in neighborhood ?,  ??. It 
equals: 
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?? ?
??????
?? ? 
It can be verified that: 
??? ? ?? ?
?
?? ?
?
??? ????? 
Since we have assumed that the rich are less sensitive to changes in the housing price 
and more sensitive to changes in cultural heritage, it must be the case that ????? ? ?. 
The change in the amount of cultural heritage therefore increases the share of rich 
households in neighborhood 1. 
Let us now see what changes if we allow for preferences with respect to the 
demographic composition of neighborhoods.  More specifically, assume that 
???? ? ?? ???? ? ????. That is, the rich have a preferences to live among members of 
their own group and this preference is stronger than that of the poor to live among 
the rich. Note that we allow the poor to have positive as well as negative preferences 
to live among the rich. 
The change in the probability ???? must now be computes as: 
????? ? ?????? ? ?????????????????????? ? ????????? 
This implies that for the change in ?? we now have: 
??? ? ?? ?
?
?? ?
?
????????? ? ?????????????????????? ? ????????? 
Solving for ??? gives: 
??? ?
?? ? ??? ?
?
????????? ? ?????????????? ? ?????????
? ? ?? ? ??? ?
?
??? ?????? ? ?????????
 
???????????????? ???? ?
?
?? ?
?
????????? ? ?????????????? ? ????????? 
where  ?? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ??? ?
?
??? ?????? ? ??????????, a multiplier associated with the 
social interaction. Substituting this result in the expression we derived for the change 
i change in the choice probability ????, we find: 
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????? ? ?????? ? ????? ????????? ? ????????
? ???????? ?
?
?? ?
?
??? ?????? ? ?????????????? ? ?????????? 
The equation shows that the preferences for demographic composition result in an 
additional effect of the changes in the housing price and the cultural heritage on the 
choice probabilities. 
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APPENDIX 4.C. DERIVE THE MARGINAL WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY 
 
Equation 4.6 and 4.7 can be written as a hedonic price regression allowing for 
heterogeneity in household preferences. 
??? ? ???? ?????????????????? ??????????????????? ? ?
?
??? ???????????????? ?? ? ?
?
??? ???????????????? ??? ?
? ???? ???????????????? ??? , 
where ??? ? ?????? ? . It is now simple to compute the MWTP of each i type of 
household for each neighborhood characteristic ???? ?: 
????
???? ? ?
??? ???????????????
??? ???????????????? ??? . 
The household characteristics are constructed to have mean zero. This simplifies the 
MWTP of the average household: 
????
???? ? ?
???
??? ? ??? . 
This is correct for calculation of the MWTP of the income variable. For the life-cycle 
status variables, the computation is somewhat more complicated. We divided the life-
cycle status in four phases. Each head of the household is a student, (self-)employed, 
unemployed or retired. We used the (self-)employment status as a reference. For 
instance, when we want to calculate the MWTP of a retired household Ȃ note that the 
household characteristics have a mean zero Ȃ we have to incorporate the coefficients 
of the other categories as well. This is simply done by extending the MWTP 
computation of a retired household: 
????
???? ? ?
??? ???????????????????????????????????????????
??? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ??? , 
where ??????????  equals one and ???? , which represent the other categories, equals zero. 
 5 THE EFFECT OF BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT 
ON SURROUNDING RESIDENTIAL AREAS: THE CASE 
OF THE AMSTERDAM WESTERN GAS FACTORY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the 1980s, the Western gas factory (in Dutch: Westergasfabriek) and its terrain was 
a desolated area where once economic activity was high due to gas production. The 
factory was now only used as a storage and maintenance facility. The soil around the 
Western gas factory was heavily polluted. This all changed between the 1993 
and 2008. The municipality and national government agreed to a cleanup plan to 
renovate this area. One part of the area became a park, Westerpark, and the real 
estate on the other part of the area got renovated and became an anchor point for 
cultural events attracting creative and innovative industries. 
At the same time, the media and local policy makers reported that the 
neighborhoods around the Western gas factory started to flourish. The neighborhood 
just south of the Western gas factory, Staatsliedenbuurt, used to be relatively poor. It 
is located 1-2km from the city center. This neighborhood is argued to be a 
gentrification area, which serves as a second-best option for households that prefer to 
live in the city center, but cannot afford the houses in the city center (Boterman et al., 
2010). A part of this gentrification process might be caused by the redevelopment of 
the Western gas factory since this location attracted many small creative firms. The 
idea to renovate an old factory became fashionable and, in connection with 
Floridaǯs (2002) ideas, many policy makers believed this provided a tool to upgrade 
neighborhoods to attract highly educated residents, firms from the creative sector 
and tourists. It is argued that these locations perform better economically (Florida, 
2002). Not only in the Netherlands (for example, Verkadefabriek, Zaanstad; Van 
Nellefabriek, Rotterdam), but also abroad there are now many redeveloped 
brownfield sites (for example, former power plant site, Erie, PA; Rheinauhafen, 
Cologne, Germany; Kings Waterfront, Liverpool, England; Gasometers, Vienna, 
Austria). Although there is some anecdotal evidence about the effects on surrounding 
neighborhoods, as far as we know, there is no research that investigates the causal 
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impact of the redevelopment of a brownfield site on the surrounding residential 
neighborhoods.46 
It is the purpose of this paper to investigate whether house prices in the area 
surrounding the Western gas factory increased more than those in other residential 
areas in Amsterdam due to the redevelopment. If the redevelopment of the Western 
gas factory made the surrounding neighborhoods more attractive, demand for the 
houses in these neighborhoods increases, and this will likely be reflected in house 
prices. We exploit the geographical location of the Western gas factory to investigate 
two possible treatment areas, houses north of the Western gas factory and houses 
south of it. The northern area includes houses that are close to the Western gas 
factory but are separated from the Western gas factory by a railway. Therefore, the 
railway could be a barrier for the spillover effects of the brownfield redevelopment. It 
could be that households want to see the redeveloped terrain, which suggests a very 
local effect where the railway is indeed a barrier for spillover effects. It could also be 
the case that the accessibility to the Western gas factory is more important. There are 
several ways to cross the railway. The fastest way to get from the northern residential 
area to the Western gas factory is by a crossing under the railway, which is only 
possible by bike or by foot. Public safety around the crossing is therefore an 
important factor for the accessibility. If the railway is a barrier for the spillover effects 
of the redevelopment, this implies that houses north of the railway benefit less from 
the redevelopment than houses south of the Western gas factory, although their 
geographical locations from the Western gas factory are similar. We test this by 
comparing the houses north of the railway with the houses south of the railway. 
The analysis then consists of two different ways to compare the changes in house 
prices in the proximity of the Western gas factory. One where we compare houses in 
the inner rings with the outer rings, and another where we compare houses north of 
the Western gas factory with the houses south of it. Conditional on observable 
structural and neighborhood-specific characteristics, time-invariant unobserved 
neighborhood-specific characteristics, and year-specific effects, we are able to say 
something about the effect of the redevelopment of the Western gas factory on house 
prices of surrounding residential areas and whether the railway is a barrier of these 
spillover effects. 
We make use of a rich dataset of sold houses and their structural characteristics. 
These transactions data have been provided by the Dutch Association of Real Estate 
Agents (NVM) and concern the period 1995 to 2009. The NVM dataset consist 
of 80,388 sold houses in Amsterdam over 15 years. We also have detailed information 
                                                          
46 There is some literature on the effects of hazardous waste, for example, Greenstone & Gallagher 
(2008) 
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on neighborhood characteristics from various sources (Statistics Netherlands and the 
Amsterdam Bureau for Research and Statistics). This allows us to control for other 
factors that could influence house prices. 
We concentrate on the two policy relevant questions: "Did the redevelopment of the 
Western gas factory have an effect on the attractiveness of surrounding residential 
areas, and how is that reflected in house prices of nearby residential houses?" and ?Is 
the railway a barrier for the effect of the redevelopment of the Western gas factory on 
the northern residential area?? These questions are crucial for local policy makers and 
real estate developers, who plan the future design of their city despite their limited 
ability to predict the evolution of a city (Rosenthal, 2008). 
Research on the impact of brownfield redevelopment on surrounding residential 
areas is rather scarce. Maliene, Wignall & Malys (2012) argue, based on descriptive 
statistics, that the redevelopment of brownfield sites has the potential to promote the 
urban renaissance. They argue that those developments are important for the future 
of a city as these redeveloped brownfield sites attract people, predominantly for the 
retail and leisure facilities and the attractiveness of the location. They also warn that 
because each site is so unique that there is no single recipe for success. Their study 
lacks detailed empirical research to provide evidence on these matters, which is what 
we do in this paper for the housing market. 
Our paper is more related to the economic literature that investigates urban 
renewal projects. In particular, our work is closely related to the study of Rossi-
Hansberg, Sarte & Owens (2010), who investigates the effect of residential urban 
revitalization programs on land values in Richmond, Virginia. They find that housing 
externalities are present and large, and that 1 dollar of home improvement generated 
between 2 and 6 dollars in land value gains over a 6-year period. They argue, 
however, that these results are probably program- and place-based. Our study differs 
in that there is no direct investment in residential areas, but instead in the 
redevelopment of a brownfield site. 
Defining the control area to be the most outer ring, we find that there is an effect of 
the redevelopment of the Western gas factory on houses within 600 meters of the 
Western gas factory compared to the control group. After 2002, the transaction price 
of the houses in the treatment area is, depending on the distance, 5 to 10% higher. 
This suggests strongly that the redevelopment of the Western gas factory did increase 
the attractiveness of the surrounding residential areas. In addition, we show that the 
residential area north of the railway benefit from the redevelopment as much as the 
residential area south of it. We do this by comparing the two possible treatment 
areas. This suggests that the railway, that separates the Western gas factory and the 
residential area north of it, is not a barrier for spillover effects caused by the 
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redevelopment of the Western gas factory and, therefore, the effect is a proximity 
effect.  
The paper is organized as follows. We devote the next section to a concise 
description on the history of the Western gas factory. In Section 5.3, we discuss the 
methodology used in our analysis. Our data and some descriptive statistics are 
presented in Section 5.4. Estimation results are reported and discussed in Section 5.5. 
Section 5.6 summarizes and concludes. 
 
5.2 HISTORY OF WESTERN GAS FACTORY 
The Western gas factory started functioning in 1885.47 Two years earlier the City of 
Amsterdam had granted the Imperial Continental Gas Association (ICGA, London) a 
permit for the production of gas used for street lighting. It was decided that they 
would build two new gas plants, one near the Haarlemmervaart canal in the western 
part of Amsterdam, the other in the Linnaeusstraat in the eastern part of Amsterdam. 
The location of the Western gas factory was strategically sited between water, rail 
and access roads (that was, back then, on the outskirts of Amsterdam). 
The Haarlemmervaart canal marks the southern side of the Western gas factory. 
In 1632, the Haarlemmervaart canal was built to connect Amsterdam and Haarlem. 
The canal provided the first barge service in the Netherlands. The (tow)barges were 
only used for the transport of passengers and mail, not heavy cargo. The canal barges 
significantly improved transportation (Frijhoff and Spies, 2004). 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Time line of the Western gas factory 
 
                                                          
47 A quick overview of the history of the Western gas factory can be found in Figure 5.1. 
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The former railway dyke now marks the northern side of the Western gas factory. 
In 1839 the railway from Amsterdam to Haarlem was completed. The first 
(temporary) station, DǯEenhonderd Roe, was actually very close to the Western gas 
factory. The transportation of passengers by water between Amsterdam and Haarlem 
continued up to 1860. 
In 1898, ICGAǯs permit was withdrawn and the municipal management took over 
the plant. The gas industry flourished and expanded its operations by building new 
plants. The prosperity ended during the First World War. Coal became scarce during 
the First World war, and Amsterdam switched to electric street lighting and needed 
less gas. In 1955, gas production moved from the city to the Hoogovens in IJmuiden. 
In 1959, the largest natural gas field in Europe was discovered in the province of 
Groningen, near Slochteren in the northeastern part of the Netherlands. Due to the 
transformation to natural gas less coal gas was demanded. The Slochteren field 
provides even nowadays a large share of the European gas supply. Hence gas 
production at the Western gas factory gradually decreased until it was fully ceased 
in 1967. The Gas and Electricity Authority (GEB) decided to use the Western gas 
factory for maintenance and storage until 1992. 
Figure 5.2 shows the neighborhoods around the Western gas factory. The closest 
neighborhood, Staatsliedenbuurt, was built in the late 19th century, at the same time 
as when the Western gas factory was built. A few decades later, Spaarndammer- en 
Zeeheldenbuurt was built north of the Western gas factory. Inhabitants complained 
that there were hardly any green spaces. In 1981, the City of Amsterdam decided that 
the former site of the Western gas factory should become a green and recreational 
area. Since the site was heavily polluted due to the toxic by-products produced by gas 
production it could not be given that function before a thorough cleanup. After 
several years of political debates, the City of Amsterdam and the Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment agreed on a cleanup plan. Right after the start 
of the cleanup in 2000, it became clear that they had underestimated the level of 
pollution of the soil. The cleanup process took therefore a lot longer and was more 
expensive than had been planned. Eventually, the cleanup process of the Western gas 
factory cost around ̀20 million. Finally, the municipality was able to realize a park, 
Westerpark, which opened in 2003. The cost of the park was also around ̀20 million. 
The cleanup project, Western gas factory isolation and renovation, finished in 2008. 
Cultural amenities at the Western gas factory began to flourish after the district 
council allowed, in 1993, temporal creative tenants to rent parts of the buildings as to 
safeguard the Western gas factory against the occupation by squatters. Between 1993 
and 2001 various (cultural) events took place at the site and there were a lot of 
temporary tenants, mostly from the creative sector. When the cleanup process 
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started, most of the temporary tenants were forced to leave the Western gas factory, 
but the site never lost its cultural status. In the meanwhile, the district council 
searched for an investor who was willing to bear the risks of investing into the real 
estate. The property developer MAB (Meijer Aannemers Bedrijf) became that 
investor.48 The property developer would design and restore the historic buildings, 
design and realize three new buildings, and organize the operation and renting of the 
complex. The investment into the Western gas factory real estate cost around ̀26 
million. After the renovation in 2003, the buildings were again available for rent for 
small creative firms. 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Neighborhoods around the Western gas factory, distance rings and 
railway 
Note: The terrain of the former industrial site, Western gas factory, is the purple 
mass in the middle. The railway is the red line, and the sign is Amsterdam Central 
Station. The distance rings each cover 100 meters from the Western gas factory. 
 
 
 
                                                          
48 Property developer MAB merged with ?Bouwfounds? to form ?Bouwfonds MAB Development? in 2004. 
Since then, the ?Westergasfabriek BV? Ȃ a subsidiary of MAB Ȃ was taken over by ?Meijer-Bergmans BV?, 
the former owner of MAB. 
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In more than a decade, the old factory turned from a polluted industrial area into 
an anchor point for cultural events. A large amount of investments were made to 
create a specific (cultural) atmosphere that attracts many creative firms and satisfy 
all their needs. The cultural atmosphere of the Western gas factory also attracted 
many other amenities, such as shops and restaurants. This further increased the 
attractiveness of the site. The Western gas factory has become the center for many 
festivals, congresses, fairs, exhibitions and so on. 
 
5.3 METHODOLOGY 
In this paper we investigate whether the redevelopment of the Western gas factory 
resulted in higher house prices in surrounding residential areas compared to the case 
if the Western gas factory would not have been redeveloped. As discussed in the 
introduction, we use a hedonic price analysis to identify two possible treatment areas 
that benefit from the redevelopment of the Western gas factory and compare them 
with houses that did not benefit. We also compare the two possible treatment areas 
with each other to find whether the railway is a barrier for spillover effects of the 
Brownfield redevelopment. This section provides details on our empirical strategy. 
We start with a standard hedonic price model where we use various specifications. 
This enables us to (roughly) identify the houses that benefit from the redevelopment 
of the Western gas factory by using the proximity to the Western gas factory. We 
exploit the geographical location of the railway and the Western gas factory - that 
separates the Western gas factory from the residential area north of it - to compare 
houses north and south of the Western gas factory, which are our two possible 
treatment areas. We test whether the railway is a barrier for the spillover effects of 
the redevelopment of the Western gas factory. In other words, we investigate 
whether houses north of the Western gas factory did benefit as much from the 
redevelopment as the houses south of it. 
 
5.3.1 STANDARD HEDONIC PRICE MODEL 
We focus on the price distribution of houses that are sold around the brownfield site 
where the Western gas factory is located.49 Our starting point is the following hedonic 
model: 
 
 
                                                          
49 Note that officially the former industrial terrain is in the same neighborhood as the houses north of 
the Western gas factory and that the houses on the south side are in another neighborhood. For the 
determination of the treatment and control areas, we therefore neglect the neighborhood boundaries 
and prefer to use distance ring dummies. 
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 ?????? ? ? ???????????? ? ? ???????????? ? ??? ? ???????? 
 ??? ? ? ???????? ? ? ??????????? ? ? ???????? ? ??, (5.1) 
where ?? is the house price transactions at year t; ?? are a set of distance 'ring' 
dummies which take value one if the house is within a certain distance (between ?? 
and ?? meters) of the Western gas factory and zero otherwise; ??? ? ????? is an 
indicator that takes value one from the year 2003 and onwards (2003 is the year that 
the Westerpark opened and the restoration of the Western gas factory finished);50 ??  
are structural characteristics j, which are described in section 4; ?? a dummy variable 
taking one for year t and zero otherwise; ?? is a neighborhood dummy variable taking 
one for neighborhood i and zero otherwise;??? is an idiosyncratic error term. 
The distance ring dummies allow for different distributions of house prices in 
areas close to the Western gas factory for the whole time period. The interaction 
term, ? ???????????? ? ??? ? ?????, should capture the effect of the redevelopment in 
areas close to the Western gas factory for each distance ring after 2002. We control 
for structural characteristics of the house and unobservable neighborhood 
characteristics. The year dummies allow for the trend of the house prices, which 
varies over time. The number of observations allows us to use rings of 100 meters. 
This implies that we get a coefficient, ?? , for each distance ring (100m-200m, 
200m-300m, et cetera). This shows us the house price development for houses 
from 2003 and onwards in each distance ring due to the redevelopment of the 
Western gas factory. 
 We set R to 1000 meters. This means that the outer distance ring, in which we 
might find effects of the redevelopment, consists of the houses between 900m-1000m 
from the Western gas factory. Note that the houses outside this ring are identified as 
the control group. We include many distance rings because we do not know to what 
extent we observe an effect of the redevelopment. We do this so we can investigate at 
what distance the effect decreases and becomes (statistically) insignificant. Next, we 
could change R, which we did in the sensitivity analysis. 
In addition, we investigate whether the railway, that is just north of the Western 
gas factory, is a barrier for spillover effects of the brownfield redevelopment. Because 
of the geographical location of the railway, one can argue that the effect of the 
redevelopment of the Western gas factory is different between the residential area 
north of the Western gas factory and the residential area south of it (see Figure 5.2). 
                                                          
50 It is difficult to state one particular year since the year of investment in the Westerpark was 2000 
and its opening was in 2003, and the year of investment in the historic real estate was 2000 and was 
finished in 2003 as well. Therefore, as a sensitivity analysis, we also used different years as an 
indicator for when the effect of the Western gas factory started. 
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Crow distance from the site to houses north of the railway is somewhat similar to 
those houses located on the south side. Only by foot or by bike, it is possible to cross 
the railway without taking a detour. To test whether the railway is a barrier or not, 
we compare the residential area south of the Western gas factory to the residential 
area north of the railway. 
This implies that Equation 5.1 will change as follows: 
 ?????? ? ? ??????????????? ??????? ? ? ?????????????????????? ? ??? ? ????? 
 ??? ? ? ???????? ? ? ??????????? ? ? ???????? ? ??, (5.2) 
where we now identify our treatment area by dividing the distance ring dummies into 
a northern part and a southern part. Everything else is the same as in Equation 5.1. 
The estimation of Equation 5.2 tests whether the distribution of house prices, in 
particular for those houses south of the Western gas factory, changed after the 
opening of the Westerpark and the restoration of the Western gas factory compared 
to the houses north of the railway. The interaction term, ? ?????????????????????? ?
??? ? ?????, should capture the effect of the redevelopment on the residential area 
south of the Western gas factory for each distance ring after 2002. Again we control 
for the structural characteristics, year dummies, and unobservable neighborhood 
characteristics. If the residential area south of the Western gas factory did indeed 
benefit more than the northern residential area, we should find positive and 
statistically significant coefficients for ??????? . 
 
5.3.2 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
In Equation 5.1, the treatment area consists of those houses that are located inside 
the R distance ring, the control area are those houses outside the R distance ring. In 
Equation 5.2, we compare the two possible treatment areas with each other. One 
concern is, for instance, that the control area changes when we change the number of 
observations outside the R distance ring (in Equation 5.1). In other words, when we 
change the sample size the control area most likely changes as well. This can 
significantly change the results. Another concern is that the treatment and control 
area change when we change R. The main problem in these types of models is that, 
more often than not, the treatment and control area is not easily defined. In our case, 
the control area can consist of houses that are not comparable with houses close to 
the Western gas factory. It could also be that there are other policy interventions on 
the other side of Amsterdam, which we do not observe and do not want to pick up in 
our analysis, that influences house prices in the control area. If the control area 
consists of residential areas where the effect of different policies cannot be 
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disentangled from the effect of the redevelopment of the Western gas factory, this will 
lead to biased estimates of the ?? coefficients, and therefore the wrong conclusions. 
One should therefore define and argue what control area to use and do sensitivity 
analysis to test for robustness, which we do in our analysis. An easy way to deal with 
the comparability problem is to decrease the sample size, and only take those houses 
within a certain distance from the Western gas factory. 
Robustness tests include different sample sizes, different distances for the ring 
dummy variables and other years as an indicator for when the effect of the Western 
gas factory started. The results of the main specifications can be found in Section 5.5. 
 
5.4 DATA EN DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This section gives an overview of the data we use to investigate the residential areas 
around the Western gas factory. In addition, we show some descriptive statistics on 
house prices and investments that were made in the former industrial terrain. 
The data that we use for the hedonic analysis is the transactions data provided by 
the Dutch Association of Real Estate Agents (NVM). It contains a large share 
(between 60 and 75%) of owner-occupied house transactions in the Netherlands. The 
NVM dataset that we use in our analysis consist of 80,416 sold houses in Amsterdam, 
the capital of the Netherlands, between 1995 and 2009. We have information on the 
exact location of those houses as well as the transaction price. The dataset includes a 
whole list of structural characteristics of the sold houses, such as floor space (in m2), 
number of rooms, type of house, garden, parking, monument status, the year of 
construction, et cetera.51 In addition, we use some neighborhood information 
provided by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) and the Amsterdam Bureau for Research 
and Statistics (O+S). They provided us with information on the number of social 
houses, rented houses, and owner-occupied houses for each year and neighborhood 
combination. An overview of the housing and neighborhood characteristics can be 
found in Table 5.A.1 in Appendix 5.A. 
These data allow us to investigate house prices in Amsterdam. The Netherlands 
experienced a house price boom that lasted from the beginning of the 1990s to 2007. 
The house price boom in Amsterdam followed the same path. House prices increased 
rapidly from 1990 to 2001. From 2001 to 2004, house prices were somewhat stable 
but after 2004 prices started to increase again. Panel a) of Figure 5.3 shows the 
growth in house prices for the Westerpark district, which includes the neighborhood 
where the Western gas factory is located, and the rest of Amsterdam (controlling for 
structural characteristics). At a first glance, they seem to follow the same path but a 
                                                          
51 In the analysis, we exclude transactions with prices above ̀1.5 million or below ̀25,000. We also 
exclude transactions that have a floor space higher than 1,000 m2 or lower than 10 m2. 
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closer look at the gap between the Westerpark district and the rest of Amsterdam 
shows that the Westerpark district was falling behind in house price growth in 
the 1990s and the beginning of the new century. Panel b) of Figure 5.3 shows this gap 
in house price growth (again controlling for structural characteristics) of the 
Westerpark district compared to the rest of Amsterdam. One could argue that this is 
just part of the cycle of neighborhood decline and renewal, but it is interesting to 
research whether local policy can influence these differences in house price growth, 
which is what we do in our analysis. 
 
 
(a) House price development (Rest of Amsterdam in 1990 = 100) 
 
(b) House price gap (Rest of Amsterdam = 100) 
Figure 5.3. House price indices over time 
Note: House price indices are controlled for structural characteristics. 
Source: NVM data (1990-2009), own regressions. 
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Figure 5.4. Descriptive statistics of the Westerpark district 
 
 
Table 5.1. Overview of investments in brownfield site, the Western gas factory 
Investment Time Financed by Amount (in million ̀) 
 
Large-scale cleanup process 
 
2000 - 2008 
 
General government / City of 
Amsterdam 
 
20 
 
Public space (Westerpark) 
 
1996 - 2003 
 
District council 
 
20 
 
Restoration historic buildings 
 
2000 - 2003 
 
Property developer MAB 
(Loan from National 
Restoration Fund) 
 
26.5 
 
The spatial units of our research are the houses inside the residential areas of 
Amsterdam that are close to the Western gas factory. A map of the neighborhoods can 
be found in panel a) of Figure 5.4. The area of interest is located in the northwest of 
Amsterdam. Considering the geographical location of the brownfield site and the 
location of the railway, one could argue that the closest neighborhoods, in particular 
the Staatsliedenbuurt, should have experienced the highest attractiveness boost from 
the renewal of the Western gas factory. As one might observe this is a different 
neighborhood than where the Western gas factory officially belongs to. The 
Spaarndammer- en Zeeheldenbuurt is separated by a railway where on the northern 
side of the railway you can find its residential area and on the southern side you can 
(a)  Western gas factory and surrounding 
neighborhoods 
(b) Government investments into listed built 
heritage 
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find the brownfield site. Because of the geographical location of the railway, one could 
argue that residential area north of the railway did benefit less from the brownfield 
redevelopment than the residential area south of it. 
The investments made by the government into the listed built heritage for each 
neighborhood in Amsterdam are illustrated in panel b) of Figure 5.4. These numbers 
are based on the 4-digit postcode level. These do not coincide with neighborhoods, 
but they do give a clear picture of where the government has invested in listed built 
heritage between 1985 and 2011. The highest investment into listed built heritage is 
in that area where the Western gas factory is located. The investment in this 
neighborhood is more than ̀7,500 per inhabitant compared to the ̀2,500-̀7,500 
per inhabitant in the protected historic area in Amsterdamǯs inner city. However, the 
government did not only invest into the listed built heritage of the Western gas 
factory but also in the large-scale cleanup process of the brownfield site and into the 
creation of new park. An overview of investment in the brownfield site is provided in 
Table 5.1. In total, more than 65 million euro is invested into the brownfield site. 
 
5.5 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
This section reports and discusses the results of the hedonic analysis. We provide an 
overview of the estimation results based on the two specifications from Section 5.2. In 
the first specification, we focus on the effect of the redevelopment of the Western gas 
factory on prices of nearby houses. In the second specification, we investigate 
whether houses north of the railway benefit as much from the redevelopment as the 
houses south of the Western gas factory. The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of the transaction price. As a robustness check, we consider a variety of 
sample sizes (and, therefore, different treatment and control areas), and other years 
as an indicator for when the effect of the Western gas factory started. 
 
5.5.1 HEDONIC PRICE ANALYSIS 
We start by providing estimation results for Equation 5.1 in Table 5.2. We report six 
different specifications. In Column 1, we report the coefficients of the interaction 
terms, ?? ? ??? ? ?????, that capture the effect of the redevelopment in areas close to 
the Western gas factory for each distance ring after 2002. In this specification, we 
used the full sample which consists of houses sold in Amsterdam between 1995 
and 2009. We simply include dummies for year, neighborhood, and for each distance 
ring corresponding to distances of 200m-300m, 300m-400m, et cetera. We also 
control for structural and neighborhood characteristics. The control area consists of 
sold houses in Amsterdam that are beyond 1km from the Western gas factory. Results 
in Column 2 shows what happens if we decrease the sample size and only include 
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those houses within 2km from the Western gas factory. This implies that the control 
area consists of sold houses that are beyond 1km from the Western gas factory, but 
are no further than 2km from it. The coefficients in this specification are large and 
statistically significant for the houses that are within 600m to the Western gas 
factory. This suggests that the impact of the redevelopment of the Western gas 
factory on house prices does not reach further than 600m. Beyond 600m, we reach 
the borders of the Westerpark district and we observe more observations from 
houses sold in the Jordaan neighborhood. The Jordaan is a completely different 
neighborhood (much older and inside the historic city center). We observe the similar 
coefficients when we drop houses inside the historic city center. 
The coefficients can be interpreted as follows: If a house is located within 200m 
from the Western gas factory, its price increased by 8% between 2003 and 2009 
compared to those houses between 1km and 2km from the Western gas factory. If a 
house is located between 200m and 300m  from the Western gas factory, its price 
increased by 14% between 2003 and 2009 compared to those houses between 
1km and 2km from the Western gas factory. As one might notice, the coefficients 
reported in Column 1 and 2 differ. This is because the control area changed 
significantly. 
In Columns 3 through 6, we show results from a specification that only takes into 
account houses within 1km of the Western gas factory. We exclude the outer distance 
ring(s). This means that the houses in the outer distance ring(s) become the control 
area. The coefficients of interest become smaller compared to Columns 1 and 2, but 
are still present and statistically significant. 
Figure 5.5 shows the course of the coefficients of the different distance rings. For 
this figure, we used the coefficients in Column 3. The course of the coefficients in 
Columns 4 through 6 shows a similar pattern. The results show that the effect of the 
redevelopment of the Western gas factory increases rapidly until 300m, stabilizes for 
a few hundred meters, and starts decreasing rapidly after 500m-600m. The figure 
suggests that those houses that are closest to the Western gas factory also 
experienced some negative effects from the redevelopment of the Western gas 
factory. One could argue that traffic increased around the Western gas factory and 
that now it is more crowded and therefore noisier. The prices of those houses 
increased 5% between 2003 and 2009 compared to the control area. Even when we 
increase the control area to include houses between 600m and 1000m from the 
Western gas factory, the results stay somewhat similar. Prices of houses 
between 300m and 500m from the Western gas factory increased around 9% 
between 2003 and 2009 compared to the control area. This percentage decreases for 
houses between 500m and 600m to 7% and becomes statistically insignificant for 
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houses beyond 600m. This rapid decrease can be (partly) explained by the increasing 
number of houses that are inside the historic city center of Amsterdam. These houses 
are built in the beginning of the 17th century and are therefore very different than the 
houses close to the Western gas factory, which are built in the late 19th and the 
beginning of the 20th century. We do control for the building period of the house, but 
houses that are built before 1905 are in the same group. If we exclude the houses 
within the historic city center of Amsterdam, we find a more gradual decrease in the 
effect of the redevelopment of the Western gas factory. 
We have also carried out an analysis in which we compute house prices for a 
standard house in every year. We compute one series of house prices that includes 
the effect of the redevelopment of the Western gas factory and one that does not 
include this effect. This results in different price developments for houses within a 
particular neighborhood and distance ring. Figure 5.6 shows two sets of houses that 
follow different price developments. The solid line follows the actual price 
development, while the dashed line follows the Ǯcounterfactualǯ price development. In 
other words, the dashed line shows the house price development if the Western gas 
factory would not have been redeveloped. The gap between the solid and dashed line 
is comparable with the cross term coefficients in Table 5.2. 
Another interesting observation is that the model predicts that house prices would 
have decreased between 2001 and 2004 if the former industrial terrain would not 
have been redeveloped. This implies that investing in old factories is a tool for policy 
makers to deal with declining neighborhoods. 
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Table 5.2. Hedonic analysis: Western gas factory spillover effects 
(1) 
 
Full 
sample 
(2) 
 
< 2 km 
(3) 
 
< 1 km 
(4) 
 
< 1 km 
(5) 
 
< 1 km 
(6) 
 
< 1 km 
      
Treatment 
?? ? ??? ? ????? 100m-200m 0.108*** 0.084*** 0.046** 0.046** 0.055*** 0.054*** 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
 
200m-
300m 
0.165*** 0.138*** 0.094*** 0.095*** 0.104*** 0.102*** 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
 
300m-
400m 
0.150*** 0.118*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
400m-
500m 
0.128*** 0.107*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.096*** 0.094*** 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
 
500m-
600m 
0.127*** 0.099*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
 
600m-
700m 
0.041*** 0.019 -0.006 -0.005 0.004 
Control 
area 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
700m-
800m 
0.020* -0.008 -0.030* -0.029** 
Control 
area 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) 
 
800m-
900m 
0.050*** 0.020 0.003 
Control 
area 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) 
 
900m-
1000m 
0.054*** 0.027** Control 
area 
(0.011) (0.012) 
Control variables 
Distance ring dummies 
Structural characteristics 
Neighborhood characteristics 
Building period dummies 
Year fixed effects 
Neighborhood fixed effects 
x x x x x x 
x x x x x x 
x x x x x x 
x x x x x x 
x x x x x x 
x x x x x x 
Observations 80,388 15,648 5,044 5,044 5,044 5,044 
Adjusted R-squared 0.918 0.929 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.925 
                  
Note: Dependent variable is ln(transaction price). Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at 
90, 95 and 99% level are, respectively, indicated as *, ** and ***. All regressions include a constant. 
There are no houses within 100 meters of the Western gas factory. The control area in Columns 3 to 6 
consists of all the cross terms that do not contain coefficients. The other coefficients can be obtained by 
the author. 
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Figure 5.5. Cross term coefficients of the hedonic regression model 
Note: The coefficients of Column 3 are used in this figure and are on the y-axis. 
The different distance rings are on the x-axis. x=200 represents the houses that 
are in the 100m to 200m distance ring. The cross coefficients become 
statistically insignificant beyond 600m. 
 
 
 
(a) Houses between 100m and 200m (b) Houses between 300m and 400m 
Figure 5.6. House price developments over time 
Note: The coefficients used in this analysis can be found in Table 2, Column 3. The dots show the 
estimated prices of a standard house in the Staatsliedenbuurt for each year. The solid lines shows 
the Ǯactualǯ price development over the years. The dashed line shows the Ǯcounterfactualǯ price 
development if the Western gas factory would not have been redeveloped. 
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Next, we report results where we compare the houses north of the Western gas 
factory with the houses south of it. Table 5.3 consists of five different specifications. 
Equation 5.2 is used to estimate the coefficients. To recap, we test whether the 
railway, which separates the Western gas factory and the residential area just north 
of it. If the railway is a barrier for the spillover effects of the redevelopment of the 
Western gas factory, we expect that the residential area north of the Western gas 
factory did benefit less from the redevelopment than the residential area south of it. If 
this is the case, we should find positive and significant coefficients for the cross terms, 
? ?????????????????????? ? ??? ? ?????. These cross terms capture the effect of the 
redevelopment of the Western gas factory on the residential area south of the 
Western gas factory for each distance ring after 2002. Again, we control for all kind of 
variables that we used before. The coefficients in Column 7 can then be interpreted as 
follows: If a house is located between 200m and 300m south from the Western gas 
factory, its price increased by 4% between 2003 and 2009 compared to those houses 
north of the Western gas factory (sample size is restricted to houses within 1km of 
the Western gas factory). If a house is located between 400m and 500m south from 
the Western gas factory, its price increased by 5% between 2003 and 2009 compared 
to those houses north of the Western gas factory. The results show only a few cross 
terms that are positive and significant (the ones we just mentioned) and the rest is 
either not significant or negative and significant. The positive and significant 
coefficients suggest that the houses within these distance bands are different from the 
northern residential area. The negative and significant coefficients could be (partly) 
explained by the increasing number of houses that are from the Jordaan 
neighborhood inside the historic city center. In Columns 8 through 11, we decrease 
the sample size. Evidently, the number of houses inside the two possible treatment 
areas becomes smaller. Where we still find a few statistically significant coefficients in 
Columns 8 and 9, we see that most significant coefficients disappear in Column 10 
and 11. 
These results show that the houses north of the Western gas factory did not change 
significantly from the houses south of it. There are a few explanations for these 
results. Ignoring the results in Table 5.2, one could argue that there is no effect of the 
redevelopment on the residential area south of the Western gas factory. We argue 
that the residential area north of the Western gas factory did benefit as much as the 
residential area south of it. This is more likely to explain the statistically insignificant 
coefficients. It may seem that the railway is a barrier between the Western gas factory 
and the residential area north of it, but this seems not the case for the spillover effects 
of the redevelopment of the Western gas factory. Considering the positive and 
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significant findings in Table 5.2, it is more likely that we found a proximity effect of 
the redevelopment of the Western gas factory. 
 
5.5.2 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
Before ending this section, we briefly report the results of some sensitivity analyses. 
We have estimated many variants of the two equations that we formulated in 
Section 5.2. As we already described above, we changed the sample size, treatment 
and control area. We do so because we cannot rule out the possibility that the 
treatment and control area is not correctly chosen. The identification of the treatment 
and control area is particularly difficult in a geographical context. We showed that 
sometimes these can significantly change the results and should be carefully 
interpreted. We find that if the control area consists of houses in the outer rings, we 
always find a positive and significant effect for houses nearby the Western gas 
factory. Even when we drop the houses that are within the historic city center, the 
results stay reasonably robust. 
What we also did was change the indicator that takes value one in a particular year 
and onwards. In the analysis above, we used the year 2003 as the indicator. In this 
year, the Westerpark opened and the restoration of the Western gas factory finished. 
If we change the indicator to 2000, the year where the most investments were made, 
we find somewhat larger effects, but the course of the house price development over 
the different distance rings keeps consistent. If we change the year to 2005, a random 
year, we find effects that are somewhat smaller. This suggests that the adjustment of 
the housing market is a process that can take several years. 
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Table 5.3. Hedonic analysis: Differences between two possible treatment areas 
(7) 
 
< 1km 
(8) 
 
< 900m 
(9) 
 
< 800m 
(10) 
 
< 700m 
(11) 
 
< 600m 
      
Treatment 
??????? ? ??? ? ????? 100m-200m -0.0027 -0.0031 0.0029 -0.0231 -0.0018 
(0.0195) (0.0199) (0.0203) (0.0219) (0.0294) 
200m-300m 0.0447** 0.0435** 0.0507** 0.0266 0.0474 
(0.0195) (0.0199) (0.0204) (0.0220) (0.0298) 
300m-400m 0.0279 0.0260 0.0358** 0.0107 0.0260 
(0.0170) (0.0176) (0.0181) (0.0200) (0.0288) 
400m-500m 0.0525** 0.0474* 0.0592** 0.0321 0.0479 
(0.0251) (0.0256) (0.0257) (0.0268) (0.0341) 
500m-600m 0.0034 0.0017 0.0095 -0.0238 -0.0009 
(0.0245) (0.0248) (0.0254) (0.0268) (0.0340) 
600m-700m -0.0443** -0.0448** -0.0380** -0.0713*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0182) (0.0187) (0.0211) 
700m-800m -0.0752*** -0.0753*** -0.0752*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0200) (0.0209) 
800m-900m -0.0512*** -0.0526*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0201) 
900m-1000m -0.0556*** 
 (0.0179) 
Control variables 
Distance ring dummies 
Structural characteristics 
Neighborhood characteristics 
Building period dummies 
Year fixed effects 
Neighborhood fixed effects 
x x x x x 
x x x x x 
x x x x x 
x x x x x 
x x x x x 
x x x x x 
Observations 5044 4215 3458 2746 2033 
Adjusted R-squared 0.925 0.926 0.934 0.937 0.937 
                
Note: Dependent variable is ln(transaction price). Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at 
90, 95 and 99% level are, respectively, indicated as *, ** and ***. All regressions include a constant. 
There are no houses within 100 meters of the Western gas factory. The 'control' area in all 
specifications consists of the northern distance rings. The other coefficients can be obtained by the 
author. 
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5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigates the effect of brownfield redevelopment on surrounding 
residential areas. We study this in the case of the Amsterdam Western gas factory. 
This former industrial terrain was desolated after gas production ceased. The whole 
area was polluted and needed a thorough cleanup which started in 2000. In the 
meanwhile, the empty real estate was made available for temporary (cultural) 
tenants. The restoration of the real estate started in 2000. This was finished in 2003. 
In the same year, the Westerpark opened. The redevelopment of this brownfield site 
improved the attractiveness of surrounding residential areas. Instead of an old 
factory on a desolated terrain, the area was now turned into an anchor point for 
cultural events. The cultural atmosphere of the Western gas factory attracted many 
other amenities, like shops and restaurants, which further increases the 
attractiveness. 
While the literature provides little conclusive evidence on the effects of brownfield 
redevelopment, this paper focuses on that issue regarding the surrounding 
residential areas. The hedonic price framework is used to investigate the effect of the 
redevelopment of the Western gas factory on prices of nearby houses. We start by 
drawing distance rings around the Western gas factory that enables us to investigate 
price developments of houses that are located in the different rings (100m-200m, 
200m-300m, et cetera). We then use the year 2003 (the year that the Westerpark 
opened and the restoration of the Western gas factory finished) to indicate when the 
effect of the redevelopment started to be noticeable. By controlling for all sorts of 
other characteristics (structural, neighborhood, year of transaction, et cetera), we 
find strong evidence that there is a positive and robust effect of the redevelopment on 
surrounding residential areas. The effect is between 5 and 10% between 2003 
and 2009 and is significant for houses within 600m of the Western gas factory. This 
implies that the prices of those houses increased statistically significant compared to 
the control area (which is the most outer ring). We test for robustness by changing 
the sample size, and the treatment and control area. We are well aware that the 
identification of treatment and control areas is an important factor in interpreting 
these results. We also change the year that indicates when the effect of the 
redevelopment started. We find that decreasing the sample size, and therefore the 
control area, evidently changes the results somewhat. If we do not change the sample 
size, but do make small changes in the treatment and control area, we find that the 
results are reasonably robust. 
We also find that the geographical location of the railway, that separates the 
Western gas factory with the residential area north of it, is not a barrier for the 
spillover effects caused by the redevelopment of the Western gas factory. We find 
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weak evidence that the houses north of the Western gas factory should have 
benefitted less from the redevelopment than the houses south of it. This is probably 
because one can, by foot or by bike, cross the railway that separates the brownfield 
site and the residential area north of it without taking a detour. Therefore, the effect 
of the redevelopment of the Western gas factory is a proximity effect. 
We conclude with a discussion on the policy relevance of this paper. Although we 
find strong evidence of the effect of brownfield redevelopment on surrounding 
residential areas in case of the Western gas factory, this does not guarantee that 
redeveloping random brownfield sites will have strong effects on its surroundings as 
well. There is probably more going on. The (historical) status of the area, the 
geographical location, and the new function of the brownfield site are just a few 
examples that can make the surrounding residential areas become more or less 
attractive. We believe though that redeveloping brownfield sites is a good way to 
reuse the land for other purposes since land is becoming scarcer, definitely in cities 
with increasing population density. 
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APPENDIX 5.A.  
 
Table 5.A.1 Variable names and definitions 
Variable name Definition Unit 
Dependent variable     
Transaction price Transaction price of house sold at a particular year. Euros 
Structural characteristics     
Floor space Size of living space of the house. m2 
Rooms Number of rooms.  # 
Central heating 
Dummy variables taking value 1 if the house has central 
heating. Reference: houses without central heating. 
0,1 
Maintenance inside  
Dummy variables taking value 1 if the inside of a house is 
maintained well. Reference: houses where the inside is on 
average or below average maintained. 
0,1 
Maintenance outside 
Dummy variables taking value 1 if the outside of a house is 
maintained well. Reference: houses where the outside is on 
average or below average maintained. 
0,1 
Garden (2x) 
Dummy variables taking value 1 if the house has a garden, or a 
well-maintained garden. Reference: Houses without a garden. 
0,1 
Parking  
Dummy variables taking value 1 if the house includes private 
parking space. Reference: houses with a no parking space. 
0,1 
House type (4x) 
Dummy variables taking value 1 if the house is a standard 
house, detached house, semi-detached house, corner house. 
Reference: apartments. 
0,1 
Building period (10x) 
Dummy variables taking value 1 if the house is built before 
1906, or in the period 1906-1930, 1931-1944, 1945-1959, 
1960-1970, 1971-1980, 1981-1990, 1991-2000, construction 
period unknown. Reference: houses that are built after 2000. 
0,1 
Neighborhood 
characteristics     
Neighborhoods 
Dummy variables for different neighborhoods taking value 1 if 
the house is located in that particular neighborhood. 
0,1 
Housing supply Number of houses within a particular neighborhood. # 
Percentage rented houses Percentage of houses in the neighborhood that are rented. % 
Percentage social rented 
houses 
Percentage of social houses in the neighborhood that are 
rented. 
% 
Percentage non-western 
immigrants 
Percentage of inhabitants of non-western origin in the 
neighborhood.  
%  
Distance to Amsterdam CS Distance in meters to the Amsterdam Central Station. m 
Monument amenities     
Listed built heritage 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the house is listed as built 
heritage. 
0,1 
      
Note: Data sources are NVM, CBS and O+S. 
 
 6 DIVERGING HOUSE PRICES AND INCOME SHOCKS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
There exists abundant evidence that the prices of different types of housing evolve 
differently over time. Typically, luxury housing appreciates more than other types 
during booms, and depreciates more during busts. Figure 6.1 illustrates this 
phenomenon for detached and terraced housing in the Netherlands during a long 
period of house price increases that lasted from 1995 to 2007. The figures refer to 
existing owner-occupied dwellings (new construction is excluded) and are published 
by Statistics Netherlands and the Dutch Land Register (in Dutch: CBS and Kadaster). 
In all provinces except one (Limburg) the prices of detached houses more than 
tripled: the price increase was more than 200%. However, for terraced houses prices 
never tripled, although in all cases they doubled.52  
 
 
Figure 6.1 Appreciation of detached and single family housing in Dutch provinces (1995-2007) 
Note: The figures show the ratio of prices in 2007 to 1995 minus 1, multiplied by 100 for each Dutch 
province. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands/Kadaster. 
 
 
                                                          
52 From 2007, house prices in the Netherlands have on average decreased. 
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The differences in appreciation rates between various types of housing do not fit 
easily with the use of Ǯhousing servicesǯ as an explanatory device for the functioning of 
the housing market. Housing services are an imaginary commodity introduced by 
Muth (1960) to facilitate the use of standard microeconomic tools for housing market 
analysis and it has been very successful.53 The typical application of this approach 
considers the housing stock as a large number of housing services that can be 
distributed arbitrarily over households. The convenient consequence of this approach 
is that there is a single price of housing services, but the flipside of this coin is clearly 
that differences between price developments of different housing types are excluded. 
The explanations for diverging house prices that have been put forward in the 
literature have therefore relaxed the housing services concept by distinguishing 
between two (or more) types of dwellings without imposing proportionality of the 
prices. Differences in price developments following a shock in income are then shown 
to be related to the down-payment constraint. If a positive income shock (modestly) 
increases the initial price on low quality houses, the leverage for owners to switch to 
higher quality houses increases (see Ortalo, Magné & Rady, 2006). However, the 
differential development of prices of different housing types can also be observed in 
countries like the Netherlands where the down-payment constraint does hardly play a 
role, as was shown in Figure 6.1.54 
In this paper, a model is developed that explains the differential development of 
house prices following an income shock without a down-payment constraint. The 
model remains very close to the conventional housing services approach and can be 
derived from it by introducing some restrictions. What we do here is abandon the 
assumption of perfect malleability of housing capital. Instead, we think of houses as a 
given quality level (that is, producing a given number of housing services in each 
period). If the number of available houses of each quality level is given (in the short 
run), the price per unit of housing services can differ for houses of different quality 
and differences in price movements between houses of different types become 
possible. In this setup, the housing stock can be described as a distribution function of 
houses that differ in quality. This housing stock has to be distributed over a set of 
households that differ in income. To focus on one important aspect Ȃ the relationship 
between income shocks causing housing market booms and differential price 
development Ȃ we assume that demand for housing depends only on household 
                                                          
53 See Rouwendal (1998) for an examination of the micro-economic foundations of the concept. 
54 In the Netherlands, a low priced mortgage insurance (Nationale Hypotheek Garantie) is available for 
first-time buyers. It allows them to borrow as much as 100% of the value of the house. To be eligible 
for the insurance the mortgage payment to income ratio should not exceed a threshold value of 
approximately 30%. However, this constraint does not have the same effects as a down-payment 
constraint following an income shock. 
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income. We show that if housing is normal, the ranking of housing consumption 
follows that of incomes. This allows us to find the matching between incomes and 
houses. This matching must be facilitated by the price mechanism, and this 
requirement implies a relationship between house price and quality, that can be 
viewed as a (one dimensional) hedonic price function. 
The conditions under which the house price function Ȃ that describes the price of 
housing as a function of quality Ȃ is locally convex, linear or concave are made precise. 
The curvature of this house price function at a particular quality level is shown to be 
related to the ratio between the number of houses with that quality level and the 
number of households with the corresponding income (i.e. the income at which this 
level of housing quality is demanded at the prevailing hedonic price function). 
Intuitively, if this ratio is large, the house price function must be locally convex to 
prevent demand from increasing Ǯtoo fastǯ with income. If the ratio is small, the house 
price function must be concave. The situation in which the house price function is 
locally linear can be interpreted as an equilibrium in the sense that the number of 
available houses with a given quality matches the number of household demanding 
that exactly that quality. 
The results of the analysis are most clear-cut when the slopes of the demand and 
Engel curves for housing services do not change as a consequence of the income 
shock. For this case, the analysis implies that an equal (absolute) increase of all 
incomes leaves the curvature of the hedonic price function unchanged, although the 
(marginal) price of housing services may change. However, a proportional increase in 
all incomes will make the hedonic price function more convex, which implies the 
phenomenon of differential price development. This conclusion is reached under the 
assumption of rigid supply, while demand shifts towards houses of higher quality. In 
the longer run changes in the housing stock will counteract this initial price reaction, 
although it should be noted that asymmetric adjustment (see Glaeser & 
Gyourko, 2005) makes it probable that the impact of income shocks may last for a 
prolonged period of time.  
To show that the model explains the phenomenon of interest we derive the 
conditions under which a proportional change in all incomes results in a more convex 
housing price function. A special case in which a closed form solution of the housing 
price function can be derived occurs if the distributions of income and housing 
quality are uniform and demand for housing services is linear. 
Our model implies that houses that provide a larger number of housing services 
will always command a higher price. The ranking based on prices therefore coincides 
with the ranking based on housing services. In our empirical application, we use this 
property of the model to estimate the number of housing services as a function of 
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housing characteristics. With this function in hand, we can investigate the 
development of the housing price as a function of the number of housing services 
over time. We find for the Amsterdam region that this function became increasingly 
convex during the long boom period that lasted from 1995 to 2007, and less convex in 
the recession that followed. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model and the 
main theoretical results. We start with a discussion of the setup, and then derive 
some initial results that characterize the matching of households over housing and go 
on to derive the curvature of the house price function. Section 6.3 discusses the 
implications of the model for the effect of income shocks and illustrates them in 
various ways. Section 6.4 provides some preliminary empirical evidence. This section 
is incomplete and will be extended in the coming weeks. Section 6.5 concludes. 
 
6.2 THE MODEL 
6.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
We consider a market with a fixed supply of a heterogeneous commodity, housing. 
Houses are available in a continuum of varieties, and each variety is characterized by 
a number of housing services. This number is interpreted as a scalar index of housing 
quality. The consumers that demand housing all have identical tastes, but differ in 
incomes. The housing stock is fixed in the short run. 
Formally, we define housing quality as the number of housing services q offered by 
a house. The only departure from Muthǯs (1960) framework is that we treat q as fixed 
for each house and allow the price per unit of housing services to differ over houses.55 
The price (rent) ????? of a house that offers q units of housing services per period is 
therefore not necessarily equal to the product of q and a unit price that is equal for all 
housing qualities. 
The housing stock is described by the distribution function of the quality of 
housing, ????. ? is assumed to be differentiable and to have support on an interval 
?????? ?????. The stock of houses is ?, ? ? ???????. The density function associated 
with G is denoted as g. 
The function ???? can be interpreted as a simple hedonic price function. It gives 
the rent or user cost of a house as a function of its quality. We assume that the 
hedonic price function is twice differentiable. The marginal price of housing services, 
?, is the first derivative of the hedonic price function: 
 ? ? ????. (6.1) 
                                                          
55 The model of the present paper is related somewhat to Braidǯs (1981, 1984) analysis of rental 
housing markets, which is built on Sweeny (1974). 
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Clearly, the marginal price of housing services is a constant if and only if the hedonic 
price function is linear, that is if: ???? ? ? ? ??. In the familiar Muth case, the house 
price is proportional to the number of housing services: ? ? ?. In the model we 
develop here, the hedonic price function will in general be nonlinear.  
The stock of houses is used by a population of households. As said, we assume that 
they all have identical tastes that can be described by a utility function u: 
 ???? ??. (6.2) 
The two arguments of this function are housing consumption q, which is equal to the 
number of housing services offered by the dwelling in which the household lives, and 
other consumption c, which is summarized in the number of units of a composite 
good. The utility function is assumed to be two times differentiable, increasing in its 
two arguments, and to have convex indifference curves. 
Consumers differ in income. The distribution of income is ?????, which has 
positive support on an interval ?????? ?????.  We treat income as a continuous 
variable and assume that ?? is differentiable and denote the density function as f. The 
total number of households equals ?, where ? ? ???????. 
Although we have emphasized that the hedonic price function should be expected 
to be nonlinear, we will make extensive use of the demand function, which is defined 
for a linear budget constraint. We denote the demand function as: 
 ? ? ???? ??, (6.3) 
where ? denotes the Ȃ constant Ȃ marginal price for housing services.  
The budget constraint for a household is: 
 ? ? ???? ? ?. (6.4) 
Maximization of the utility function (Equation 6.2) subject to the budget constraint 
(Equation 6.4) leads to the familiar first-order condition: 
 
??
??
??
??? ?
??
??.  (6.5) 
This condition says that in the optimum an indifference curve touches the nonlinear 
budget line, as is illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2 Linearizing the budget constraint 
 
We can describe consumer choice behavior in terms of the conventional demand 
function by linearizing the budget line at the optimum of the consumer. This implies 
that we use the marginal price of housing services, ?? ??? , in the optimum as the first 
argument of the demand function and virtual income ??, which is defined as: 
 ?? ? ? ? ???? ? ? ????,  (6.6) 
as its second argument. Demand function (Equation 6.3) is therefore rewritten as:  
 ? ? ???? ??? ???? .  (6.7) 
In market equilibrium, each household must be on a demand function (Equation 6.7), 
with ?? given as in Equation 6.6. Note that the arguments of this demand function are 
determined by the choice the household makes on the housing market. That is, both 
Budget line 
yv=y- ????????????????????? 
c 
q 
c* 
q* 
????????? 
Indifference curve 
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the marginal price and virtual income are functions of the chosen amount of housing 
services q. 
 
6.2.2 TWO PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
In this subsection, we establish two elementary properties of the hedonic price 
function. The first one is that the hedonic price function is increasing in the number of 
housing services. To see this, suppose that the hedonic price function is not increasing 
in the number of housing services. Then there is at least one pair of housing services, 
say ?? and ?? with ?? ? ?? and ????? ? ?????. Since all consumers are utility 
maximizers, there will then be no demand for housing with quality ??. The existence 
of such a pair is therefore incompatible with price equilibrium. Hence the user cost 
function must be increasing in the number of housing services. 
The second result is that in a market equilibrium housing consumption must be 
increasing in income if housing is a normal good. This sounds a bit trivial since 
normal goods are defined as goods whose consumption increases with income, but 
remember that this definition refers to a situation in which the unit price of the good 
is constant. That is, it refers to the special case ???? ? ?? only, and what we will show 
now is that it also holds with a nonlinear hedonic price function. Fortunately, this is 
easy to do since with a nonlinear budget constraint exactly the same logic applies. 
Housing is normal if and only if the marginal rate of substitution between housing 
and the composite commodity increases in the consumption of the composite 
commodity, that is if: 
 
?
?? ?
?? ???
?? ??? ? ? ?. (6.8) 
If the budget line shifts upward, its slope remains unchanged for any given level of 
housing consumption. This is true for a linear as well as a nonlinear budget line. 
However, the slope of the indifference curve through the point of the budget line 
corresponding to this given level of housing consumption gets steeper, if inequality 
(Equation 6.8) holds. This implies that the optimal level of housing consumption must 
be larger after the vertical shift of the budget line than it was before. The same 
reasoning applies of course to a downward shift. 
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Figure 6.3. Normal goods and a nonlinear budget line 
 
This is illustrated in Figure 6.3. In this figure, two budget lines are drawn as 
? ? ? ? ???? for a nonlinear hedonic price function. The lowest budget line touches 
the indifference curve ???. For given housing consumption, for instance ??, the slopes 
of the two budget lines are equal. If the slopes of the indifference curves crossing or 
touching the two budget lines would also be equal, housing could not be a normal 
good.56 Indifference curve ??? must therefore be steeper than ??? when housing 
consumption equals ?? and optimal housing consumption at the higher income level 
must exceed ??. This second result ensures that, in equilibrium, a householdǯs 
                                                          
56 Note that for this conclusion the nonlinearity of the budget constraint does not matter. 
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position in the income distribution is reflected in its position in the housing stock, 
even if the housing price function is nonlinear.  
Earlier in this section, we introduced the income and housing distributions. The 
result just reached tells us that there is an intimate relationship between the two 
distributions. Consider the situation in which the number of households is, at least, as 
large as the housing stock: ? ? ?. Then only the households with the highest income 
will be able to live in a house. The remaining households ?? ? ?? can be interpreted 
as potential households, which will only be formed if the situation on the housing 
market permits. Alternatively, the housing stock ? may refer to a part of the housing 
market only, for instance owner-occupied dwellings. We will use the latter example in 
what follows. 
Let ?? be the lowest income of households with an owner-occupied house. The 
results just derived imply that the household with this income lives in the house of 
the lowest quality ???? and pays the lowest price ???????. Similarly, the household 
with the highest income ???? lives in the house with the highest quality and pays the 
highest price for housing. More generally, we can order the incomes of the 
homeowners from low to high and we can similarly order the quality of the houses 
from low to high. The order of the incomes must be the same as the order of the 
housing qualities. We can therefore determine the pairs of incomes and housing 
qualities that must match. We denote the income ? that is associated with housing 
quality ? as ????. 
The relationship between income and housing consumption implies: 
 ???????? ? ?????? ? ????,  (6.9) 
which follows from our earlier result that housing consumption is increasing in 
income. We use the more convenient notation ???? ? ????? ? ?????? for the part of 
the income distribution that refers to households with positive housing consumption. 
Using this notation, we can rewrite Equation 6.9 as: 
 ???? ? ?????????.   (6.10) 
This gives the relationship between income and housing consumption in this model. 
Note that it could be determined on the basis of some general properties of the 
allocation process and that the role of prices is not yet made explicit. For later 
reference, we note that (6.10) implies: 
 
?????
?? ?
????
???????, 
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where ???? ? ?? ???  and ???? ? ?? ??? , that is ? and ? are the densities associated 
with the distributions ? and ?, respectively. 
 
6.2.3 MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND THE CURVATURE OF THE HEDONIC PRICE FUNCTION 
In a market equilibrium each household must be on demand curve (Equation 6.7) and 
the implied combination of income and housing consumption should satisfy Equation 
6.10. That is, in market equilibrium we can rewrite Equation 6.7 as: 
 ????? ? ? ????? ? ???? ? ???? ?
??
?? ??.  (6.11) 
Substitution of Equation 6.10 into Equation 6.11 gives: 
 ????? ? ? ????? ? ????????? ? ???? ?
??
?? ??.  (6.12)  
This equation defines the market equilibrium in the model. 
We will now characterize the nonlinearity of the hedonic price function. To do so, 
we focus on its second derivative of the hedonic price function, which gives the 
change in the marginal price of housing. With a linear hedonic price function, this 
second derivative equals 0, but in general it will, of course, be nonzero. Our main 
result is the following: 
 
Proposition 1 In market equilibrium the second derivative of the hedonic price 
function is: 
 
???
??? ?
??
??
????
????????? ??
????????
??
???
,  (6.13) 
with ? ? ????? ??? , the marginal price of housing services. 
 
To show this, we differentiate the equilibrium demand function (Equation 6.12) 
with respect to q. The result is: 
 ?? ? ???? ?
????
??????? ?? ? ??
??
?? ?
??
?? ? ?
???
???? ??? ?
??
??
???
??? ??. (6.14) 
After removing the terms that cancel and collecting the remaining terms, this gives: 
 ? ? ????
????
??????? ? ?
??
?? ? ?
??
???
???
???. (6.15) 
Solving this equation for ??? ????  gives Equation 6.13. 
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To interpret Equation 6.13, observe that the expression between brackets in the 
denominator is the Slutsky term of the demand equation for housing. It is negative if 
the demand for housing is consistent with utility theory. Assuming this condition is 
satisfied, we conclude that the proposition says that the hedonic price function is 
linear when: 
 
??
??
??
?? ?
??
??. (6.16) 
This can be interpreted as a local equilibrium condition that holds when the housing 
stock and the income distribution are balanced. In other words, the density of 
households with a particular income level ? is matched perfectly with the density of 
houses that have the quality level ? demanded by these households at the prevailing 
marginal price of housing. The hedonic price function is (strictly) convex when: 
 
??
??
??
?? ?
??
??, (6.17) 
and strictly concave when: 
 
??
??
??
?? ?
??
??. (6.18) 
To see what this means, observe that the densities on left-hand sides of 
Equations 6.17 and 6.18 give numbers of houses and the densities on the right-hand 
side numbers of households. The slopes of the Engel curve, that also appear on the 
left-hand sides translate the number of houses into corresponding numbers of 
households. The houses whose number is indicated on the left are those demanded by 
the households whose number is indicated on the right, and if the translation of 
houses into households results in equal numbers on both sides of the equation, the 
hedonic price function is linear. If not, the hedonic price function must be nonlinear in 
order to match all households to houses.  
If Equation 6.17 holds there are more dwellings available than needed for the 
households to be on their demand curve if the marginal price is fixed. Equilibrium can 
therefore only be realized in this part of the stock when the marginal price changes. 
More precisely, the marginal price must increase in order to slow down the increase 
of demand with income so that all houses in this part of the stock will be demanded. 
Indeed, Equation 6.13 implies that ??? ???? ? ? in this case. In the alternative case 
(Equation 6.18), analogous reasoning shows that the hedonic price function is 
concave. 
Since we have assumed that housing is a normal good, and ????? ???  is 
nonnegative, the value of the numerator on the right hand side of Equation 6.12 
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has -1 as its lower bound. This implies that there is also a bound on the possible 
concavity of the hedonic price function (i.e. on the absolute value of ??????? 
whenever it is negative), whereas there is no such upper bound on the convexity. To 
see what the upper bound on the concavity implies, we consider the Hicksian demand 
curve for housing ?? ? ???? ??. If we move along this demand curve, we have: 
?? ? ???? ??? ??? or ?? ??? ? ?????? ??? ?. Now observe that ? is the slope of the 
indifference curve corresponding to the Hicksian demand, and that ?? ???  is the 
second derivative of this indifference curve. This second derivative equals 
?????? ??? ??, which is minus the upper bound of ???????. We conclude therefore 
that the concavity of the hedonic price function is bounded by the convexity of the 
indifference curve. That is, ? ???? cannot be more convex than the indifference curve 
to which it is tangent. 
This is illustrated in Figure 6.4. The figure shows a non-linear budget line, which is 
partly convex, because the hedonic price function is partly concave. However, in the 
optimum, the convexity of the budget line is less than that of the indifference curves. 
The highest indifference curve that can be reached touches the budget line: the two 
have just a single point in common. The budget line is less convex than the 
indifference curve. 
 
 
Figure 6.4. A locally concave hedonic price function for housing 
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6.3 INCOME SHOCKS AND HOUSE PRICES 
6.3.1 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
To see what the model implies about the effects of income shocks, we consider a 
change in the distribution from ????? to ?????, while we assume that the housing 
stock remains unchanged. We consider a shift to the right of the income distribution 
to investigate the possibility of the model to explain the phenomenon that motivated 
this paper. The case of interest is one which all incomes change by the same 
percentage, but we start by considering the somewhat simpler one in which all 
incomes change by the same amount. We assume that the housing stock remains 
unchanged. 
With an equal change in all incomes ???? ? ?? ? ?????, where ? denotes the 
common change in income and we have used super fixes to distinguish the two 
density functions. The matching of households to houses requires that households 
with income ? ? ? now inhabit houses formerly used by households with income ?. 
Since ???? ? ?? ? ????? the ratio ???????????? in Equation 6.13 remains unchanged for all 
?. The curvature of the hedonic price function may nevertheless change when the 
higher income (at a given value of ?) affects the slopes of the Engel curve or the 
demand curve (or both). Although general statements cannot be made, it seems likely 
that the absolute value of the Slutsky term will decrease, which would imply more 
curvature of the hedonic price function. In other words, if the hedonic price function 
was concave it becomes more concave, if it was convex it becomes more convex. If the 
slope of the Engel curve also decreases, this would strengthen the impact on 
concavity, and counteract the impact on convexity. 
Now consider the situation in which all incomes increase with the same 
percentage:  ?????? ? ????? for some ? ? ?. Matching of the households to the 
housing stock now requires that households with income ?? occupy the houses 
formerly inhabited by households with income ?. Moreover, we must have 
?????? ? ?????? ? ?????,  which tells us that the term 
????
???????? in Equation 6.13 now 
increases. This makes the hedonic price function more convex in the sense that it 
increases the value of the second derivative of this function. 
The slope of the Engel curve and the Slutsky term may change also in this case, and 
this complicates the picture of course. It seems likely that the absolute value of the 
Slutsky term decreases when income changes, but the slope of the Engel curve may 
also decrease. Since the latter phenomenon counteracts the movement towards a 
more convex price function we look at it in some detail. The net change in the 
numerator of the right-hand side of  Equation 6.13 remains positive after all incomes 
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increase with a factor ? ? ? if ???????? ?
?
?
?????
?? . It can be shown that this inequality is 
fulfilled if 
???????
??? ? ?
?????
??
?
?. This shows that some concavity of the Engel curve for 
housing is compatible with a price function that becomes more convex after an 
income shock. It is not difficult to verify that the linear and loglinear Engel curves 
satisfy this criterion. Concluding, we may state: 
 
Proposition 2 If the absolute value of the Slutsky term is non-increasing in income and 
the Engel curve for housing services is not too concave in the sense that ?
??????
??? ?
????????
?
?, then a proportional increase in all incomes causes the second derivative of the 
house price function to increase everywhere. 
 
6.3.2 A LINEAR EXAMPLE 
To illustrate the model further, we consider an example. Assume that preferences are 
such that the demand function for housing is linear: 
 ? ? ? ? ?? ? ??, (6.19) 
and that the distributions of income and housing stock are uniform: 
 ???? ? ????????,  (6.20) 
 ???? ? ??????????. (6.21) 
The maximum income should be small enough to keep the Slutsky term of the linear 
demand function (Equation 6.19) negative, as is required by economic theory. 
Equation 6.13 implies: 
 
???
??? ?
? ??????????????????
??????? . (6.22) 
Differential Equation 6.22 can be solved as: 
 ???? ? ??????? ? ??? ? ???????? ? ??? ?? ? ?????  
 ?? ? ??? ?? ? ????? ? ?????? ?
????
????????, (6.23) 
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where ? ? ????????????????? It is clear from Equation 6.23 that the second derivative of the 
hedonic price function equals 0 if ?? ? ?, and in that case Equation 6.23 simplifies to: 
 ???? ? ??????? ? ????????? ? ?????.  (6.24) 
We can compute the value of ??????? from the requirement that the owner-
occupying household with the lowest income chooses the house with the lowest 
quality: 
 ???? ? ? ? ????????? ? ??????  (6.25) 
This gives ??????? ? ????? ? ? ? ????????. The value of ??????? is determined by 
the requirement that the owner-occupying household with the lowest income should 
be able to reach the same level of utility in rental housing. 
The linear hedonic is, of course, a special case. If ?? ? ? the coefficient for 
?? ? ????? in the second term of ???? is a constant that is larger than ???????, and 
the third term is non-zero. If ?? ? ? this third term is negative and convex. If ?? ? ? 
the coefficient for ?? ? ????? is smaller than ???? and the third term is positive and 
concave. 
A simple numerical example can be constructed as follows. The parameters of the 
demand function are chosen as: ? ? ?? ? ? ??? ? ? ????. Incomes are between 
???? ? ?? and ???? ? ???. This implies that the Slutsky term ? ? ?? varies 
between -1.9 and -1. Housing quality varies between ???? ? ? and ???? ? ??. The 
market is equilibrated by a linear hedonic price function that passes through the 
origin. The price per unit of housing services equals 6.5. 
If all incomes increase with 1 unit, the market is equilibrated by a unit price 6.55 
for housing services. This requires that the price of the owner-occupied house of 
minimum quality now also has a price 6.55. This might be due to an increase in rent 
that parallels the increase in user costs. If rents remain unchanged, and the price of 
the lowest quality owner-occupied house is constant at 6.5, the new marginal price of 
housing is slightly higher: 6.5526. The hedonic price function is still a straight line, 
but it does not pass through the origin. 
If all incomes increase by 5%, the hedonic price function is no longer linear. The 
marginal price increases from 6.525 for ? ? ???? to 6.846 for ? ? ???? when it is 
assumed that the user cost of the smallest owner occupied house also increases 
to 6.525. Again, results are slightly different when the price of this house is kept 
constant. The results for decreases in incomes are, of course, similar but in the 
opposite direction. 
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(a) The hedonic price function  (b) The marginal price of housing services 
Figure 6.5. Hedonic price functions and marginal prices 
 
Figure 6.5 illustrates the model for the 20% changes in income and all other 
parameters identical to those we just discussed. Panel (a) shows the hedonic price 
functions in the original situation (in which it is linear), and with the higher and lower 
incomes, whereas panel (b) pictures the marginal prices in each of the three 
situations. 
The results just shown for a specific case can be generalized to arbitrary linear 
demand curves. First consider a change in the income distribution by which all 
incomes grow with the same absolute number ??. The income change implies that the 
demand for housing quality of each household increases with ???. This implies that 
demand for the lowest quality houses disappears completely, while there is now 
demand for houses of a somewhat higher quality than the maximum currently 
available in the market.  The old equilibrium thus no longer holds. To find the new 
one, note first that ???? and ?? both increase by ??, which implies that ? will not 
change. This tells us that if the hedonic price function were linear in the original 
situation, it will again be so in the new equilibrium. Also if it were convex or concave, 
this will not change.  
Assuming a linear hedonic price function in the original situation, we know that 
the new equilibrium price ??? must satisfy ???? ? ? ? ???? ? ???? ? ???. From this it 
is easy to compute that ??? ? ?? ? ?? ?????? , where ???denotes the original 
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equilibrium price. This means that the prices of all housing qualities increase 
proportional to their quality. In other words, incomes change by the same number 
but house prices with the same percentage. Note also that in this example all 
households remain in the same dwelling. All that changes is that a higher price has to 
be paid for these dwellings. And there is, of course, a wealth effect for the owners of 
the houses. 
Now consider the effect of a proportional change in all incomes, where all incomes 
change by the same percentage. This means that the difference between ???? and ?? 
increases, and therefore the value of ? changes. If the hedonic price function is linear 
in the original situation, it will be convex in the new one when incomes increase, and 
concave when incomes decrease. Proportional changes in incomes will therefore lead 
to changes in house prices that are not proportional to quality. The relative change in 
the housing price will be largest for the highest quality dwellings. This will probably 
stimulate the supply of high quality dwellings. 
 
6.3.3 SOLVING THE MODEL IN THE GENERAL CASE 
To see how the model can be used with an arbitrary demand curve, return to 
Equation 6.11, which we repeat here: 
 ????? ? ? ????? ? ???? ? ???? ?
??
?? ??. (6.26) 
We assume that the distributions of income and housing are known. This allows us to 
find the matching function ???? and therefore the income that corresponds to the 
housing of minimum quality, ?? ? ???????. At this minimum income a household 
must be indifferent between the owner-occupied housing of minimum quality and its 
substitute, for instance rental housing. This allows us to determine the price of the 
lowest quality housing, ???????. Imposing the condition that this household is on its 
demand curve gives the marginal price, ???????. This brings us in a position in which 
we can use standard methods for solving differential equations, for instance Eulerǯs 
method, to trace out the complete hedonic price function ????. 
 
6.3.4 HETEROGENEITY IN PREFERENCES 
Until now we have only considered heterogeneity in incomes. To deal with a situation 
in which actors can also differ in tastes we now generalize the model to a situation in 
which the utility function is ???? ?? ??, where ? is a possible vector valued variable that 
indicates taste heterogeneity. We assume a simultaneous density function ????? ??. 
Demand for housing can be written as ? ? ????? ?? ??. The consumer is a homeowner 
when the maximum utility of owning exceeds that of renting and we denote the set of 
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combinations ??? ?? for which this is the case with a given hedonic price function as 
???????. 
The distribution of the demand for housing at a given hedonic price function will 
be denoted as ???? ?????. It is defined as: 
 ???? ????? ? ? ????? ???????????????????
????? ?????
 . (6.27) 
The distribution of houses is denoted as before as ????. A price equilibrium is a 
housing price function ???? for which: 
 ???? ????? ? ???? for all ???????? ?????. (6.28) 
This implies: 
 ???? ????? ? ???? for all ???????? ?????,  (6.29) 
where ??? ? ? ?? ??? . A given demand for housing services ? can be generated by 
different combinations of ? and ? and we can write the income that generates ? as a 
function of ? by inverting the demand function: 
 ? ? ???? ? ?? ? ???? ?? ??. (6.30) 
Using this, we can write: 
 ???? ????? ? ? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ???? ?? ??? ?????????????????
????? ?????
. (6.31) 
This can be used to find an expression for ??? ? from a demand function and the 
simultaneous distribution of income and the taste heterogeneity parameter. 
Numerical techniques can then be used to find the equilibrium price function. For the 
special case of a linear demand function, we introduce taste heterogeneity as a 
random intercept: 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ??. (6.32) 
This allows one to summarize all heterogeneity in a scalar ? ? ? ? ?? ?. The 
distribution of ? can be derived from the simultaneous density ????? ??, and then one 
can proceed as in the example given above. However, in this model there is no longer 
a strict one-to-one relationship between income and housing consumption. 
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6.4 DIVERGING HOUSE PRICES IN AMSTERDAM 
To estimate the divergence of house prices, we focus on what we regard as a crucial 
property of the model developed above: the ranking of houses on the basis of housing 
services is identical to that on the basis of prices. This ranking therefore reveals 
information about the housing services that we will exploit this information to 
develop a measure of housing services. Once we have this measure, we can compare 
the increase in price for any level of housing services. 
The data we use are provided by the Dutch Association of Real Estate Agents 
(NVM). It contains a large share (between 60 and 75%) of owner-occupied house 
transactions in the Netherlands. We have information on the exact location of those 
houses, their characteristics, as well as the transaction price. The dataset includes a 
whole list of structural characteristics of the sold houses, such as floor space (in m2), 
number of rooms, type of house, garden, parking, monument status, the year of 
construction, et cetera.57 We focus on the transactions in the municipality of 
Amsterdam between 1995 and 2009. During most of this period the Dutch economy 
was growing and house prices increased.    
 
6.4.1 ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
A major difficulty in applying the model developed in the previous section is that we 
cannot observe housing services. The purchase price of a house is, in this framework, 
the product of a unit price and a number of housing services. If, in a given market and 
period, the unit price is equal for all houses, differences in the purchase price are 
proportional to differences in the quantity of housing services. Changes in price over 
time or space can be estimated by comparing house prices of similar houses in 
different periods or markets as is done with Ǯhedonicǯ price indices. However, if the 
assumption of a constant unit price in a given market and period is dropped, things 
become less clear.    
We assume that housing services are a function of observed and unobserved 
housing characteristics: 
 ? ? ???? ? ?.  (6.33) 
In this equation ? is a vector of observed housing characteristics, and ? is a random 
variable that reflects the unobserved characteristics. An elementary property of out 
model is that in each market and in each period the house prices is a monotone 
increasing function of the number of housing services provided by the house. This 
implies that the ranking of houses on the basis of price reflects the ranking on the 
                                                          
57 In the analysis, we exclude transactions with prices above ̀1.5 million or below ̀25,000. We also 
exclude transactions that have a floor space higher than 1,000 m2 or lower than 10 m2. 
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basis of the number of housing services, although the strict proportionality of the 
Muth (1960) model is lost. We thus have: 
 ?? ? ?? ?? ??????? ? ?? ? ????? ? ??, (6.34) 
where the suffixes i and j denote arbitrary houses observed on the same market and 
in the same period. To be able to estimate the function ? that links housing 
characteristics to housing services, we assume that ??  is extreme value type I 
distributed and apply the results of Beggs, Cardell & Hausman (1981). We have 
observations on prices and housing characteristics for a number of years ? ? ??? 
and we order the observations within each year on the basis of their prices: the most 
expensive house in year ? is indexed 1,??, et cetera. The likelihood of observing the 
actual ranking of these houses on the basis of the prices in year ? is then given as: 
 ?? ? ?
????
? ????????
?????
? ????????
?????
? ???????? ?
??????????
???????????????????, (6.35) 
where ???? denotes the number of observations in year ?. We pool the observations 
for all years and maximize the likelihood of all observations: 
 ? ? ? ???  .  (6.36) 
This means that we use the same specification of the housing services function ??? ? in 
all periods. Moreover, we specify ??? ? as being linear in the parameters to be 
estimated: 
 ???? ? ? ???????? . (6.37) 
This specification of housing quality is consistent with what is often used in hedonic 
price equations. However, it can be argued that this is a bit too restrictive, because the 
attractiveness of neighborhoods, which is part of the housing services, can change 
over time due to changes in household composition, shopping possibilities, et cetera. 
We have therefore estimated two variants of the one: one in which all coefficients are 
assumed to be constant over time, and a second in which we allow the coefficients for 
neighborhood dummies to be year-specific. 
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Table 6.1. Summary statistics for house transactions in Amsterdam 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Transactions (in euros)      254,975       170,158         25,900   1,500,000  
Floor space (m2) 90.10 43.38 10 919 
Rooms (#) 3.27 1.30 1 10 
Distance to city center (km) 3.89 2.18 0.26 11.66 
Detached house (ref: standard house) 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Corner house (ref: standard house) 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Semidetached house (ref: standard house) 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Apartment (ref: standard house) 0.87 0.34 0 1 
Balcony 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Dormer 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Terrace 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Private parking 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Garden 0.99 0.12 0 1 
Well-maintained garden 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Bad inside maintenance 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Bad outside maintenance 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Monument 0.03 0.18 0 1 
1 Centrum 0.16 0.36 0 1 
2 Slotervaart en Overtoomse Veld 0.05 0.21 0 1 
3 Zuidoost 0.06 0.24 0 1 
4 Oost en Watergraafsmeer 0.06 0.24 0 1 
5 Amsterdam Oud-Zuid 0.04 0.20 0 1 
6 Zuideramstel 0.05 0.22 0 1 
7 Westerpark 0.07 0.26 0 1 
8 Oud-West 0.03 0.18 0 1 
9 Zeeburg 0.05 0.22 0 1 
10 Bos en Lommer 0.04 0.20 0 1 
11 De Baarsjes 0.06 0.24 0 1 
12 Amsterdam-Noord 0.07 0.26 0 1 
13 Geuzenveld en Slotermeer 0.16 0.37 0 1 
14 Osdorp 0.09 0.28 0 1 
          
 
 
136 |  Chapter 6 
Once we have a measure of housing services, we can proceed to estimate the 
housing price function ????. One difficulty that emerges is that the proper argument 
of this function is ? ???????? ? ??, while we do not have information about the last 
term, ??. Since the price function is in general nonlinear, it is not of much help that we 
can assume that the expected value of ?? equals 0. However, it helps if we can assume 
that the median of this variable equals 0, because the median of ??? ???????? ? ??? 
equals ??? ???????? ?. We will thus estimate ???? by quantile (median) regression.  
 
6.4.2 RESULTS: HOUSING SERVICES AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS 
Estimation results for the housing services function ???? are reported in Table 6.2. 
The observations refer to the years 1995 to 2011. The number of available 
observations increased gradually over the years. In order to keep estimation 
tractable, we imposed a maximum of 2,000 on the number of observations to be used 
per year. If the number of available observations was larger, we randomly drawn 
fraction of the available observations. Most coefficients for housing characteristics 
have the expected sign and most of them are highly significant. 
The estimation results for the neighborhood dummies also show patterns that 
confirm expectations based on prior knowledge. We used the center as the reference 
in each period. Figure 6.6 shows three examples. Amsterdam Zuidoost is a residential 
area that was developed in the heydays of modernism with a large share of rental 
housing. It gained a bad reputation in the 1980s and in the 1990s there was a large 
restructuring effort, some of the high-rise buildings were turned down and high 
quality owner-occupied housing was constructed. Panel a) suggests that the 
operation was to some extend successful. Amsterdam Oud-Zuid dates back to the 
late 19th and early 20th century. Notwithstanding the age of the houses, it is still a 
popular residential area and a reputation that is constant over time, as panel b) 
confirms. The area to the north of the river IJ was mainly industrial until the 1960s. 
Recently plans to connect the neighborhood better to the part of the city below the IJ 
river appear to make the neighborhood more attractive. The large negative outlier for 
the year 2007 is remarkable. 
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Table 6.2. Estimation results for housing services 
Variables (1) (2) 
Floor space (m2) 0.020 (0.0002) *** 0.019 (0.0001) *** 
Rooms (#) 0.326 (0.006) *** 0.334 (0.0056) *** 
Distance to city center (km) -0.052 (0.0067) *** -0.028 (0.0063) *** 
Detached house (ref: standard house) 0.143 (0.0593) ** 0.144 (0.0538) *** 
Corner house (ref: standard house) 0.263 (0.0387) *** 0.302 (0.0355) *** 
Semidetached house (ref: standard house) 1.023 (0.0641) *** 1.058 (0.0605) *** 
Apartment (ref: standard house) -0.272 (0.0226) *** -0.217 (0.0209) *** 
Balcony 0.011 (0.012) 0.010 (0.0111) 
Dormer 0.287 (0.0401) *** 0.202 (0.036) *** 
Terrace 0.557 (0.02) *** 0.499 (0.019) *** 
Private parking 0.479 (0.0219) *** 0.586 (0.0209) *** 
Garden 0.818 (0.0457) *** 0.735 (0.043) *** 
Well-maintained garden 0.596 (0.0215) *** 0.502 (0.0198) *** 
Bad inside maintenance -0.669 (0.0186) *** -0.662 (0.0169) *** 
Bad outside maintenance -0.649 (0.0274) *** -0.594 (0.0242) *** 
Monument 0.252 (0.0305) *** 0.307 (0.0275) *** 
Neighborhood dummies YES - 
Neighborhood * Year dummies - YES 
Log likelihood -202,999 -205,557 
Observations 34,351 34,351 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at 90, 95 and 99% level are, respectively, 
indicated as *, ** and ***. The reference neighborhood is 1 Centrum. The other coefficients can be 
obtained by the author. 
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(a) Amsterdam Zuidoost 
 
(b) Amsterdam Oud-Zuid 
 
(c) Amsterdam-Noord 
Figure 6.6. Time specific estimates of neighborhood effects 
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6.4.3 RESULTS: THE HOUSE PRICE FUNCTION 
To investigate the relationship with convexity of the house price function, we carried 
out a median regression using a quadratic specification of the housing price 
function.58 We use the estimation results (specification 2 of Table 6.2) to compute the 
estimated value of housing services ???? ? ? ???????? , and use this as a regressor for 
the housing price function. The results are given in Table 6.3. The coefficient of the 
quadratic term indicates the convexity of the housing price function. It shows a clear 
upward trend which is summarized in Figure 6.7 that depicts the four year moving 
average of the coefficient for the quadratic term. 
In an attempt to get an even clearer picture, we have also carried out local linear 
quantile regressions of the housing price function. Bandwidth selection is based on 
minimizing the mean squared error. The results are shown in Figure 6.8. Since the 
impact of the recession that started in 2007 is clearly indicated, we split the result in 
two panels. The first refers to the years 1995 to 2007 and clearly shows the tendency 
of more luxury housing to increase more in price than more decent types of housing, 
which results in a strong increase in the convexity of the hosing price function 
throughout the period. The second panel shows that the convexity diminished after 
the year 2007, when the great recession started. Convexity decreased in 2008 
and 2009, a modest recovery followed in 2010, but in 2011 the level of house prices 
decreased in combination with an increase in convexity. 
 
  
                                                          
58 See, for example, Chapter 7 of Koenker (2005). 
140 |  Chapter 6 
 
 Diverging house prices and income shocks |  141 
 
 
Figure 6.7. Increasing convexity of the housing 
price function over time 
 
6.4.4 DISCUSSION 
Our estimation results show that during the period 1995 to 2007 house prices in 
Amsterdam increased while the housing price function tended to become more and 
more convex. After 2007, house prices decreased two years, and then followed a 
slight recovery and a new drop. The model developed in this paper suggests that this 
development could be caused by income shocks. To investigate this issue we should 
realize that economic theory suggests that it is not the current income as well as the 
permanent income that should be viewed as a determinant of housing demand. 
Permanent income reflects expectations with respect to future developments of 
income and it is generally thought that the development of consumption expenditure 
provides a better indication of the development of permanent income than does 
current income. Figure 6.9 shows the annual changes in consumption volume in the 
Netherlands in the period 1995 to 2011. For the years 1995 to 2007, it shows positive 
numbers except for the year 2003. A close inspection of panel a) of Figure 6.8 shows 
that this is reflected in an exceptional downward movement of the housing price 
function. The drop in consumption expenditure in 2006 is not reflected in a drop in 
house prices. And the drop in house prices in 2008 does not reflect a drop in 
consumption expenditure. However, in the years 2009 to 2011 there is close 
correspondence between the development of consumption expenditure and house 
prices. 
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(a) 1995-2007 
 
 
(b) 2007-2011 
Figure 6.8. Annual housing price functions (1995-2011) 
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Figure 6.9. Annual changes in consumption volume (1995-2011) 
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
This paper has proposed an explanation of the well-known phenomenon of diverging 
house prices by imposing a restriction on the malleability of housing capital in the 
conventional Muth (1960) model of housing services. Instead of a single market, there 
is now a continuum of markets for all the possible quality levels of housing. The 
housing price is an increasing function of the number of housing services and its 
curvature is determined by local supply and demand conditions. General conditions 
under which a proportional change in all incomes causes increasing convexity of the 
house price function were derived. 
Our empirical application assumes that house prices are a stable function of 
housing characteristics, where only neighborhood quality is allowed to change over 
time. Our model implies that the ranking of houses on the basis of price reflects the 
ranking on the basis of housing services and we use this property to estimate the 
number of housing services as a function of the housing characteristics. Using the 
results of this analysis, we investigate the development of the convexity of the 
housing price function. We find a gradual increase in the boom period 1995-2007 and 
a decrease followed by a weak recovery in the period 2007-2011. 
There is a close correspondence between the development of the convexity of the 
housing price function and that of consumption volume, which supports the 
hypothesis that the development of permanent income drives that of hose prices. 
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 7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 SUMMARY 
This dissertation focuses on the themes of location choice of households, the 
economic valuation of cultural heritage, and the housing market in the Netherlands. 
In the introduction, we set out several research questions that were investigated in 
the different chapters. The answers to these research questions will be discussed in 
this summary. 
We start to explore the area of sorting models with application to house prices, 
location choices and amenities within a wider context of heterogeneous household 
preferences. We discuss two types of models that are mostly used in the literature. 
These are the so-called vertical sorting models, extensively used by Epple & Sieg, and 
horizontal sorting models, developed by Bayer and co-authors. In both types of 
models, the main focus is to investigate the demand for housing in different 
neighborhoods by heterogeneous households. In this way, one goes a step further 
than the conventional hedonic price analysis, where house prices are the starting 
point of the hedonic analysis. In the sorting framework, the house prices are an 
outcome of the analysis. The model explicitly explains the interaction of demand and 
supply that results in a price equilibrium and it accounts for unobserved location 
characteristics and heterogeneous household preferences. In addition, we propose 
ways to extend the models reviewed. These involve the development of dynamic 
sorting models for household location behavior, taking into account important 
aspects of choice, such as moving costs and life-cycle components. 
We deal with the first research question in Chapters 3 and 4. It is formulated as 
follows: What is the contribution of cultural heritage to the location choice of 
households? We use municipalities and neighborhoods as our spatial units. We 
investigate the impact of cultural heritage on the attractiveness of cities by analyzing 
the location choice of Dutch households. Although the Netherlands is a small country, 
it has a very rich cultural background. A prime example, to which our empirical work 
refers, is the historic city centers of the towns. Some date as far back as to the 17th 
century Ȃ the Dutch Golden Age Ȃ or earlier. We use a horizontal sorting model to 
estimate the WTP of different types of households for living in or close to a historic 
city center. We find that, in terms of house prices, the MWTP for historic city centers 
is large and significant (̀5,495/km2) on the municipal level. This implies that, ceteris 
paribus, houses in a municipality with one square kilometer of historic city center are 
̀5,495 more expensive than houses in a municipality without a historic city center. 
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This includes the multiplier effect that cultural heritage has over other (endogenous) 
amenities, such as restaurants, shops, et cetera. On the neighborhood level, where we 
focus on the Amsterdam area, the MWTP is larger (̀41,619/km2). This is evident as 
the neighborhood covers fewer houses. Also note that the largest neighborhood in the 
historic city center is 1.08km2, whereas the municipality can cover the whole historic 
city center which is around 7km2 for Amsterdam. With average house prices in the 
Amsterdam area of ̀210,000 (in 2009), this implies that neighborhoods with one 
square kilometer of historic city center are ̀41,619 more expensive than houses in a 
neighborhood without a historic city center. This implies that the total effect of one 
square kilometer of historic city center explains, on average, almost 20% of the house 
prices in those neighborhoods. In our knowledge, this is the first empirical evidence 
about the impact of cultural heritage on the attractiveness of cities. This suggests that 
the success of a city does not only depend on the location of the job and accessibility 
to transport facilities, but also on cultural heritage. 
We also investigate the heterogeneity of household preferences. For instance, we 
find that power couples and highly educated singles have a higher MWTP for historic 
city centers (of approximately +2% and +5%, respectively) than the average 
household. This implies that municipalities with a large area of historic city center 
attract highly educated households relative to the average household, but not by a 
large amount. However, it also seems important for highly educated households to 
live in areas that have high wages and good accessibility to intercity stations. We also 
do the analysis for the Amsterdam area where we include income and the social 
economic category of the household. We provide strong evidence that the multiplier 
effect of the historic city center exists. The results suggest that high income 
homeowners are not only attracted to the historic city center but also to a high 
concentration of high income households in the neighborhood. This increases the 
concentration of high income households in the neighborhood, which further attracts 
more high income homeowners.  We also find that students who can afford to buy a 
house prefer to live in the historic city center. 
Furthermore, we extend the sorting framework by incorporating spatial spillover 
effects. We account for both observed and unobserved characteristics of surrounding 
locations. We show that the impact of having a historic city center extends outside the 
border of the municipality in which it is located. We find positive and significant 
effects if we include the historic city center within a certain distance. In other words, 
it has the potential to improve the attractiveness of a wider area, for example the 
region. We argue that it is important to incorporate these spatial spillovers effects in 
the research of location behavior. The same is found on the neighborhood level in the 
Amsterdam area. 
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Finally, we make advantage of the general equilibrium property of the sorting 
framework to show how house prices react to changes in the spatial distribution of 
cultural heritage. This counterfactual analysis shows that if cultural heritage was 
evenly distributed over the municipalities in the Netherlands, house prices would fall 
by 17% in Amsterdam and 8% in Utrecht. Note that these figures refer to the overall 
effect that includes changes in other (endogenous) amenities. A similar counterfactual 
analysis is done for the neighborhoods in the Amsterdam area. We find that the 
standard house price of neighborhoods inside or close to the historic city center 
decreases substantially, but that the predicted prices are still higher than most other 
neighborhoods outside the city center. This is probably because of their favorable 
characteristics regarding their location close to other amenities. Considering all of the 
above, this suggests that cultural heritage (and its multiplier effect) have a large 
impact on the attractiveness of municipalities. 
The second research question is dealt with in Chapter 5 and is formulated as 
follows: What is the effect of urban redevelopment of brownfield sites on surrounding 
residential areas? We perform a case study on the Amsterdam Western gas factory to 
investigate the effects of brownfield redevelopment on surrounding residential areas. 
This former industrial (brownfield) site changed from a desolated and polluted area 
to an anchor point for cultural activities attracting creative and innovative industries. 
This probably had consequences for the attractiveness of surrounding 
neighborhoods. In line with Floridaǯs (2002) ideas, the media and local policy makers 
believe that the redevelopment of old factories could improve the quality of the 
surrounding neighborhoods. In this way, they found a policy tool to upgrade 
neighborhoods to attract highly educated residents and their employers, and tourists. 
However, the literature that links the redevelopment of an old factory and flourishing 
surrounding neighborhoods is scarce. In our knowledge, there is no literature that 
provides strong evidence that the revival of surrounding neighborhoods is caused by 
the redevelopment of Brownfield sites. Therefore, we investigate this issue and 
provide strong evidence that the price development of houses close to the Western 
gas factory were significantly higher than houses further away after the 
redevelopment of the Western gas factory. We report effects between 5 and 10% 
given the distance oneǯs house is located from the Western gas factory. This effect is 
only noticeable for houses within 600m of the Western gas factory. We show that the 
effect increases the first 300m, and decreases rapidly after 500m. 
We also show that the residential area north of the Western gas factory benefit as 
much as the residential area south of it. One could believe that the residential area 
north of the Western gas factory should have benefitted less from the redevelopment 
because the two areas are divided by a railway. We show that this is not the case. This 
148 |  Chapter 7 
suggests that the railway is not a barrier for spillovers caused by the redevelopment 
of the Western gas factory and that the effect is a proximity effect. 
The third research question is: What is the impact of income shocks in the price 
developments of houses of different quality? We deal with this research question in 
Chapter 6, where we first provide a theoretical framework that explains the price 
development of houses of different quality, and then provide empirical evidence. We 
develop a stylized model where there is perfect correlation between household 
income and housing quality (which can also be seen as a sorting mechanism). We 
then show that positive income shocks shift the housing demand from lower quality 
housing to higher quality housing. Given a fixed housing stock (which is a plausible 
assumption for the short run) a positive shock results in, relatively, more demand for 
higher quality housing and lower demand for lower quality housing. This results in an 
increase in convexity of the hedonic price function. In the empirical analysis, we 
provide strong evidence that the effect of income shocks can indeed explain the 
diverging price developments of low and high quality housing. We use the same data 
as in the previous chapter and we, therefore, investigate houses in Amsterdam. We 
exploit a crucial property of the theoretical model that the ranking of houses based on 
the housing services (quality measure of the house) is identical to the ranking of 
houses based on prices (perfect sorting process). Hence, we first estimate the number 
of housing services for each house in each year by exploiting the ranking. Next, we use 
the estimated number of housing services in a quadratic specification to explain the 
house prices. It is clear from the results that the housing price function became more 
convex between 1995 and 2007. When the prices dropped after those years, also the 
convexity of the housing price function decreased. The empirical results support the 
relevance of the theoretical model. 
 
7.2 RELEVANCE FOR POLICY 
It is well-known that cultural heritage is one of the most important drivers that is 
associated with a unique atmosphere in cities. It is less clear how that translates itself 
in direct and indirect benefits for society. We show that cultural heritage is an 
important factor that drives location choices of Dutch households. We find evidence 
that historic city centers in the own municipality and surrounding municipalities is an 
important driver of household location choice. This means that not only the 
municipality itself, but also surrounding municipalities, benefit from cultural heritage. 
We are aware that policy makers cannot create (authentic) cultural heritage but there 
is a clear policy suggestion implied in this chapter. The maintenance of cultural 
heritage and exposing it to visitors and residents can contribute substantially to the 
attractiveness of the area. 
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If the costs of maintaining cultural heritage would have to be financed completely 
by the municipality in which it is located, this would likely result in underinvestment 
because of spillover effects which we show are present. However, in the Netherlands, 
the national government is heavily involved in these activities and therefore this 
conclusion may not be valid. By determining a part of the benefits of cultural heritage, 
as we did in this dissertation, we could help policy makers to determine whether 
enough public money is spent on this amenity. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, we use somewhat rough measures for cultural heritage. We 
divide the conservation areas into historic city centers and historic sceneries. These 
areas get only selected after a thorough investigation and have to satisfy a large 
number of requirements. We expect that the atmosphere provided by cultural 
heritage is picked up by these different conservation areas. Where historic city 
centers seem to have a substantial impact on the municipality choice of households in 
the Netherlands, sensitivity analysis shows that historic sceneries seem not to be 
important for the location choice of the average household. The average household is 
a household where income, number of persons, and other household characteristics 
are set to the average value. This finding could be the result of using these rough 
measures for cultural heritage. It is also likely that households prefer cultural 
heritage more when other (important) factors of location choice are also present, 
such as the presence of a large labor market and good accessibility. 
The policy relevant information, which we just discussed, can be obtained due to 
exploiting the advantages of the sorting framework. The framework allows for much 
more detail than the conventional monocentric urban economic model and hedonic 
price analysis. The sorting framework adopts a general equilibrium perspective and 
puts conventional hedonic price analysis into a solid market equilibrium setting, 
while explicitly accounting for heterogeneity of preferences and unobserved 
characteristics. The welfare measures are one of the policy-relevant outcomes of 
these models, notably the WTP of different types of households for different 
neighborhood characteristics. This is of some interest because it shows whether 
certain types of households are attracted by certain types of amenities. They also 
allow for policy simulations, in which the general equilibrium impact of changes in 
neighborhood characteristics can be analyzed through counterfactual analysis. The 
fundamental point is that residential sorting models of household location can help 
policy makers better understand the mechanics of the housing market and the 
consequences of policy interventions.  
An advantage of the hedonic price analysis is that it needs less information than 
the sorting model presented in this dissertation. In case of the redevelopment of the 
Western gas factory, we investigate the house transactions of houses sold over 15 
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years. If one would prefer to use a sorting model to explain moversǯ behavior over all 
these years, one should have information on these houses and households over all 
these years. This information is for obvious reasons difficult to obtain. We therefore 
use a hedonic price analysis to investigate the effect of the redevelopment of the 
Western gas factory on surrounding residential areas. We find strong positive effects 
for houses within 600m of the Western gas factory between 2002 and 2009. The 
prices of these houses increased 5 to 10% more than houses further away. We 
attribute these numbers due to the redevelopment of the Western gas factory. A part 
of the wasteland of the old factory became a beautiful park and the real estate was 
renovated and housed many creative events. What we observed was that not only 
firms from the creative industry were attracted but also many other amenities, such 
as shops and restaurants. This again suggests that cultural amenities have some sort 
of multiplier effect. This multiplier effect increases the attractiveness of the 
surrounding neighborhoods even further. However, there is no literature on how the 
mechanism of the multiplier effect exactly works. In Chapter 4, we attempt to relate 
the preferences for demographic composition (in our case, the concentration of high 
income households) and the historic city center. We provide strong evidence that the 
multiplier effect of cultural heritage exists through attracting high income 
households. This would suggest that the historic city center also has a multiplier 
effect through its impact on other consumer amenities, such as shops, restaurants, et 
cetera. However, we do not provide evidence for this. 
 
7.3 FURTHER RESEARCH 
7.3.1 SORTING FRAMEWORK 
Although the literature on the sorting framework is relatively young, it has already 
made a substantial impact to our understanding of the urban housing market. In this 
dissertation, we have discussed the structure of these sorting models (Chapter 2) and 
provided examples of their application (Chapter 3 and 4). The main strengths of these 
models is that they allow for much more detail than the conventional monocentric 
urban economic model and hedonic price model. It deals with unobserved location 
characteristics and heterogeneity of preferences among households thereby 
enriching the possibilities for welfare and policy analysis.  
We expect future research on the structure of the sorting framework. An important 
issue is the sorting framework, as is presented in literature, is static whereas housing 
decisions are inherently dynamic. There is some recent work on this by Bayer 
et al. (2010) and Epple, Romano & Sieg (2010). Bayer et al. (2010) make an 
interesting attempt to introduce dynamics into a horizontal sorting model by allowing 
for forward-looking behavior of households with respect to house prices and moving 
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costs. The main problem of their estimation of the dynamic sorting framework is that 
it ignores the endogeneity of prices. In a static framework Ȃ as we use in Chapters 3 
and 4 Ȃ an instrumental variables strategy is used to control for the endogeneity issue 
between prices and unobserved characteristics of the location. The same 
instrumental variables strategy is not feasible if current prices are correlated with 
expected future utility. Epple, Romano & Sieg (2010) extend the vertical sorting 
framework to include moving costs and life-cycle components. The aim of their 
working paper is to study the intergenerational conflict over the provision of public 
education between younger households with children and older households without 
children. The extensions of the sorting framework enables them to predict the 
expenditures spent on education and other public goods in neighborhoods in the 
Boston Metropolitan Area, and which households will move to another neighborhood 
in the following period. In their conclusions, they argue that there is still scope for 
future work. For instance, relaxing assumptions, such as assuming there are only two 
periods and only two different types of households, would be interesting additions for 
future research on this topic. 
The extension towards dynamic models is, in our view, the most important 
example in which future research should focus on. However, there are many other 
possibilities and challenges ahead for sorting models.59 We hope to have made clear 
that, even in its present state of development, the literature on household location 
choice has made an important contribution to the understanding of the sorting 
mechanism and the effects of local amenities. The sorting framework enables policy 
makers to better understand the mechanics of the housing market and the 
consequences of policy interventions. We are convinced that more theoretical, as well 
as empirical, work in this area will be extremely useful. 
 
7.3.2 CULTURAL HERITAGE 
As we mentioned before, in the quantitative research we use rough measures of 
cultural heritage. The available data allowed us to distinguish the conservation areas 
into historic city centers and historic sceneries. We hope that in the future there will 
be more information on these conservation areas, so it will be possible to distinguish 
even more different types of cultural heritage. We are aware that this is very labor 
intensive. In return, this means that researchers can provide a more detailed 
overview of the benefits of different types of cultural heritage. This would 
considerably improve the research on the economic valuation of cultural heritage. 
                                                          
59 For an excellent survey on equilibrium sorting and its possibilities and challenges, see Kuminoff, 
Smith & Timmins (2010). 
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We mention the multiplier effect of cultural heritage in this dissertation. We argue 
that cultural heritage is an anchor point for economic activity. A cultural atmosphere 
attracts residents, firms and tourists. In this dissertation, we estimate the total effect 
of cultural heritage, including these multiplier effects. We do not exactly know how 
other amenities, such as shops and restaurants, are attracted by cultural heritage. We 
only know that they do as we can observe in many cultural cities. In Chapter 4, we 
provide the first steps to prove the existence of the multiplier effect of cultural 
heritage through demographic composition. To disentangle the multiplier effect from 
other effects would be an important aim with high policy relevance. A better 
understanding of the mechanism of the multiplier effect would substantially 
contribute to the understanding of the economic effects of cultural heritage. 
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 Samenvatting (Dutch summary) 
 
Locatiekeuze, cultureel erfgoed en woningprijzen 
 
De locatiekeuze van huishoudens heeft over de tijd veel veranderingen ondergaan. De 
opkomst van technologische ontwikkelingen en een voortdurend stijgende welvaart 
in de 20ste eeuw hebben ervoor gezorgd dat de werklocatie van de kostwinner steeds 
minder belangrijk geworden is voor de locatiekeuze van huishoudens. Waar men 
voorheen naar de stad ging om te werken (productie), zien we dat men steeds meer 
behoefte heeft aan voorzieningen (consumptie) in steden (Glaeser, Kolko & Saiz, 
2001). Voorzieningen voor consumenten die een woonlocatie aantrekkelijk maken 
zijn daardoor een grotere rol gaan spelen voor het vestigingsgedrag. 
Economen zijn geïnteresseerd in factoren die een verklarende rol spelen in de 
locatiekeuze van huishoudens, gezien het belang voor vele centrale kwesties in de 
toegepaste economie. In een groot deel van deze dissertatie richten wij ons op één 
specifieke locatiefactor: cultureel erfgoed. Cultureel erfgoed is van toegevoegde 
waarde voor het imago van een stad. Het erfgoed kan gezien worden als een publiek 
goed, dat de kwaliteit van leven in een stad verhoogd. Hoeveel het erfgoed bijdraagt 
aan de plaatselijke economie is moeilijk in euroǯs uit te drukken. Het is daarom 
belangrijk om te weten wat de omvang van de baten van cultureel erfgoed is om zo de 
kosten die gemaakt moeten worden te verantwoorden. In deze dissertatie richten wij 
ons op de berekening van de baten van cultureel erfgoed met betrekking tot de 
locatiekeuze van huishoudens. Met behulp van een econometrisch model die in de 
economische literatuur steeds meer bekendheid krijgen, genaamd het sorteermodel 
(zie bijvoorbeeld, Bayer, McMillan & Rueben, 2004; Kuminoff, Smith & Timmins, 
2010), kunnen wij de betalingsbereidheid schatten van verschillende typen 
huishoudens om in de nabijheid van stedelijk erfgoed te wonen. Verder heeft het 
sorteermodel andere unieke eigenschappen Ȃ en daarnaast ook een aantal 
beperkingen Ȃ die wij kritisch analyseren. 
Daarnaast toont deze dissertatie interesse in de herontwikkeling van industrieel 
erfgoed en de baten met betrekking tot het uitstralingseffect op de woonomgeving 
(met name naar de woningprijzen). Het industrieel erfgoed geeft een specifieke sfeer 
aan de omgeving en als daar goed op ingespeeld wordt, zoals gebeurd is bij de 
herontwikkeling van de Westergasfabriek in Amsterdam, kan dit positieve 
uitstralingseffecten hebben op de omliggende woonwijken. Literatuur over het 
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kwantificeren van deze baten is zeer gering. Meer kennis over de effecten van 
herontwikkeling zou van toepassing kunnen zijn voor toekomstige projecten. 
De woningprijzen spelen dus een belangrijke rol in het kwantificeren van bepaalde 
effecten waar economen in geïnteresseerd zijn. De mechanismes die de prijs van een 
woning bepalen zijn complex. Het zijn niet alleen de structurele eigenschappen van de 
woning, maar ook de locatie zelf die zeer belangrijk zijn voor de ontwikkelingen van 
de woningprijs. We zien daarom ook dat verschillende woningen, bijvoorbeeld 
woningen met een lage of hoge kwaliteit, verschillende prijsontwikkelingen hebben. 
Onderzoek naar het verklaren van deze verschillende prijsontwikkelingenen is 
schaars maar zeer belangrijk om stappen vooruit te zetten in het begrijpen van de 
woningmarkt. 
Deze dissertatie onderzoekt themaǯs rondom de locatiekeuze van huishoudens, de 
economische waardering van cultureel erfgoed en de woningmarkt in Nederland. 
Hoofdstuk 2 analyseert de huidige locatiekeuze modellen die veelal in de 
internationale economische literatuur worden gebruikt. De focus ligt niet alleen op 
beleidsrelevante vragen, maar ook op de economische inhoud van de modellen en de 
daarbij behorende econometrische vraagstukken. Het sorteermodel, dat in enkele 
andere hoofdstukken gebruikt wordt, komt hierin uitgebreid aan de orde. De analyse 
toont de voor- en nadelen aan van het gebruik van het sorteermodel in vergelijking 
met de hedonische prijsmethode en zet een onderzoeksagenda uit voor toekomstig 
werk. 
Hoofdstuk 3 gebruikt één van de sorteermodellen om empirisch te onderzoeken of 
cultureel erfgoed een belangrijke factor is voor de locatiekeuze van verschillende 
huishoudens. We doen dit door gegevens van huishoudens te combineren met 
kenmerken van elke gemeente in Nederland. Hierbij houden wij rekening met de 
geobserveerde en niet-geobserveerde kenmerken van de woonlocatie. We laten zien 
dat de aanwezigheid van historische stadscentra een belangrijke factor is voor de 
locatiekeuze van huishoudens. De historische binnensteden maken een stad dus 
aantrekkelijker en dat blijkt een impact te hebben op de woningprijzen van zowel de 
eigen gemeente als omliggende gemeenten. Met name, hoger opgeleiden hechten 
meer waarde aan de nabijheid van stedelijk erfgoed. Dit type huishouden vervult een 
spilfunctie in de huidige, op kennis gebaseerde economie. Het stedelijk erfgoed kan 
dus ingezet worden door locale overheden om deze doelgroep aan te trekken of te 
behouden. Dit hoofdstuk geeft ook inzicht op het prijseffect van cultureel erfgoed op 
de woningmarkt in Nederland. In een simulatie laten wij zien dat als cultureel erfgoed 
in heel Nederland gelijk verdeeld zou zijn (of vernietigd zou worden), er substantiële 
verschillen zouden zijn in woningprijzen (bijvoorbeeld, een afname in woningprijzen 
van gemiddeld 17% in Amsterdam en 8% in Utrecht). 
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Dezelfde econometrische strategie is gebruikt in Hoofdstuk 4 om de locatiekeuze 
van huishoudens met verschillende inkomens en sociaaleconomische status te 
verklaren. De focus is ditmaal op een lager schaalniveau, namelijk op buurtniveau, en 
op een kleinere keuzeset, namelijk op de gemeente Amsterdam en omliggende 
gemeenten. De resultaten van het vorige hoofdstuk worden hier ook ondersteund. 
Hogere inkomens lijken woonlocaties in de nabijheid van stedelijk erfgoed meer te 
prefereren dan het gemiddelde huishouden. Daarnaast vinden we ook dat deze hogere 
inkomens prefereren om bij elkaar te wonen. Er is dus ook sprake van een Ǯmultiplier 
effectǯ (het samenklonteren van voorzieningen die de aantrekkelijkheid voor bepaalde 
groepen huishoudens bevorderen). Eerst worden hogere inkomens aangetrokken 
vanwege het erfgoed en vervolgens worden er meer hogere inkomens aangetrokken 
vanwege de stijgende concentratie van hogere inkomens. Het is dus waarschijnlijk dat 
andere voorzieningen, zoals winkels, cafés en restaurants, hierdoor ook aangetrokken 
worden, waardoor de buurt nog aantrekkelijker wordt. Hier kan nog veel onderzoek 
naar gedaan worden. 
In hoofdstuk 5 analyseren we de woningprijsontwikkelingen tussen woonlocaties 
rondom de Westergasfabriek in Amsterdam. Er is ongeveer 65 miljoen euro 
geïnvesteerd in de herontwikkeling van de Westergasfabriek. Weinig 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek is gedaan naar de baten van dit soort 
herontwikkelingsprojecten. Het succes van een herontwikkelingsproject blijft niet 
alleen beperkt tot het bedrijfseconomische rendement van de ondernemers op het 
terrein, maar deze straalt ook uit op de omliggende woonwijken. We vinden dan ook 
dat de woningprijzen in de omliggende woonwijken Ȃ vooral sinds de voltooiing van 
het Westerpark en de renovatie in 2003 Ȃ sneller zijn gestegen dan elders in 
Amsterdam. We tonen aan dat de woningprijzen rondom de Westergasfabriek zo rond 
de 5 en 10% meer zijn gestegen, gegeven de afstand van de Westergasfabriek. Het 
effect stijgt de eerste 300 meter en neemt na 500 meter sterk af. We laten ook zien dat 
het spoor geen barrière is voor de effecten die we waarnemen. 
Hoofdstuk 6 begint met het uitzetten van een theoretisch raamwerk dat verschillen 
verklaart in woningprijsontwikkelingen van woningen van verschillende kwaliteit. We 
ontwikkelen een gestileerd model waarin er perfecte correlatie is tussen het inkomen 
van huishoudens en de kwaliteit van de woning (wat kan worden gezien als een 
sorteermechanisme). Daarna laten we zien dat positieve inkomensschokken Ȃ 
gegeven dat het aanbod vast staat (wat een geloofwaardige aanname is op de korte 
termijn) Ȃ tot gevolg heeft dat de vraag van woningen met hogere kwaliteit relatief 
meer toeneemt dan de vraag van woningen met lagere kwaliteit. Dit resulteert in een 
meer convexe woningprijsfunctie. Vervolgens wordt het theoretische model getest 
met woningmarktdata uit de omgeving van Amsterdam. In het empirische deel van dit 
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hoofdstuk wordt er gebruik gemaakt van een belangrijke eigenschap van het 
theoretische model, namelijk dat de ranglijst van woningen gebaseerd op de kwaliteit 
van de woning identiek is aan de ranglijst van woningen gebaseerd op hun prijs 
(perfecte sortering). De resultaten van het empirisch onderzoek laten duidelijk zien 
dat de woningprijsfunctie meer convex werd tussen 1995 en 2007 en vervolgens, 
tijdens de economische crisis, minder convex wordt. 
Kortom, het is van wetenschappelijk belang om te begrijpen hoe de mechanismen, 
die we hierboven hebben besproken, functioneren en te vertalen naar relevant beleid. 
Deze dissertatie beoogt de kennis over deze mechanismes te vergroten en antwoord 
te geven op beleidsrelevante vraagstukken. De contributie aan de huidige literatuur is 
gericht op het sorteermodel waarmee we de economische waardering van cultureel 
erfgoed voor Nederlandse huishoudens schatten. Vervolgens geven we inzicht in de 
herontwikkeling van industrieel erfgoed en de impact hiervan op de woningprijzen 
van omliggende woonwijken. Tot slot ontwikkelen we nieuwe ideeën die 
prijsontwikkelingen van woningen met verschillende kwaliteit verklaren.  
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The Tinbergen Institute is the Institute for Economic Research, which was founded in 
1987 by the Faculties of Economics and Econometrics of the Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, University of Amsterdam and VU University Amsterdam. The Institute is 
named after the late Professor Jan Tinbergen, Dutch Nobel Prize laureate in economics 
in 1969. The Tinbergen Institute is located in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The 
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